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Iraq: Speed of the essence
By
David Isenberg
In the aftermath of the defeat of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the possibility of a war
to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the logical
question, not that it is raised all that much, is what
happens next?
In this context, the old song "It
Ain't Easy" comes to mind. That, at least, is the
conclusion one draws from a briefing on post-war
occupation prepared by the US Army Center of Military
History.
The briefing was undertaken in light of
significant new troop demands in Afghanistan, previous
commitments in the Balkans, and potential peacekeeping
duties in Iraq. At a briefing given to this
correspondent last week, an army historian from the
center, located at the National Defense University in
Washington, DC, made the following points.
Occupations can be defined differently,
depending on circumstances and the nature of the
countries being occupied. The center has studied 16 past
occupations, or occupation-like missions, by US armed
forces; ranging from the decades-long mission in the
Philippines in the aftermath of the 1898
Spanish-American war, post-World War II experiences in
Germany and Japan, to northern Iraq in the aftermath of
Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Not all
occupations are the same. Aside from the "occupation per
se", occupying forces might be tasked with such missions
as "external defense, law and order, humanitarian relief
and nation-building;" the latter being a mission that is
definitely out of favor in the Bush administration, as
in its view nation building is an almost unlimited
mission. And, from a US army perspective, "humanitarian
relief and peacekeeping are not the major focus of our
missions", according to the center historian.
In
both Afghanistan and Iraq, external defense against the
political designs of neighbors could become significant
missions, as both countries have long figured
prominently in the foreign policies of neighboring
states.
According to the center's briefing,
different circumstances dictate different numbers. There
are several different considerations that must be taken
into account. These include demographics, socio-economic
conditions, collateral missions, strategic circumstances
and the availability of assistance, either internal or
external.
Demographics are a particularly
crucial variable. According to the center’s briefing,
"traditional" societies, which have lots of males in
their teens, twenties and thirties, frequently
unemployed, are more volatile and require more
occupation troops. The classic example of a large
occupation force is Vietnam. In 1969, Vietnamese armed
forces, as well as paramilitary forces, and those of the
United States and allies, totaled 1,663,300, for a
military/population ratio of 9.2 percent.
This
may be why at least some military officials are leery of
occupation missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. According
to the army historian, "You would recoil in horror if
you add up the numbers." According to the center’s
briefing, the number of troops required in Afghanistan,
which has a population of over 29 million, is over
300,000. In large part this is because Afghanistan is a
traditional tribal society, with no tradition of a
strong central government, and where law and order has
long been problematic. Iraq, on the other hand, with a
population of 18.5 million, would require about 100,000.
That is because Iraq is regarded as a modern society
with a robust infrastructure and oil wealth.
Some dismiss the 300,000 estimate as
exaggerated, arguing that nobody in Washington would
take the number seriously. But even assuming some help
from other countries, these are dire numbers; especially
for a military establishment that has cut its forces
structure about a third since the end of the Cold War.
And even if you have the initial number of
people, you have to train and retrain the troops that
would have the occupation mission. According to the
briefing, not all troops are appropriate for the job.
The initial occupying force is usually the combat force,
which does occupation-like duties. But that force still
has "combat hostility; they are front line troops not
interested in occupation duties". That is why you have
to create "constabulary" forces; often easier said than
done. For example, the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan has experienced significant
difficulties thus far in training a new Afghan army, and
it is regarded as unlikely that it will ever expand
beyond Kabul.
Even when the creation of
constabulary forces is possible, it is not a quick
process. From the beginning of the US occupation in the
Philippines in 1902, it was not until 1919 that the bulk
of constabulary duties were being done by native
Filipinos, according to the center's briefing.
On the other hand, the experience in Japan after
World War II was much better. There the population was
83,199,600, and US forces were only 92,538 for a
military/population ratio of 0.1 percent.
Ironically, nations which have been ruled by
dictators, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, may be easier
to occupy. "Dictatorships are easier to run, people are
used to following orders," according to the center’s
briefer.
This is born out by some of the
previous cases the center has studied. Japan, for
example, prior to World War II, was essentially a
military dictatorship. Similarly, South Korea, in the
immediate aftermath of World War II, under the rule of
Syngman Rhee, only required a 0.3 percent military
population ratio.
But given some of the goals
occupation forces are expected to accomplish, the
expectations may be too high. In Iraq, for example, many
conservative pundits have talked about making it into a
secular democratic state that would serve as an example
to other nations in the region. The center briefer said,
"When you have no tradition of true voting, to build
this out of total nothingness; historically, it is a
very difficult thing."
According to the
briefing, the prime imperative for an occupying force is
to divest itself of the mission as soon as possible.
According to the briefer, you need to "do everything
possible to work yourself out of a job".
That
may mean making unpleasant compromises. Already in
Afghanistan there have been instances where various
factions have sought to avenge long-standing grudges. It
is expected that if Saddam Hussein is overthrown in Iraq
there would be substantial bloodletting as various
Iraqis sought revenge for decades of oppression and
terror from the military and security forces.
But according to the briefer, with regard to
"those who want to take vengeance, you have to say, 'You
can't do that'. You have to call their bluff. As soon as
US civil forces start the mission they will be legally
responsible. You are responsible for law and order."
And, in so doing so, "you will have to deal with
unsavory characters".
For example, you may end
up having to use people who previously supported the
regime you defeated, such as the Allies did during World
War II with Vichy French leader Admiral Darlan in
Algeria. Or, even more infamously, General Reinhard
Gehlen, Hitler's chief of eastern front intelligence,
who buried his files and waited to be captured. He felt
certain that access to his files was an offer the
Americans couldn't refuse. He and his staff cut a deal
with the CIA and the Pentagon to absorb his networks and
his expertise. As part of the deal, Gehlen transferred
his organization (the "Gehlen Org") to West Germany in
1955, where he directed intelligence until his
retirement in 1968, and died in 1979.
When asked
what was the single most important thing he concluded
from the center’s studies of past occupations, the
briefer said, "It is not an easy thing; it is not to be
done lightly."
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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