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Iran and Kuwait close ranks
By
Hooman Peimani
On September 29, Kuwait's Defense
Minister Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak will pay an official
visit to Iran, its regional friend since the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait led to a thaw in their hostile
relations. Reacting to news connecting his visit to the
proposed American war against Iraq, the Kuwaitis have
described it as "previously arranged" and "unrelated to
the developments in the region". However, the Iraqis
have portrayed it as aimed at coordinating Iran-Kuwait
efforts "for their collaboration with a future American
war against Iraq".
Besides the historical
mistrust between Iraq and its neighboring Iran and
Kuwait, the visit to Kuwait of General Tommy L Franks,
commander of the American forces in the Persian Gulf,
Afghanistan and Central Asia, and his talks with Sheikh
al-Mubarak, have created grounds for such claim.
While both Iran and Kuwait are trying to explain
the visit as part of their efforts to expand bilateral
relations, there is little doubt, if any at all, that
the proposed American war and its impact on regional
security are major factors behind the visit. In fact,
there are indications of an emerging common stance among
Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on that war, a response to
the regional realities and the American determination to
attack Iraq with or without United Nations approval.
The opposition of Iran and Saudi Arabia to an
American war against Iraq is a well-known fact.
Undoubtedly, the two states are against the Iraqi regime
for its posing a threat to their security, as reflected
in its war against Iran (1980-88), in its 1990
occupation of Kuwait and threatening to invade Saudi
Arabia, and in its 1991 missile attack on Saudi cities.
However, they are worried about a future American war's
impact on the stability of the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf, including that of their own countries.
Also, they cannot accept its objective of regime change,
which, while undermining all explicit and implicit
international laws, regulations and agreements, would
set a precedent applicable to their countries as well.
Having troubled relations with the Americans creates
another disincentive for the Iranians.
The
Iranian and Saudi opposition to an American war against
Iraq has not been a secret, but Kuwait's opposition to a
war against the country, which invaded and annexed it in
1990, sounds surprising in the very outset.
Notwithstanding their apparent animosity towards the
Iraqi regime, the Kuwaitis share the Iranian and Saudi
concerns, while they, like the Saudis, are worried about
the long-term implications of their collaboration with
the Americans, should their war fail to achieve its
objectives. Alternatively, in case of success, the
uncertainty about the nature of the future regime and
its long-term policy towards Kuwait make the Kuwaitis
question the wisdom of a regime change. As the
proponents of Iraq's territorial claim to Kuwait are not
confined to the current Iraqi leaders and their Baath
Party, the Kuwaitis have every reason to fear the
reemergence of such a claim in the future. Potentially,
it could be even more dangerous than the one put in
practice in 1990, if it were made by an Iraqi regime on
good terms with the United States.
Thus, the
Kuwaitis have sought to follow a policy towards the
proposed American war to reflect their concerns, while
not alienating the Americans, who helped them regain
their occupied country a decade ago. They have subjected
their support of a war against Iraq to United Nations
approval. While hosting tens of thousands of American
military personnel, their uncertain consent to any
American use of their military bases in the event of war
has convinced the Americans to move the headquarters of
their forces stationed in the Persian Gulf from Kuwait
to Qatar.
The three Persian Gulf countries of
Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have reasons to get closer
to each other as the threat of war becomes stronger.
Their common concerns aside, this is partly a natural
outcome of their improving ties, which began in the
1990s. This is also partly due to a geographical fact.
As Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors, they will be the main
regional beneficiaries or losers of such war, depending
on its eventual outcome. Provided Iraq remained stable
and undivided, a future Iraqi government with a positive
attitude towards them would be a great security relief
for the three states, which have faced the Iraqi threat
to their national security over the past few decades in
different forms and to a varying extent. However, the
survival of the current Iraqi regime in the case of a
failed American war would contribute to the
intensification of its aggressiveness towards its
neighbor in the long run. Likewise, a divided and
chaotic Iraq run by any regime would lead to the export
of instability from Iraq to its neighbors, including
Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Thus, the three
countries have opted for closer cooperation, although
they differ on issues such as ties with the United
States, a friend of the two Arab states and an enemy of
Iran. This has been evident in the growing contact and
consultation between Iran and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
over the past few months, including the August visit of
the Saudi foreign minister to Iran to be followed by a
Kuwaiti defense minister visit.
As well, this
has become apparent in the similar Saudi and Kuwaiti
stances on their collaboration with the Americans in the
case of a war, which they both envisage within the
context of a United Nations operation. Even though Iran
rejects cooperation with the United States in any war
against Iraq, and will not host American troops in its
territory, its position on such a war itself is
gradually mirroring that of its Arab friends. Hence, it
has demanded the full Iraqi compliance with the United
Nation's demands regarding the destruction of its
weapons of mass destruction. As stated by its foreign
(Kamal Kharazi) and defense ministers (Admiral Ali
Shamkhani) among other figures, Iran will accept United
Nations decisions in case of Iraq's non-compliance,
implying even a military action so long as it is
authorized by that organization.
Against this
background, close contacts and consultations between and
among Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will likely
continue, and even increase, as the three states have
major stakes in the stability of their region and in
Iraq's future. Given the closeness of the Iranian and
Kuwaiti views on Iraq, the visit of Sheikh Jaber
al-Mubarak will not likely lead to major changes in
their regional policies. Yet it will probably lead to
their common policies to deal with the consequences of a
seemingly inevitable war against Iraq, which may not
necessarily go their way.
Dr Hooman
Peimani works as an independent consultant with
international organizations in Geneva and does research
in international relations
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