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GETTING SADDAM
PART 5: The
aftermath
By David Isenberg
PART 1: A plan is hatched
PART 2: Military preparations
PART 3: Iraq prepares
PART 4: Voices of opposition
Map
The scene, a
future White House press conference. "Mr Bush, you have
just successfully invaded Iraq. What are you going to do
now?"
"Why, I’m going to Disney World."
If only it were that easy. In truth the United
States faces grave difficulties, even after a successful
invasion. It must have a successor regime ready to take
over in Baghdad from Saddam Hussein. But assembling such
a regime is no easy task, given the squabbling factions
that make up the disparate Iraqi opposition.
Indeed, they mirror the Iraqi population itself,
which is split between Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds - all
of which are further subdivided into competing clans and
tribes. Turkey would not like a separatist Kurdish state
on its borders, while the US cannot afford to prop up
the Shi'ites as they could easily join Iran at a later
stage.
It is strange enough that the United
States may soon be going to war against Iraq mainly
because it does not like its head of state. But it is
even more mystifying that there has been even less
discussion of what happens if the United States achieves
its goal. For the issue of what happens in and to Iraq
after Saddam will certainly have regional and global
repercussions. Indeed, Iraq could be the classic case of
be careful what you wish for because you just might get
it.
Many outside analysts are starting to ask
what about the day after the invasion? Does the United
States have a workable plan for a post-Saddam Iraq? And,
most important, does the US itself plan on sticking
around long enough to build a new Iraq that is
reasonably stable, peaceful, and democratic? Or will the
Americans bug out after a few months or a year, leaving
the job of putting Iraq back together again to the
United Nations or to Europe or, perhaps even to Iran?
Considering the distate of the administration of
George W Bush for "nation-building" and "peacekeeping",
these are critical questions.
As Robert Kagan of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote in
the Washington Post, “One gets a whiff of it in Bosnia,
from which the Pentagon seemingly can't wait to
extricate itself. And, more disturbingly, one sees it in
Afghanistan, where the administration's aversion to
nation-building and peacekeeping, and even to putting
substantial numbers of troops on the ground to fight the
war, is palpable. The Bush administration may have its
reasons for limiting the US commitment to Afghanistan,
but the effect so far has been to cast doubt on American
willingness to stay anywhere for the long haul,
including in a post-Hussein Iraq."
In 1999,
Dilip Hiro, a veteran Middle Eastern observer, wrote,
"How will such a new ruler cope with inevitable
bloodletting as thousands of Iraqis who have suffered
under Saddam's rule, kill intelligence agents and Baath
party officials? How will Iran, with a network of agents
and sympathizers among Iraqi Shi'ites, respond to a
pro-US general in Baghdad? How will Syria’s President
Assad, surrounded by hostile Israel, unfriendly Turkey
and an untested young King of Jordan, react to the
emergence of a pro-US regime to the east? No prizes for
the answers, which, point toward a civil war in
post-Saddam Iraq, which will inevitably draw in Jordan,
Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and
destabilize the whole region."
At a London
conference of former Iraqi military officers in July,
the question of what would happen after Saddam went was
the main topic of conversation. "Given Iraq’s 40-year
history of repression, it is highly likely that blood
will fill the streets," said Major-General Saad Obeidi,
in charge of psychological warfare before defecting in
1986.
Writing in the spring issue of Washington
Quarterly, Michael Isherwood, a lieutenant-colonel in
the US Air Force, wrote, "US policymakers must think
beyond merely removing Saddam and recognize that peace
will come to the region only with an Iraqi government
that respects the international rule of law and the
rights of all its citizens."
But thus far almost
no thought appears to have been given as to how this
will be achieved.
Surprisingly, it turns out
that having Saddam Hussein in power is not the worst of
all possible words. Last year, Daniel Byman, director of
the Rand Center for Middle East public policy, wrote,
"Saddam's continuation in power also has some surprising
benefits. First, Saddam’s aggressiveness and outright
evil have created a strong and broad consensus that Iraq
must be contained to some degree. Any successor to
Saddam, even if cast from the same mold, would probably
receive control over Iraq’s purse strings from the
United Nations, a warm welcome in most regional
capitals, and the benefit of the doubt most generally.
Second, Saddam’s incompetence as a general is matched
only by his ineptitude as a diplomat. Any likely
successor, even including those who share his aggressive
ambitions, would likely be more skilled. The United
States and its allies should continue to seek Saddam’s
removal, but should prepare for trouble down the road;
especially in the event that they succeed incompletely
and a leader from the same power base emerges."
It is also unclear that a new Iraqi regime would
want to give up its nuclear, biological and chemical
programs, that is, weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Iraq lives in a rough neighborhood. Iran, Pakistan,
Syria, Turkey and Israel all possess various types of
WMD and missiles. A future Iraqi regime seeking WMD as a
deterrent is likely, if not desirable.
Also,
enmity towards Israel is likely to remain. Saddam gained
considerable prestige by repeatedly threatening Israel
and a successor might seek to gain similar support by
maintaining a hostile policy, or at least rhetoric,
towards Israel.
If an invasion succeeds, Western
forces need to be prepared for a long haul. Recently,
British cabinet ministers were told that British troops
would have to be stationed in Iraq for up to five years
as part of an "occupation force" once Saddam Hussein had
been removed from power. It is thought that up to 15,000
troops would have to remain in the region for several
years to help support the post-Saddam government, in
much the way as an international stabilization force now
operates in Afghanistan.
But even a successful
invasion of Iraq could have negative consequences
elsewhere. "The consequences [of an American attack]
will not be confined to Iraq," said Egyptian Foreign
Minister Ahmed Maher. He warned that US action against
Iraq could ignite hostility across a Muslim world
already incensed over Israel's treatment of Palestinians
and consequently threaten the stability of Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other US allies in the Arab
world.
Indeed, a key question that has not been
addressed is what effect a US invasion of Iraq would
have on the broader conflict between Islam and the West?
If al-Qaeda grew out of the humiliations attached to the
Gulf War and the stationing of US troops in Osama bin
Laden's native land, Saudi Arabia, what would grow out
of the new humiliation of a massive long-term occupation
in Iraq by the United States?
(©2002 Asia Times
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