Page 2 of 2 Why Pyongyang clings to its weapons
By Andrei Lankov
subjected to international sanctions. The strategy of economic sanctions is
based on the assumption that a dissatisfied population would pressure the
regime for a policy and/or regime change. This might take the shape of a
popular revolution, but in the case of a more democratic and tolerant regime,
it could be achieved via elections.
However, this mechanism is not likely to work in North Korea. The North Korean
regime does not allow its people to have any say in matters of governance.
North Koreans do not vote (well, they vote with predictable 100% approval of a
single government candidate). They do not rebel either. They are terrified and
isolated, have none of the rudimentary self-organization required to start a
resistance and to a large extent are still unaware about any alternative to
their mode of life (rumors about prosperous life outside North Korean borders
are spreading, but only a minority of the North Koreans understand how backward
and poor their society really is in comparison with its neighbors). Therefore,
if sanctions are made successful, the only result would be the suffering and
death of common people.
Why carrots are not tasty enough
The optimists who believe North Korea can be persuaded to abandon nuclear
weapons usually cite three major incentives which could be put on the table:
monetary payments and other aid (like, say, building light-water reactors);
security guarantees and a normalization of relations with the US.
The aid and monetary payments are most welcome in Pyongyang, no doubt. Indeed,
generous aid is the pre-condition of a regime's survival. However, a lump sum
payment is not necessarily a solution. Once money is spent (and it would be
spent quiet soon), the Pyongyang regime would have great difficulties in
obtaining a sufficient amount of additional aid without an opportunity to use
its nuclear potential as a way to press international donors.
At the same time, the North Korean leadership believes that it cannot initiate
Chinese style-reforms, as the existence of dirty-rich and very attractive South
Korea means such reform might become destabilizing and lead to collapse, East
German-style. This means that they have to adhere to the old Stalinist model of
a centrally planned economy (of an exceptionally rigid variety).
The promises of the security guarantee are also not attractive enough. There
are two reasons why the security guarantees might be irrelevant. First, North
Koreans deeply distrust Americans (and, broadly speaking, all foreigners), so
they do not believe in the value of foreigners' promises, especially in a
democratic system where leaders and policies are bound to change every few
years. Second, they know that their major security threat is internal, not
external. They are afraid of a US invasion, but they are even more afraid of a
domestic crisis which might lead to their overthrow by their own population.
Needless to say, the US cannot provide them a guarantee against such an
outcome, while the existence of nuclear weapons at least increases the North's
ability to fend off unwanted intervention into their domestic crisis as well as
their ability to extract aid which might help to prevent such a crisis.
Additionally, promises of "cooperation" are not particularly alluring to a
regime which for many decades has done its best to remain as isolated as
possible. The North Korean leaders suspect that all exchanges with the outside
world are corrosive and ultimately destructive for their system, and they might
be correct in this assumption.
Contours of possible compromise
Does this mean that compromise is completely impossible? It seems that it is
not the case, even though the road to such a compromise may be long and
winding. There is another problem: the only compromise solution which seems to
be at least theoretically acceptable for the North Korean regime would be
probably seen as unacceptable by the US side.
First of all, to achieve at least something, the US side should abandon any
illusions about North Korea's willingness to completely surrender nuclear
weapons. As shown above, "complete, verifiable and irreversible"
de-nuclearization is an unattainable dream - at least as long as the Kim family
regime stays in control in Pyongyang. Due to the reasons outlined above, North
Korea needs to keep at least a part of its modest nuclear arsenal. The North
Koreans might compromise on certain things (if they were paid well enough), but
this is a non-negotiable bottom line.
If this is the case, what are the possible options for compromise? North Korea
is likely to agree to dismantle its nuclear research facilities. After all, it
does not need its old rusty reactors anymore. Yongbyon, the North Korean
nuclear research center, cannot possibly produce more than Los Alamos in the US
or Arzamas-16 in Russia, and it does not make much political sense to increase
the North Korean nuclear arsenal further.
They already have enough nuclear devices to achieve the desirable political
effect. If North Koreans use Yongbyon facilities to increase their nuclear
armory from their current six to 15 devices to, say, 60 or 100 devices, their
ability to deter and/or blackmail would not increase fivefold or tenfold. As a
matter of fact, it would not increase much at all. So, the research and
production facilities have outlived their usefulness and thus can be dismantled
if the fee is sufficiently high.
Perhaps, North Koreans would agree to accept measures which would make
proliferation less likely, thus addressing another major American concern. It
is open to question which types of measures would become acceptable, but
perhaps surprise inspections of ships and even airport facilities would be
allowed (once again: North Korean diplomats would require a high price for such
a major concession, actually infringing their sovereignty).
Partial surrender of nukes might be negotiable. Perhaps, North Korea could be
bribed into giving up a part of its plutonium and/or a few nuclear devices.
However, this de-nuclearization, contrary to the US insistence, is not going to
be either "complete" or "verifiable". North Korean leaders will need at least
to maintain a high level of ambiguity about their nuclear capabilities - or,
ideally, they would like to have an explicit or implicit admission that they
would be allowed to keep some stockpile of plutonium and a couple of nuclear
devices.
It remains doubtful whether such an outcome would be acceptable to the US,
which will be expected to pay hefty fees for downsizing the threat while still
living with nuclear North Korea. Perhaps, such a compromise is not even
advisable, if judged from the American viewpoint - after all, it creates a
dangerous precedent. It will mean that North Korea would be rewarded for its
nuclear blackmail. In all probability, the total price they would extract from
the US for the above-described compromise would exceed their spending on the
nuclear program.
This is a very imperfect and partial solution, to be sure. It might be even
seen as an unacceptable solution. Unfortunately, no other compromise seems to
be in sight. So if the above-mentioned solution were rejected, we are likely to
see years of negotiations, broken promises, false dawns, and still without any
tangible result at the end - at least until the demise of the Kim family
regime, which is perhaps an event of a rather distant future.
Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul,
and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian
Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State
University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea.
He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.
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