Page 2 of 2 'Taliban' want a say in
Korean talks By Michael J Green
from Kim Jong-il on the North's
commitment to "fulfilling the six-party
commitments" - another low-cost pronouncement
since Pyongyang has an endless list of "hostile"
US policies it can point to as excuses for not
moving forward at a later date.
Kim
Jong-il would benefit from such a celebration in
propaganda terms alone. The symbolism of "ending"
the Korean War and proceeding with confederation
would erode any remaining
pressure on the North to move
to phase two of the February 13 agreement and
would put another piece in place in Pyongyang's
effort to socialize the outside world into
accepting its nuclear weapons status after last
October's test.
(Who could convince the
South Korean people or even the Chinese to call
for new sanctions against the North for
noncompliance with its commitments after Roh and
Kim had declared peace in our time?). The
symbolism of a breakthrough would come with other
price tags from Kim Jong-il, of course.
The menu floated unofficially by some
close to the Blue House (presidential office and
official residence) has included a new fertilizer
plant, rebuilding the port of Nanpo, construction
of a modern Gaesong-Pyongyang highway, and opening
a new tourism project at Mt Paektu (the last would
involve tens if not hundreds of millions of
dollars of cash for the elite a year with
virtually no "pollution" of the North Korean
people).
The bad scenario would definitely
set back the course of denuclearization, probably
causing the whole process to bog down in phase one
of the February 13 agreement as Kim Jong-il worked
away at his existing plutonium-based weapons, his
missile inventory and his suspected
uranium-enrichment program. It would isolate
Japan. It would create renewed tensions with
Washington.
At the same time, it might
help the progressive camp avoid a drubbing in the
December presidential elections, which would be
one more benefit for Kim Jong-il. On the other
hand, this scenario is not risk-free for Roh,
since the South Korean public's idealism about the
North is not what it was a few years ago.
The ugly The ugly scenario
would require the hardcore believers of the 386
generation - born in the 1960s and called the
"Taliban" in the Blue House - to trump both the
national-security professionals and the political
realists. It would also mean that "Roh the
Defiant" trumped "Roh the Pragmatic" (the one who
brought the US the United States Forces Korea
realignment, the Iraq dispatch and the free-trade
agreement).
If Roh recognizes that a
breakthrough on denuclearization is beyond his
control, but nevertheless wants to leave a major
legacy, he could instead agree with Kim to a
North-South peace treaty that would pave the way
for dismantling the current security architecture
of the peninsula.
The North is already
testing this possibility by demanding that the
annual US-South Korea Ulchi Focus Lens exercises,
inconveniently scheduled for August 20-30, be
canceled. Perhaps Roh agrees to that or perhaps to
canceling them in future in exchange for
proceeding with the summit. The North's other
demands on the security front include settling the
Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, dismantling
the UN and Combined Forces Commands, and ending
the US nuclear umbrella.
The "Taliban" in
the Blue House have tried unsuccessfully to
deliver in all of these areas for Pyongyang and
could convince Roh to resolve them once and for
all as part of a comprehensive peace treaty. The
scenario would be even uglier if rumors prove true
that Roh plans to pledge $20 billion in aid and is
working on a second summit on Cheju Island to ruin
the conservatives' shot at winning the presidency
in December.
As dear as this scenario is
to some of Roh's closest supporters, the downside
risk is obvious. For one thing, a significant
majority of South Koreans believe that the
US-South Korea alliance is still indispensable for
stability on the peninsula. The political and
strategic backlash against a unilateral peace
treaty could be devastating for the progressive
camp in December, no matter how much the hardcore
elements of their political base would be
inspired. But for a president who sometimes likes
doing the unexpected to keep his opponents on the
defensive and who hasn't been afraid to ignite
anti-Americanism in the past, this scenario might
be attractive.
The odds are that that
Roh's summit will be somewhere between good and
bad, with a slight but unnerving possibility for
ugly. It is also quite possible that the Pyongyang
summit will be good, bad and ugly all at the same
time. With various constituencies grasping for
control and different audiences expecting
different messages, the entire affair may end up
sending a muddled message to Pyongyang, Washington
and the South Korean people.
The
significance of the summit would then only become
clear in the next wave of competition to define
what happened and who promised what. That can be
avoided if the US and South governments agree now
on how they would define a good summit, and begin
coordinating to make sure Pyongyang knows what to
expect.
Dr Michael J Green
(Mgreen@csis.org) is senior advisor and
Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and associate professor of
international relations at Georgetown University.
He served on the National Security Council staff
from 2001-2005, completing his tour as special
assistant to the president for national security
affairs and senior director for Asian affairs.
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