North Korea's decision to return to the
negotiating table is a win-win-win situation, at
least temporarily. The United States, China and
even North Korea gain from the announcement.
However, the boost given to each country - a
modest "October surprise" for the Bush
administration, a diplomatic achievement for
China, and a stronger negotiating position for
North Korea - will not carry over into the
negotiations themselves. A decision to talk, after
all, does
not
translate automatically into a decision to
compromise.
The resumption of the
six-party talks is a small but much-needed bright
spot in the otherwise dismal foreign-policy record
of the administration of US President George W
Bush. In May 2003, 67% of Americans were satisfied
with America's place in the world, according to a
Gallup poll. But a just-released Program on
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll shows a
complete reversal in attitudes. Now, 68% of
Americans are dissatisfied with their country's
global position. Foreign policy is a huge
albatross around the neck of the administration,
and numerous Republican Party candidates next
Tuesday's mid-term elections are trying to
distance themselves from their leadership's
policies.
On North Korea, according to the
PIPA poll, 55% of Americans believe that the
United States should talk to North Korea without
preconditions. This percentage barely changed as a
result of the October nuclear test. After all,
North Korea's test simply confirmed that the Bush
administration policy was just not working. The
restarting of the six-party talks also involving
South Korea, China, the US, Russia and Japan has
come just in time to salvage some small diplomatic
victory for the administration.
But with
October marking one of the highest death tolls for
US soldiers in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, with
the Taliban gaining power again in Afghanistan,
and with numerous domestic scandals, this small
success in East Asia will not likely affect the
mid-term elections.
China probably gains
more than the US has from this development. After
the nuclear test, Washington pundits predicted a
major setback for Beijing's "soft power" approach
to multilateralism. China was instrumental in
convening the six-party talks and mediating
between the US and North Korea. With its nuclear
test, North Korea not only defied China's explicit
warnings, it jeopardized Beijing's whole economic
project of turning its northeastern provinces -
along with North Korea's Rajin port - into an
economic hub.
Short of outright war,
there's nothing worse than sanctions to put a
damper on regional investment. Brokering the
recent seven-hour discussions between US and North
Korean diplomats, China has again proved that it
holds the key to Northeast Asia's future.
Finally, North Korea itself is a winner.
Pyongyang didn't achieve the bilateral
negotiations with the US it has been clamoring
for, but no doubt some face-to-face meetings will
take place on the outskirts of the multilateral
negotiations. More important, North Korea has a
stronger bargaining position at the table. It has
more of a nuclear program (though how much more
remains uncertain) and will likely ask for more in
return.
Whether South Korea gains anything
from the return to the talks remains to be seen.
Getting back to the table has required the
expenditure of much diplomacy and no small amount
of arm-twisting. The prospect of a Chinese energy
cutoff and the impact of the various sanctions
certainly pushed North Korea to the table without
achieving its coveted bilateral talks. And the
prospect of an end to the non-proliferation regime
has certainly pushed the US toward some small
measure of compromise.
But the six-party
talks still suffer from the same two problems.
North Korea can't have a nuclear deterrent and
trade it away at the same time. And the US can't
both negotiate a regime-saving agreement with
North Korea and push for regime collapse at the
same time.
In 1994, when the two sides
faced the same two competing paradoxes, a
face-saving compromise was achieved. North Korea
traded away its nuclear program but probably kept
an insurance policy, namely some processed
plutonium. The administration of US president Bill
Clinton signed the Agreed Framework but sold it to
Congress by reassuring politicians that the regime
in Pyongyang wouldn't be around in 2003 when the
light-water reactors were due to go on line.
Today, North Korea is further along with
its nuclear program and the Bush administration is
more unyielding in its attitude toward "evil"
regimes. However, this time around, China is more
actively involved in mediating the crisis, and
South Korea has more to offer if a settlement is
within reach.
Still, the six-party talks
will only succeed if both Pyongyang and Washington
come to an arrangement that is as flexible as the
Agreed Framework. The Bush administration must
finally accept the possibility of negotiating an
agreement. Pyongyang must be willing to give up
its nuclear program. Both sides will no doubt
harbor their secrets - perhaps a cache of
processed plutonium on the one hand and a
persistent desire for regime collapse on the
other. Without resolving these central
contradictions, however, the six-party talks will
go in precisely the same direction as before:
nowhere.
John Feffer is the
co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus for the
International Relations Center.
