Cracks in North Korean
'Stalinism' By Andrei Lankov
SEOUL - One of the most common descriptions of
North Korea is a "Stalinist state". Indeed, for decades
this unfortunate country could be seen as an embodiment
of Stalinism - actually, in many regards it was far more
Stalinist than Josef Stalin's Russia itself. But this is
hardly the case any more.
Despite talk of the
tyrannical Hermit Kingdom with its human-rights abuses,
the past decade has witnessed the steady disintegration
of the system that was founded by the late Great Leader,
Kim il-sung. Actually, one has to stretch the
definitions in describing North Korea of 2004 as
"Stalinist". Clearly North Korea is still run by a
repressive regime that treats its population with
remarkable brutality. But many major peculiarities of
Stalinism are now disappearing from North Korea.
Its centrally planned economy is in great
disarray. Its Leninist party has nearly ceased to
operate, with military and "normal" state bureaucracy
assuming many of its functions. Private enterprise is
tolerated and even cautiously encouraged. And of course,
its old system of political control is visibly
crumbling. Reports from visitors, defectors and foreign
visitors leave no doubt that North Korea is still very
repressive and restrictive. But it is also clear that it
is much less repressive and restrictive than it was 15
years ago, let alone in its worst times of terror and
brainwashing in the 1970s.
Analysis of these
increasingly numerous reports creates a remarkable
picture of a slowly disintegrating system of "thought
control", once the world's most effective. Its
slow-motion demise is probably not a result of
deliberate decisions, but rather a product of the
growing impotence of the government and its inability to
find enough resources - from economic to human resources
- to maintain its old structures or control. After all,
efficient supervision costs money, and Pyongyang is
desperately short of money.
As a former citizen
of a communist country, the Soviet Union, this analyst
can confirm that Western radio propaganda broadcasts
greatly contributed to the demise of the communist camp.
But it seems that these days in North Korea most
subversive information is spread largely in visual,
video, not audio channels. The first VCRs turned up in
the North around 1990, but for a decade they remained
beyond the wildest expectations of the average North
Korean.
The situation changed around 2000 when
northeast China was flooded with cheap DVD players and
newer VCRs. Old machines are now sold very cheaply by
their owners, and then smuggled to North Korea via its
porous (essentially, uncontrolled) border with China. In
North Korea the used VCRs are resold at high premiums,
but a machine still only costs the equivalent of US$35
or $40 - definitely within the reach of a more
successful North Korean family. VCRs are largely used
for copying and watching tapes of South Korean TV soap
operas, which have become major hits in North Korea in
the past few years. The South Korean actors and
actresses are much admired, and their hairstyles and
fashions are eagerly imitated by the Pyongyang youth.
The more affluent, better-educated and younger
segments of the population are more eager to fall under
the spell of this "imperialist pollution" - much like
the former Soviet Union, where in the 1970s and early
1980s the scions of the party bosses were avid watchers
of James Bond movies and proud consumers of Levi
Strauss' blue jeans. Younger North Koreans are no
different, and it is the youth from the best
universities, largely well-connected - spoiled brats,
some say - who now sport the eccentric haircuts and
outfits straight from the Seoul TV shows. Even a few
North Korean students have dyed their hair, mimicking
South Korean fashion. (Visitors from the North didn't
say whether anyone they saw dyed his or her hair green
or adopted a punk hair style, but anyone apart from the
severe, heretofore unchanging norm is notable).
Of course, the North Korean authorities are not
very happy about these developments, which would be
unthinkable merely 10 years ago. They launched a few
crackdowns - or rather attempted crackdowns, since their
efforts did not quite work out as intended. The steady
erosion of old Stalinist values also influenced the
attitudes of lower-level officialdom and police. Young
policemen sabotaged the recent crackdowns, visitors
reported, being unwilling to arrest boys for wearing
clothes that departed from the ubiquitous dark suit and
dark tie or Mao-type outfit.
It is difficult to
estimate the extent to which South Korean TV dramas and
movies are impacting the North Korean world view. They
give a relatively truthful picture of daily life in
Seoul, but it is not clear to what extent these dramas
are believed: after all, North Korean films have always
grossly exaggerated the living standards of the North,
so it is likely that North Koreans assume that the same
is the case with South Korean productions - more
exaggerations.
Perhaps few North Koreans believe
that every South Korean family has its own car (even if
it really is the case). But there is no doubt that it is
dawning on them that the South is not exactly a land of
hunger and desperation. This is certain to have
political consequences in the not too distant future,
since the myth of South Korean poverty has been
fundamental to the survival of the North Korean state.
Pyongyang has always based its claims for legitimacy on
being a better type of Korean government, supposedly
delivering the quality of life that would be unavailable
in the "exploited" and "impoverished" South. If the
North Korean populace learn about South Korean
prosperity, then the Pyongyang government is in deep
trouble - as the fate of the much more successful East
German government demonstrated: the economic gap between
North and South Korea is much greater than was once the
case in Germany. According to current estimates, the per
capita gross national product (GNP) in the South is 10
to 20 times higher than in the North.
Many more
cracks are opening in the self-imposed information
blockade so painstakingly constructed and maintained by
Pyongyang for decades. The radio sets sold inside Korea
are still permanently altered and sealed, so they can be
used only for listening to the official Pyongyang
broadcasts, but that does not really matter since cheap
transistor radios are smuggled across the Chinese
border. These radios are common enough: in 2003 a poll
confirmed that 67% of defectors from North Korea had
been listening to foreign and South Korean broadcasts
before they fled. Of course, this is not very
representative: the willingness to defect obviously
makes a person more interested in listening to foreign
broadcasts. Nonetheless, it's clear: information is
spreading inside the North.
Political relaxation
is noticeable as well. Take the story of Yi Yong-guk,
the former bodyguard of the Beloved Leader himself, Kim
il-Sung. Disappointed about the North Korean system, he
fled to China and attempted to defect to South Korea:
things went wrong, he was caught by North Korean agents
in China and deported. In the times of Kim il-sung, the
fate of such a high-profile defector was easily
predictable: torture and execution awaited a person who
betrayed the personal trust of the leader. But in the
relatively more liberal 1990s, Yi was treated with
surprising leniency: he was sent to prison camp and then
released (yes, released) following a special order by
the current Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il. Needless to say,
he used the opportunity to repeat his escape - and he
eventually reached Seoul.
North Koreans are also
much less reserved in casual interactions with
foreigners. In the 1970s, even an innocent question
asked by a foreigner could make a North Korean run away,
literally; in the 1980s a few minutes of small talk were
seen as acceptable, and now interaction with foreigners
can last for a relatively long time.
The daily
controls are crumbling as well - and in a long run this
is probably even more important. In the old times, a
worker had to spend a few hours every day on ideological
indoctrination sessions in which he or she was expected
to memorize many speeches of both the Great Leader and
his son, the Beloved Leader. Now it is getting
increasingly difficult to ensure that people attend
these boring functions. The same is true in regard to
many other public rituals which used to define the daily
life of North Koreans: tributes to the portraits and
statues of the Great Leader, mass rallies, and so on.
The more privileged people still have to attend, since
they have something to lose, but the North Koreans at
the bottom of the official hierarchy, and those outside
the hierarchy entirely, do not care any more.
Indeed, a worker from a long-defunct factory is
aware that the state bureaucracy has neither the means
to reward his "politically correct behavior", nor the
means to punish his refusal to participate in a state
ritual. If such a person survives economically, it is
largely through small-scale business activities and
handicraft. He or she is independent of the crumbling
state-run economy and hence is immune to subtle threats
and incentives of promotion/demotion, increase/decrease
in rations etc, which had ensured daily compliance for
decades. In this new situation, many minor
transgressions are likely to remain unpunished and even
go unnoticed and unheeded by authorities. It is all
relative in this repressive states, but the controls are
loosening.
Will North Korea survive such a
liberalization? It is commonly assumed that such a
survival is possible - after all, post-Mao Zedong China
survived easily and flourished. But there is a major
difference: the Communist Party government of China did
not have an affluent and democratic "another China" just
across the border (except for Hong Kong, of course). In
the Korean case, the impoverished Northerners are likely
to see unification with the South as an easy and quick
fix to their manifold problems. Only their ignorance
about South Korean prosperity, combined with the fear of
persecution keeps them from following the example of
East Germans. But what will happen when this ignorance
and fear are gone? Will the government be able to find
some substitute, or at least provide economic growth
fast enough and sufficient to silence the voices of
protest? This seems rather unlikely.
And of
course there are booming markets and the growth of
private businesses - but the economic collapse of the
regime is the topic for another day.
Dr
Andrei Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian
Studies, China and Korea Center, The Australian National
University. He graduated from Leningrad State University
with a PhD in Far Eastern History and China, with
emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on
factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published books
and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is currently on
leave, teaching at the Kookmin University, Seoul.
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