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Korea:
Out of the frying pan ...
By David Scofield
SEOUL - Having won national elections last December, and being only eight
months into a 60-month mandate to serve the country, South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun's declaration that he will seek to clarify support for his
administration through referendum this December smacks of political
opportunism.
There is no question that Roh has been peppered with problems since his
inauguration last spring. He inherited a country in decline: a moribund
economy; an inflexible, militant labor force; a consumer debt load two-thirds
the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) with more than 3.4 million people in
credit default; and, according to recent data released by the Korea Development
Institute, the poverty rate has doubled in the past six
years (more than 20 percent of the population is now living in or near
poverty). With idealistic supporters demanding "change" - a concept that went
largely undefined during the election campaign - coupled with a belligerent
neighbor to the north that rewards South Korean overtures with humiliating
counter demands, it would not be surprising if Roh wanted to give it all up -
but he's not interested in resigning.
And while he assumed control of a country already mired in corruption, many of
the issues he faces, both domestic and international, are related to the
platform he rode to power on. Populism and vague promises of reform were
underscored by a close alliance to young, vocal, nationalistic South Koreans,
pampered by South Korea's relative affluence and too young to have any memory
of Korea's hardships.
The United States military, protectors of the South for half a century, had
become increasingly incompatible with former president Kim Dae-jung's policies
of rapprochement and its accompanying new, kinder, gentler depiction of the
North and its paunchy leader. During the KDJ years, pro-North, anti-US voices
became emboldened, and after the acquittal of two soldiers tried for the
accidental deaths of two middle-school girls during a training exercise in the
summer of 2002, the nation's emotions boiled over. Pro-North, anti-US forces
marshaled and exploited a nation's passion to provide fuel for their xenophobic
causes.
The Roh camp also exploited the current of anti-Americanism that gripped the
nation last fall, often using anti-US demonstrations as political rallies - his
supporters careful to position him as a leader before the young, mercurial
nationalists. Free from the encumbrances of reality, Roh's whirlwind campaign -
he was a distant prospect three months before voting - was exceptionally keen
in marketing a message of national independence and "pride" to Korea's younger
voters, a group roundly ignored by the grayer members of the Grand National
Party (GNP).
Election results fell along generational lines. Those who had taken to the
streets before the election voted in mass for Roh, while Korea's older, more
conservative citizens voted for the GNP candidate, former Supreme Court justice
Lee Hoi-chung. Roh, like his predecessor Kim Dae-jung, rode to power on a thin
majority. The referendum, which if the polls are to be believed he will
"win", seems set to show the same or slightly stronger results as last December
- a thin majority for Roh. Those who voted against him last December will
probably not vote for him this December, with the undecided likely to opt for
the incumbent as this is essentially a "Yes/No on Roh" and not an election
where the citizens can consider new candidates. The ballot will be either Roh
or the unknown, and there is little chance the people will vote for the
unknown.
Given this, Roh's referendum seems to have but one function: to increase the
profile and support of Roh and his fledgling group of "reformers", now the
People's Participatory and Unity Party, allowing his people the opportunity to
form a majority in the National Assembly during elections slated for this
April. Of course, the entire process is of dubious legality, for at least two
reasons. The exercise will allow Roh and the Blue House to use public money and
resources to launch what amounts to a campaign, while the opposition will not
be able to field a candidate, nor begin electioneering. And the process itself,
the right of the president to call a national referendum, is limited by the
Korean constitution to matters relating to "national destiny" - a dispatch of
troops to Iraq, for example, could fall into this category, but not a
president's quest for self efficacy. To make the referendum binding will
require substantial changes to South Korea's constitution, a process that seems
likely to distract Korea's lawmakers at a time when reform in virtually every
other sector should take precedence.
For Roh, the gamble could well pay off. With the domestic economy in doubt and
consumer sentiment the lowest ever, the majority of South Korean voters will
probably not vote against Roh. But while the whole process may help Roh feel
better about himself, and ensure some residual support for the splinter party
of his supporters, the nation can ill afford the distraction with so many
pressing issues threatening the stability of the world's 12th-largest economy.
While Roh may win, the country seems set to lose, as the increased instability
that the referendum will likely bring will exacerbate the country's structural
and institutional weaknesses, which underlie the many challenges facing South
Korea today.
David Scofield is a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies,
Kyung Hee University, Seoul.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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