Korea

North Korea: Such a nuisance
By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - North Korea is staging its little play at a strange time, before the opening of a grander drama in which the United States will attack Iraq, or the Iraqi generals will topple Saddam Hussein and open their doors to US presence in their country.

North Korea threatens nuclear disaster, rattles its nuclear saber, hints at the possibility of firing missiles over the heads of South Koreans or Japanese, all for no grand political goal, but to obtain a few million dollars in aid without losing face. North Korea does all this not because it really wants a war, but because it wants support for its weak economy and it wants to open a dialogue with the United States. It could simply ask, without all the posturing, but evidently for domestic reasons it can't. A strong constituency in Pyongyang is against asking for a dialogue, which it fears as some kind of capitulation, so it makes up this act to show that it is not asking for a dialogue but is in fact threatening the US. The US then is expected to give in to this "powerful North Korean blackmail" and the North Korean leadership proves once more its global status. But this policy is wrong because it is based on old Cold War premises at a time when the Cold War is finished.

North Korea was once strategically important because it had the Soviet Union and China behind it. Now this is no longer the case; moreover, China and South Korea, which fought against each other over North Korea half a century ago, have an idyllic relationship and both work in strong partnership for a peaceful transition in North Korea. The mainstay of the Cold War in East Asia, the confrontation between Beijing and Seoul, has disappeared since the two countries established diplomatic relations and even more so after the launch of South Korea's Sunshine Policy toward the North. With China having possibly a better relation with the South than with the North, with Russia following suit and much weaker than it was 50 years ago, Pyongyang's threat can no longer be the trigger for a global crisis, but is only a worrisome issue, strictly localized.

There remains the issue that North Korea is a bottleneck on the development of a land route through the Eurasian continent. Once roads and railways are open, goods from Japan and North Korea will be able to move easily to Europe, and vice versa. At one time the United States was concerned that this land route would bypass the sea lanes it controlled. In that case, China or Russia, providing the security for the land route, would have an important card to play with the US. However, since the war in Afghanistan the situation has changed. The US has established a strong military and political presence in Central Asia. So the land route and the sea lanes are equally controlled by the United States and nobody can play any cards against it. The fact that North Korea opposes any passage through it is certainly a nuisance, an economic stumbling block for the region, but it is no longer a strategic piece in a global game.

All in all, North Korea can't kindle a world war, because it has no real friends. It was included in the US "axis of evil" not because of its importance but mainly because the United States wanted to produce a list of enemies that were not all Muslims, for fear of a clash of civilizations.

Moreover, North Korea has no strategic resources, it has no economy to be reckoned with, it has no global or even real regional reach. In other words a war in North Korea would not cause any global repercussions, hikes in the price of oil or other strategic commodities; stock exchanges around the world would not collapse. Life would largely go on as ever.

The only problem is that it has missiles, it is developing nuclear capabilities, and its leadership is unreliable. In other words there is major concern for public security, as its missiles could terrorize the Japanese and cause a drop in their economic activities. It is a serious and pitiful humanitarian case, some 20 million people are held hostage, as human shields, by their manipulative leaders who have no scruples. But it is not a turf anybody wants to take or defend, as during the Korean War. On the contrary, it is possibly a piece of dirt everybody would be happy to see disappear one way or another.

The North Korean leaders need to consider this when venting their threats, as they do not have the leverage they once had. They have been too greedy, and shortsighted. If they had built the railway crossing Korea before the war in Afghanistan, and the land route had supplanted the sea lanes then, they now would have had a much more powerful instrument to pressure the world than atomic bombs. They would hold something possibly as important as the Suez Canal to play against Japan, South Korea and China. But they didn't open up the land route, and even now they seem unable to understand the basic logic of the post-Cold War world, where you have leverage only if you sit at the table politely and take part in the game. If you are out of the game you don't count. That is: if you are part of the global economy you can make your demands, as your contribution to the global economy affects everybody. But if you have no contribution to the global economy your demands are just a nuisance.

Now the United States is preparing for a war in Iraq, where there are no atomic bombs, and North Korea, also in the axis of evil like Iraq, is saying it has an atomic bomb. From a purely rhetorical point of view, the US should then prepare for war in Korea as well, but it doesn't want to, because Iraq is globally important for its oil and North Korea isn't. The United States would prefer to talk with North Korea. But as it has declared that war in Iraq is part of war against terrorism and North Korea is openly terrorizing everybody, it can't wage a war in Baghdad (without nuclear weapons) and talk to Pyongyang (with nuclear weapons). So the US can't accept being pushed around by threats coming from a country wielding its missiles like a bully in a saloon in a spaghetti Western. But as President George W Bush said on New Year's Eve, "I believe this is not a military showdown; this is a diplomatic showdown. We can resolve this peacefully."

Therefore, for its own good Pyongyang has to recognize that threats will make the situation worse, not better, and that objectively its allies are South Korea and China and Japan, who have an interest in the peace of the region. South Koreans especially can play a pivotal role with their policy of dialogue and engagement.

Bush argued that "there is strong consensus ... that North Korea ought to comply with international regulations. All options, of course, are always on the table for any president, but by working with these countries we can resolve this." And among America's friends, South Korea is pivotal.

Bush said he believes the United States has made "good progress in talking to our friends" about tensions with Pyongyang. He said he had "a very good visit" with South Korea's president-elect, Roh Moo-hyun.

But it seems that to accept this engagement the North Korean leaders have to reconsider their weight in global affairs. North Korea has to learn the reality of international engagement. It should not grossly miscalculate the effect of the revelations on the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and embarrass Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who took a big risk in going to Pyongyang.

In other words, Pyongyang should stop this saber rattling, for its own good. But can it? Can the domestic political balance allow the leaders to drop all the nuclear-war nonsense and simply ask for help? Could they have normal news conferences, where the spokesman can take questions one by one, as in the rest of the world? Could they stop the present comical procedure where, once every two years, the North Korean ambassador in Beijing or Moscow delivers a speech, then has all the reporters ask all the questions together and finally provides one cumulative, selective answer?

The answer is in Pyongyang, and it hinges on the strength and determination of the present leadership. Contrary to what it may seem, if Kim Jong-il is strong in his position and determined to get his country out of its misery, he should quickly stop this nuclear slide. If the saber-rattling goes on, it could indicate deep weaknesses in the North Korean leadership, strong rivalry, power struggles and a simple lack of basic understanding of the world. And that would be a nuisance.

(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
 
Jan 3, 2003


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