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North Korea: True
confessions?
By Ralph A Cossa
BUSAN - They say that a little bit of confession
is good for the soul, but North Korea's sudden burst of
religion is creating a moral dilemma for Washington,
Tokyo, and Seoul.
First, Pyongyang decides to
come clean on the kidnapping of Japanese citizens,
admitting to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro
that its agents did, as suspected, kidnap a number of
Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s and that most
are now deceased. Then it confirms Washington's worst
suspicions about its secret nuclear-weapons program by
confessing that it indeed has one, in direct violation
to the 1994 US-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of
Korea) Agreed Framework, not to mention the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement, and the 1992
Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula.
What's going on here?
The reasons for playing true confessions with
Japan are pretty obvious: Tokyo made it very clear that
there would be no progress toward normalization - and
the billions of dollars of colonial-era compensation
that this is expected to bring in - unless Pyongyang
came clean on the abductions issue. But coming out of
the nuclear closet does not promise the same awards,
while putting the Japanese rewards even further at risk.
The Japanese public has been so outraged by revelations
of the poorly explained deaths and the controlled
circumstances under which the five surviving abductees
were allowed to visit Japan, with their children held in
North Korea to ensure their return, that the first
confession may actually set back progress in Japan-DPRK
relations.
Understanding North Korea's
motivations for coming clean on their nuclear program at
this time is more difficult. Clearly North Korea got
caught with its hand in the cookie jar. When presented
with the evidence of prohibited nuclear-weapons activity
by assistant secretary of state James Kelly during his
visit to Pyongyang on October 3-5 - the first high-level
visit by a Bush administration official - North Korea
reportedly vigorously denied the allegations at first
and then, after an all-night meeting, was quoted as
saying "of course we have a nuclear program", blaming
President George W Bush's "axis of evil" speech and the
presence of US forces in South Korea for its deliberate
violation of the above-referenced agreements.
Some see North Korea's actions as deja vu.
Recall the 1993-94 crisis prompted by Pyongyang's sudden
withdrawal from the NPT, which led to the 1994 Agreed
Framework - under which the DPRK receives 500,000 tons
of heavy fuel oil annually and two light-water reactors
(LWR) eventually in return for a verified freeze in its
nuclear-weapons program. Assuming that Kelly's proof
would, at a minimum, end the fuel-oil deliveries and
halt the LWR construction anyway, the North Koreans may
have decided to create a new crisis in hopes of reaching
a new agreement, under which they would again be
compensated for not doing what they were not supposed to
be doing in the first place.
Officials in Seoul
have another (more polite) way of saying this,
speculating that the North's confession "may be a sign
that it wants to resolve the problem through
negotiations rather than confrontation". To this end,
local press reports also cite unidentified Republic of
Korea officials as saying that the North offered
Washington a deal to barter US guarantees for its
survival in return for resolving US concerns regarding
the North's weapons of mass destruction. Given the ROK
media's tendency to report rumor as fact, however, this
should be taken with a large grain of salt.
ROK
officials are understandably concerned what's good
for the soul has not been good for Seoul. President Kim
Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy of engagement with the North
had already been under attack for being too trusting
(and generous) toward Pyongyang; "suspicions confirmed"
has been the outcry from the opposition, with all
candidates for the December presidential elections
(including the one from the ruling party) demanding that
the North comply with its promises and abandon its
nuclear ambitions. Throughout the country, people are
confused by the North's confession, especially in light
of its recent more friendly behavior toward the South.
This is particularly true here in Busan, which is still
basking in the glow of hosting this year's Asian Games,
which included a team of athletes and even a cheering
squad from North Korea, raising renewed hopes of genuine
reconciliation.
Many have also tied the North
Korean action, in one way or another, to Iraq. Perhaps
North Korea decided to come out of the closet now
because it believed the Bush administration was so
preoccupied with Iraq that it would have to accept
Pyongyang's actions. Or, more credibly, perhaps
Washington's presumed determination to strike Iraq
before it develops nuclear weapons caused Pyongyang to
claim that it has them in order to deter Washington for
picking on North Korea next. On this point it is worth
noting that it is still unclear exactly what the North
acknowledged having - a secret program for developing
nuclear weapons or the actual weapons themselves. One
report also claims that DPRK officials said they "have
more powerful things as well", causing speculation about
possible biological weapons, while North Korea's
possession of chemical weapons has been an open secret
for years.
One person I talked to even
speculated that there was some conspiracy between
Pyongyang and Washington behind the announcement. South
Koreans are world-class conspiracy theorists, although
this one stretched the limits. And, of course, there are
those who wonder if the North really did confess or if
there wasn't a "secret offer" that Washington is still
withholding, such as the grand bargain described above.
Its reputation as a trigger-happy unilateral
cowboy notwithstanding, the Bush administration's
response to the crisis has been measured,
non-threatening (to date), and taken in full
consultation with Tokyo and Seoul. Bush has called North
Korea's confession "troubling, sobering news" but has
expressed his determination to address the issue through
diplomatic channels. "We seek a peaceful solution," he
said. One would have thought that this would have gained
Washington a few rounds of applause. Instead, it raised
questions as to why the administration was revealing all
this now rather than the more logical question of why
the DPRK seemed to be precipitating another crisis.
All eyes will now be on next Saturday's planned
Bush-Kim-Koizumi summit meeting along the sidelines of
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Mexico,
to see whether the three leaders will be able to speak
with one voice in charting a clear path toward bringing
North Korea back into full compliance with its own
earlier agreements, one hopes without resorting to
forceful measures. This topic will also - rightfully -
become a central theme in future Japan-DPRK negations,
scheduled to resume in Kuala Lumpur at the end of the
month, and should be high on Seoul's list in its own
negotiations with Pyongyang.
Ralph A
Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (e-mail
pacforum@hawaii.rr.com).
Used by permission.
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