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US-North Korea: Dialogue of the
deaf
By Ralph A Cossa
Will the
United States and North Korea ever sit down and talk? In
all probability, yes. But the odds remain strong that
the dialogue, when and if it happens, will largely
remain a dialogue of the deaf, especially given the new
ground rules recently laid out by Washington.
July offer rescinded
The June 29
North-South Korea naval engagement off the Korean west
coast, which resulted in five South Korean and an
unknown number of North Korean sailors (estimates range
to 30) dead or missing, rightfully delayed the beginning
of US-North Korean dialogue that had tentatively been
scheduled for July 10. But it is important to note that
the naval clash was not the only, or even the primary,
reason given for the postponement.
The July 2 US
State Department announcement rescinding Washington's
offer to send its assistant secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific affairs, James Kelly, to Pyongyang
cited the lack of a timely response to its offer as well
as the "unacceptable atmosphere" created by the
North-South naval engagement. This sent two clear
signals. First, North Korea's behavior toward the South
affects Washington-Pyongyang talks. Second, Washington
will not tolerate the unprofessional diplomatic behavior
that has long characterized interaction between
Pyongyang and Seoul. Pyongyang frequently makes Seoul
wait until the last minute (or beyond) before responding
to South Korean initiatives, as Seoul seemingly pleads
for a response and continues to adjust to the North's
inconsiderate whims. Washington, it appears, will not
play this game.
The next time Washington offers
to send a high-level emissary, Pyongyang needs to
respond promptly and directly, in accordance with
standard diplomatic protocol. (Of course, it would not
hurt the State Department to set a better example; it
waited several months before responding after Pyongyang
finally said "yes" to the any time, anywhere offer.)
Ironically, had the North broken with tradition and
responded positively to the State Department offer
immediately after the naval incident, it would have put
the George W Bush administration in an awkward position.
US hardliners would have demanded that Kelly not go,
even as the South undoubtedly would have urged him to do
so. Pyongyang's failure to respond made the decision
easy.
(It is worth noting that despite the
continuing hiatus in official dialogue, US-North Korean
interaction continues in one important area: namely, the
search for remains of US troops missing in action from
the Korean War. Three 30-day joint searches are
scheduled in the coming months, with Pyongyang
reportedly being provided upward of US$3 million for
their assistance in this cooperative humanitarian
effort.)
ASEAN Regional Forum presents
opportunities
The next US offer for official
talks may (or may not) come this month when the region's
foreign ministers meet in Brunei on July 31 for the
annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum (ARF) meeting. US Secretary of State
Colin Powell is scheduled to attend, as is North Korean
Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun. Of course, whether Paek
will show up remains anyone's guess; he inexplicably
skipped last year's meeting in Hanoi, avoiding what
would otherwise have been the first direct high-level
North Korean contact with a senior Bush administration
official. His absence again this year would, in and of
itself, speak volumes about Pyongyang's willingness to
engage in serious dialogue, not only with Washington and
Seoul but with its other Asian neighbors as well.
South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong is
no doubt also eager for Paek to attend so that he can
try, once again, to resuscitate President Kim Dae-jung's
Sunshine Policy. South Korea has already expressed its
willingness to put the June 29 naval incident behind it
and recent statements by the North indicate that it too
seems ready to move on. North Korea's soccer chief even
sent a belated message to his Southern counterpart in
early July applauding the South's "striking
demonstration of the advantages and tenacity of the
Korean nation to the world" during the World Cup soccer
championships. Nonetheless, time is running out and it
would appear to be in Pyongyang's interest to
reinstitutionalize high-level North-South dialogue in
advance of December's South Korean presidential
elections.
Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi
Yoriko is also reportedly seeking a side meeting with
Paek in Brunei; a predecessor, Kono Yohei, met with Paek
when both attended the July 2000 ARF session, but
Japan-North Korea relations have not progressed very far
since then. The rumored repatriation of four Japanese
Red Army members - they have been enjoying North Korean
refuge since they hijacked a Japanese airliner there
more than 30 years ago - could help break the current
impasse, or it could make it worse, if they provide
their Japanese captors (they face certain arrest when
they return) with details of other North Korean
misdeeds, including the kidnapping of Japanese citizens.
Of note, the departure of the Red Army
terrorists from North Korea has long been one of the
primary prerequisites for Pyongyang's removal from the
US State Department's "state sponsors of terrorism"
list. During the Clinton administration, it would likely
have been sufficient to earn Pyongyang's removal from
the list. It's doubtful it will have the same affect
now, but should have some residual favorable impact on
future US-North Korea talks.
US
prerequisites
Even if the two sides agree
eventually do sit down and talk - Washington's "any
time, any place, without preconditions" offer reportedly
remains on the table - the negotiations appear destined
to be unpleasant. In a little-noticed speech on
America's East Asia policy in early June, Powell laid
out some specific prerequisites for progress that may
further reduce Pyongyang's incentive to begin a dialogue
with the Bush administration. While none of Powell's
prerequisites were particularly surprising and have all
been mentioned before, his June 10 speech to the Asia
Society in New York seems to cast them in stone.
Powell stated explicitly that "progress between
us will depend on Pyongyang's behavior on a number of
key issues." More specifically (to paraphrase), Powell
insists that the North:
Must get out of the
proliferation business and eliminate long-range missiles
that threaten others.
Must make a much more serious
effort to provide for its suffering citizens (to include
greatly improved monitoring and access to insure the
food provided by Washington and others gets into hungry
mouths).
Needs to move toward a less
threatening conventional military posture (by living up
to its past pledges to implement basic confidence
building measures with the South).
Must come into full compliance with International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards (as called for in the
Geneva Agreed Framework, which Washington remains
committed to following, according to Powell).
This appears to represent yet another hardening
of Washington's position; at a minimum, it certainly
places "without preconditions" in a new context.
Powell's remarks should leave few illusions about
Washington's determination to hold a "comprehensive"
dialogue that addresses all of its Korean Peninsula
security concerns. On the positive side, at least it
does not draw any further links between North Korea and
Washington's war on terrorism, President Bush's earlier
"axis of evil" comments notwithstanding
Of
course, Pyongyang is no stranger to prerequisites; it
has a number of its own, which include a withdrawal of
all US forces from the peninsula, and has traditionally
been quite unyielding when it comes to dialogue either
with Washington or Seoul on this point. This month, it
added an interesting new demand, insisting that Seoul
tear down the statue of US General Douglas MacArthur
that proudly commemorates his landing in Incheon, which
Pyongyang claims represents an "insult" to the Korean
people. Pyongyang also seems more comfortable blaming
Washington for everything that happens than it does
discussing ways to avoid crises and misunderstandings -
it claims Washington "orchestrated" the naval clash in
June and has demanded an apology for US "backstage
manipulation" of the incident.
Unless both sides
are prepared to move beyond their seemingly unyielding
positions, the prospects of meaningful future dialogue
appears slim. All eyes will be on Bandar Seri Begawan,
first to see if Paek indeed shows up and then to see if
he and Powell can set a more positive tone for future
dialogue than the one that currently exists.
Ralph A Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS
(e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com).
Used by permission.
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