Page 1 of 2 Japan weighs role in India's nuclear boom
By Peter J Brown
Japan is promoting the use of nuclear energy and long ago integrated nuclear
power into its national power grid on a massive scale. Now, French and United
States companies want Japan to sign a nuclear deal with India - and soon -
because billions of dollars in contracts for the construction of two and
possibly as many as six more new Indian nuclear plants are in motion.
Specifically, GE Hitachi and Toshiba-Westinghouse cannot sell nuclear plant
technology as planned without formal Japanese approval. (In the US, Hitachi is
partnered with General Electric and Toshiba with Westinghouse.)
"Japan is an essential party for US and French nuclear cooperation with India.
Japanese firms are deeply entangled in the US and French nuclear industry,"
said Jeffrey Lewis, director of
the Nuclear Strategy and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Washington
DC-based New America Foundation.
The swirl of geopolitics behind giant nuclear deals is increasingly evident as
the US seeks to challenge or even block outright China's planned sale of more
nuclear power plants to Pakistan, for example. As Japanese Prime Minister Naoto
Kan takes the helm the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), he and the DPJ
leadership must weigh both the advantages and the drawbacks of this proposed
nuclear deal with India.
In late 2008, the US House of Representatives passed a civilian nuclear
agreement with Delhi allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology
from the US. The accord had been in the pipeline for many years as it had
difficult hurdles to overcome.
Although India is a nuclear-armed country it is not a signatory to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It had thus agreed to separate its civil and
military nuclear facilities and place all its civil nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It then had to get an
exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), an export-control cartel
that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974.
Commenting on a proposed Japanese nuclear deal with India, Nobumasa Akiyama, an
associate professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University in
Tokyo, said, "This deal is important in a symbolic way. But there are some
other areas in which the two countries could strengthen their 'strategic
partnership', as there could be a potential to complicate the bilateral
relationship in the course of negotiating on a nuclear cooperation agreement.
"Without Japanese involvement, American and French nuclear businesses could be
denied opportunities in the Indian nuclear market. Also, India could face a
delay in its nuclear energy program. In this respect, India may push this
agenda in its relationship/partnership with Japan."
Despite pressure from the US and France to change Japan's existing nuclear and
high-tech export control rules that forbid Japanese companies from engaging in
such transactions with India, Kan can simply walk away from this deal or at
least postpone it indefinitely.
"Kan is rather stubborn when it comes to the issue of security, and he is not
strongly in favor of the change of the [nuclear] export regulation," said
Associate Professor Kazuto Suzuki of Hokkaido University's Public Policy
School. He describes the way in which former prime minster Prime Minister
Hatoyama Yukio handled the issue of the Futenma air base on Okinawa as a
constant reminder for Kan of the importance of separating important domestic
ideological issues from realistic security issues.
"In the case of the nuclear deal with India, Kan will demonstrate that his
government will not do anything that would not easily win the approval of a
rather ideologically stimulated population," said Suzuki.
Should Kan oppose this deal, he will probably annoy Masayuki Naoshima, Japan's
minister for economy, trade and industry, and Shunsuke Kondo, chairman of the
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). These two men are widely seen as
spearheading this drive that is moving ahead with the creation with India of a
joint working group.
"Naoshima as well as Kan and Yoshito Sengoku, chief secretary general of the
cabinet, are keen to promote sales of nuclear plants and large infrastructure
projects such as bullet trains to foreign countries," said Suzuki. "However,
they would do so only when there are no major security concerns or any conflict
with existing laws and government principles."
Besides, Kondo has previously stressed the need for openness and transparency
when it comes to dealing with the public, a stance that may not work to the
advantage of proponents of a nuclear agreement with India.
"It is important to maintain openness and transparency to the public of any
activities including policymaking processes, giving the public both formal and
informal opportunities to learn what nuclear energy policy and activities are,"
said Kondo at the Second International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards
that was held in Japan last October.
When Hatoyama visited India in late 2009 and discussed the agreement with
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Hatoyama alluded to the possibility that
Japan would soon start to export nuclear plant equipment and other high-tech
items to India. Japan would do so, Hatoyama stated, so long as India promised
to refrain from conducting nuclear tests.
Because India possesses and has tested nuclear weapons, and because it has
resisted signing key non-proliferation treaties such as the NPT and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), this is not an easy decision for Japan to
make. However, with respect to the CTBT in particular, India is not alone
because both the US and China have yet to ratify the CTBT. Manmohan did pledge
that India would not conduct any more nuclear tests.
Once India had received exemption from the NSG, after the US deal, it moved
quickly and signed agreements involving the sale of uranium fuel and/or nuclear
equipment with France, Russia, Kazakhstan, and soon if no last-minute snags
occur, Canada.
By joining this list, which includes a few other nations, Japan will in effect
relinquish much of its moral high ground with respect to opposing the
continuing spread of nuclear weapons.
"Most experts do not appreciate how important Japan's role is, so in one sense
the damage to the non-proliferation regime was done by granting India an
exemption from NSG strictures," said Lewis. "If Japan sticks to its guns on a
no-testing pledge, the India-Japan agreement might modestly reduce the harm
from the NSG exemption."
Confidence was high, and Hatoyama's popularity seemed to be on solid ground at
the time he had these discussions with Manmohan. Following Hatoyama's abrupt
exit from his leadership post this month, Kan finds himself perhaps in a
defensive position, which means he might be prone to going the extra mile in
terms of garnering popular support. Shedding some of Hatoyama's baggage and
making life easier inside Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) after the
bruising and often heated Futenma-related exchanges with the US, might serve
this purpose well.
"The Kan government may want to promote nuclear disarmament to maintain its
'liberal' image," said Akiyama.
Still, Kan cannot escape the fact that Japan's nuclear business community is
keenly interested in promoting international business, and the Indian market is
obviously one of the most promising markets.
"METI - Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry - pushes the agenda,
and MOFA is cautious so far. So sooner or later, the government needs to
address this issue," said Akiyama.
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