Japan's bureaucrats face the firing line
By Purnendra Jain
ADELAIDE - The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) increasingly looks set to
displace the near monopoly on political power held by the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) since it was formed in 1955. The LDP has governed Japan for more
than five decades, except briefly in 1993-1994 when a fragile coalition
replaced the LDP.
The LDP, that seemed only recently invincible under prime minister Junichiro
Koizumi until his departure in 2006, is now on the brink of losing power at
Sunday's general election. Most polls and psephologists suggest that the DPJ,
either on its own or in coalition with smaller parties, is certain to form the
next government with Yukio Hatoyama as its prime minister.
The DPJ in its election manifesto and through various policy
announcements has made many pledges to distinguish itself from the ruling LDP.
A domestic demand-led economic recovery plan has been announced, which includes
financial support for families with young children, struggling farmers and the
elderly, better pensions and new programs for both youth and employment. How
the DPJ will fund spending on new programs is already being questioned.
But the party's most radical plan is about eliminating the influence of
bureaucrats on policy formulation and making politicians more responsible and
accountable for it. Is this achievable?
Bureaucratic tradition
The task of fighting the bureaucracy is not easy in a country with a
century-old tradition in which bureaucrats have always been held in high esteem
and politicians played second fiddle.
Under the occupation reforms following World War II, Japan saw many of its
pre-war institutions reformed and transformed, including the divine status of
the Japanese emperor. The one institution that largely remained untouched even
under this transformative period was Japan's bureaucracy.
The American occupying authorities regarded Japan's elite bureaucracy as an
essential institution to facilitate the implementation of political and
economic reforms to modernize and democratize Japan. Many politicians were
"purged" under the occupation, but bureaucrats remained unaffected. Indeed, a
Foreign Ministry bureaucrat Shigeru Yoshida, with no previous political
experience, became prime minister and ruled Japan for about a decade following
Japan's defeat.
The influence of bureaucrats in Japan is legendary. Much of the economic
miracle of post-war Japan is largely ascribed to the planning and
implementation of policies by the higher civil service. The so-called
developmental state model, guided mainly by Japanese bureaucrats, served as an
example for many other Asian nations' economic development.
Eminent Japan scholar Chalmers Johnson in his celebrated book MITI and the
Japanese Miracle had observed that in Japan "the bureaucrats rule and
the politicians reign". A close nexus developed between the bureaucrats, LDP
politicians and big business in Japan, often known as "Japan Inc". Many LDP
politicians came from the bureaucracy and approximately half of Japan's
post-war prime ministers and the origins of many cabinet ministers are in the
higher civil service.
Some scholars have argued that Japan's bureaucrats are not as influential and
dominating in policy formulation as often claimed. But the reality is that
there existed a symbiotic relationship between the LDP and the bureaucrats - a
relationship in which LDP politicians depended on bureaucrats for policy
advice, policymaking including budget formulation and the bureaucrats in turn
looked after the special interests such as the construction industry, farmers
and big business that supplied the bulk of votes for the ruling party. This
perpetuated the influence of the bureaucracy and kept the LDP in power.
Whenever politicians tried to change this balance by taking the policy matters
in their own hands they faced strong bureaucratic resistance. When the
coalition Morihiro Hosokawa government that replaced the LDP in 1993 tried to
take political leadership, the bureaucrats previously used to working with
their LDP political masters offered immense resistance.
Indeed, in some cases they even passed critical information on to their old
political masters, triggering instability in the coalition government and
eventually their collapse leading to the return of an LDP-led government in
1994 which has continued since then under many prime ministers, including the
current leader and Prime Minister Taro Aso.
Even reformist LDP leaders such as Koizumi who had strong popular support
behind them found it extremely hard to fight the deeply entrenched and
all-powerful bureaucracy to introduce reform that did not have the blessing of
the civil service.
Will the DPJ succeed?
DPJ party president Yukio Hatoyama has argued that the LDP has been too
dependent on bureaucrats for policy formulation and exhorted his audience at a
recent press meeting in Tokyo: ''Let's put an end to bureaucracy oriented
politics and please give us the power to achieve a change of government.''
The DPJ seeks to eliminate the bureaucratic model of governing Japan by making
politicians more responsible and accountable for public policy, including the
budget. To this end, it plans to deploy 100 members of the party to assume
senior government positions to work in a coordinated fashion, what Hatoyama
describes as "an historic shift" in policymaking.
While bureaucrats will undoubtedly resist this historic shift in policymaking,
the early indications are that for the first time in Japan's post-war history
the bureaucrats are preparing to work under a political master other than the
LDP. Reports suggest that senior bureaucrats from key ministries such as the
Ministry of Finance, Economic Ministry, Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of
Industry and Foreign Affairs and some others have already had meetings with
Hatoyama and other key leaders like Katusya Okada, the DPJ's secretary general.
Other senior DPJ leaders such as Naoto Kan have given strong signals that they
want to be in charge of policies and bureaucrats must take instructions from
them and implement government policies. Kan was recently in Britain and had
discussions with senior politicians about the relationship between politicians
and bureaucrats.
In a DPJ government, Kan would occupy a high-profile ministerial post and in
his previous ministerial portfolio of health and welfare (while serving in an
LDP-led government) he played tough on the bureaucrats on the issue of blood
contaminated with the HIV-AIDS virus. He made the bureaucrats apologize for
their error and declared compensation for those affected by the contamination -
an action that was previously unthinkable in Japan.
While battling with the bureaucracy, the DPJ will need to keep in mind that
even the occupying authorities with little domestic and external constraints
had decided to work with Japan's bureaucracy as they recognized the importance
of the civil service. True, today's bureaucracy is not as infallible as it was
in the 1940s and 1950s, as many cases of bureaucratic unethical behavior,
corrupt practices and scandals have been unearthed. But it is also true that
most parts of the Japanese bureaucracy are committed to working in the national
interest.
The higher civil service in Japan still attracts some of the best and brightest
and their talent and knowledge should be harnessed and utilized, not ridiculed.
The DPJ needs to cultivate those who are willing to work with it and lend a
supporting hand to the government in office while keeping a close eye on the
recalcitrant. With little experience in governing, the DPJ will undoubtedly
need the support and experience of bureaucrats.
While the DPJ's aim to reform the old-style bureaucratic culture and its close
alliance with the LDP and special interests is a noble one and needs support,
the party should not throw the baby out with the bath water. For an effective
implementation of the DPJ's policy agendas, cooperation with the bureaucrats is
essential.
In Japan as elsewhere, politicians and bureaucrats remain the two essential
elements of governance. Each has its own defined space and should work
accordingly and not try to invade the other's territory.
Purnendra Jain is professor of Asian Studies at Adelaide University's
Center for Asian Studies in Australia.
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