Page 3 of
3 The strengthening Japan-India
axis By Chietigj Bajpaee
Nakhodka, as well as competition
from China and India, and rising oil prices.
India also faces its share of energy
dilemmas, having lost energy assets to China in
numerous states, including Angola, Ecuador,
Kazakhstan and Myanmar. This has been fueled by
India's inability to adopt a more strategic and
holistic approach toward securing energy assets
that integrates financial incentives with aid,
infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives and arms
packages. India's ambitions
for natural-gas pipelines from Bangladesh, Iran,
Myanmar and Turkmenistan have also been stalled by
the poor security and political situation along
its periphery.
Both Japan and India have
shown a growing interest in Central Asia, although
they are still marginal players in the "New Great
Game" for energy resources in Central Asia, with
China, Russia and the US dominating the playing
field. Then-Japanese prime minister Junichiro
Koizumi visited Central Asia in August, the first
visit to the region by a Japanese premier, and in
June Japan held the second ministerial-level
meeting of the "Central Asia plus Japan" dialogue,
which was launched in August 2004.
Japan
also has stakes in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, which came online in June and could
potentially be extended to Kazakhstan's Kashagan
oilfield. Meanwhile, India's long-standing
cultural and historical links to Central Asia have
been complemented by its growing
military-to-military cooperation with the region,
including a military and medical facility in
Tajikistan and military aid and training to
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. India is also a party
to the proposed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or
Trans-Afghan, gas pipeline.
Potential
for cooperation Japan and India also have a
number of shared interests and values. Both are
democratic states. They share concerns over the
rise of China. Both maintain amicable relations
with the United States.
Cultural exchanges
between Japan and India date back to the 6th
century when Buddhism was introduced to Japan from
India. India's cordial relations with Japan date
back to the latter's support for Subhash Chandra
Bose's short-lived Indian National Army during
World War II and justice Radhabinod Pal's
opposition to punishing Japan at the Tokyo trials.
The two states were on opposite ends of the Cold
War divide, with Japan in the US camp and India
oscillating between non-alignment and the Soviet
camp. Japan also vehemently opposed India's
nuclear tests in 1998.
However, this
historical baggage is fast being left behind as
improving US-India relations bring Japan and India
closer together. Japan's willingness to assist
India with its civilian nuclear program has
further fueled a rapprochement in India-Japan
relations. The potential for cooperation also
exists in the fields of energy exploration and
efficiency, counter-terrorism, maritime security,
and both states' bids for a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council. The failed bid by the G4
countries - Brazil, Germany, India and Japan - for
permanent seats on the council last year
demonstrates the need for better coordination and
a more strategic approach by these states.
India needs as much as $300 billion in
investment into its infrastructure, and Japan has
expressed interest in diversifying its trade and
investment beyond China. India is the leading
recipient of Japanese aid, receiving more than $1
billion in 2005. Japan, as a leader in energy
efficiency, conservation and technologies, has
much to offer India in the field of energy
security. For instance, at the most recent East
Asia Summit in January, Japan offered $2 billion
in aid to help developing countries in the region
adopt greener, more energy-efficient technologies.
Finally, the leaderships in both states
remain enthusiastic about improving India-Japan
relations. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
visited Japan in December, which was preceded by
Koizumi's visit to India in April-May 2005.
Manmohan's visit to Japan culminated in the
signing of the "Joint Statement Toward Japan-India
Strategic and Global Partnership". In his book
A Beautiful Country, Abe proposes an Asian
order that groups together Australia, India, Japan
and the United States.
Nonetheless,
India-Japan rapprochement is by no means
inevitable. For example, plans to increase
India-Japan trade and investment remain more
rhetoric than reality, as Japanese investment in
India was about $2 billion in 2006, far less than
the $57 billion that Japan invested in China.
China has also emerged as Japan's and India's
second-largest trading partner. Sino-Indian trade
exceeded $25 billion in 2006, while Sino-Japanese
trade was more than $207 billion, far less than
Japan-India trade, which amounted to $7 billion,
although discussions have begun on an India-Japan
comprehensive economic-partnership agreement.
Within Japan, there remains significant
opposition to India's nuclear status, while
India's unpredictable coalition politics has the
potential to reverse India-US and India-Japan
rapprochement. Much depends on external factors.
For instance, further nuclear tests by North Korea
or other aggressive behavior by North Korea or
China could lead Japan to reassess its own
opposition to nuclear weapons.
The rise
of China Finally, the rise of China is
clearly a factor in growing cooperation between
New Delhi and Tokyo. China's growing emphasis on
both its naval-power projection capabilities and
ballistic-missile and space-based-weapons
capabilities has implications for Japan and India.
Both Japan and India have expressed ambitions to
join the space race and in expanding naval
operations beyond their immediate neighborhood.
China's anti-satellite weapons test on
January 11 is likely to accelerate the space race
in Asia, with Japan and India both playing
catch-up. Soon after the test, Indian Air Force
chief Shashi Tyagi announced that India would
establish an aerospace defense command. The same
month, India returned a space capsule from orbit
successfully, bringing it a step closer to its
goal of manned space missions. During the visit of
Russian President Vladimir Putin to India in
January, India and Russia also stated their
opposition to the "weaponization of outer space",
although they did not specifically criticize
China.
China has also expressed ambitions
to expand its blue-water naval capabilities to
protect its growing oil imports through the Indian
Ocean and Strait of Malacca, through which 80% of
its oil imports transit. China's attempt to secure
its sea lanes along the Indian Ocean through
building up its blue-water naval capabilities and
its "string of pearls" strategy to develop port
facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar has
led to fears in India over China's encroachment
into its back yard as part of a wider Chinese
policy to encircle India.
China's naval
ambitions have also brought it into confrontation
with Japan in the East China Sea, where the two
states are engaged in a maritime territorial
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and three
oil-and-gas fields, where Japan regards the median
line as the boundary of its Exclusive Economic
Zone, while China claims jurisdiction over the
entire continental shelf. The incursion of a
Chinese nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese
waters off Okinawa in November 2004 and a Chinese
destroyer taking aim at a Japanese P3-C
surveillance aircraft near the disputed waters in
September 2005 have demonstrated China's naval
posturing in the region.
China's growing
interests in securing chokepoints and constructing
ports along strategic waterways also has
implications for the international community given
that 50,000 ships comprising 40% of world trade
and half of world trade in oil and natural gas
transit through the Malacca Strait, while 40% of
the world's oil trade transits the Strait of
Hormuz. Notably, more than 50% of India's trade
passes through the Strait of Malacca, while more
than 80% of Japan's oil imports transit the
strait. Beijing's statement in January that it has
the ability to build its own aircraft carrier
demonstrates its ambitions in expanding its
blue-water naval capabilities.
Given
India's and Japan's shared concerns over China's
space program and naval-power capabilities, both
states may decide to develop a joint approach to
check China's growing military influence in the
region. Cooperation among the navies of Australia,
India, Japan and the US after the Asian tsunami in
December 2004 illustrates the potential for
cooperation between India and Japan.
The
Indian Navy, the world's fifth-largest, has set up
a Far Eastern Naval Command facility off Port
Blair on the Andaman Islands to increase its
presence in the Strait of Malacca and possibly
monitor Chinese naval activities in the region.
Meanwhile, in a sign of Japan's growing
concern over China, the US-Japan "two plus two"
statement in 2005 identified the "peaceful
resolution" of the Taiwan issue as a "common
strategic objective", while Japan identified China
as a potential security threat in its National
Defense Program Outline in 2004.
Toward
a new international order Japan and India
are rediscovering their global identities. Both
were once major players on the international
stage. Under the late prime minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, India was a leader in the developing world
as a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement,
mediator to numerous international conflicts, and
spokesman for international issues ranging from
decolonization to the Cold War divide. India's
defeat at the hands of China in a brief border
conflict in 1962, preoccupation with Pakistan, and
inability to meet its development needs led India
to turn inward, fueled by the realization that its
ambitions outweighed its capabilities.
Similarly, Japan went from trying to
exercise control over Asia under the aegis of its
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" to
rejecting a role on the foreign-policy stage after
its defeat in World War II. However, Japan's and
India's capabilities are now catching up with
their ambitions as both states regain their
self-confidence and come to terms with their
history.
The US will continue its
engagement with Asia even though its preoccupation
with Iraq and the Middle East has led it to
downgrade Asia on its list of priorities. This has
left a gap, which has been increasingly filled by
China. A concert or balance of powers in the
region will be necessary to prevent hegemony by
China or any other state. Japan and India have the
potential to play this role if they improve their
relationship, enhance their strategic
coordination, and become more assertive in Asia
and the world.
Published with
permission of thePower and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com.
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