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5 CHINA AND THE
US Part 11: Japan's strategy to
be a 'beautiful nation' By Henry C K Liu
culture, while the whole
nation adopted the martial aspects of Western
civilization without full appreciation of its
humanist side.
Among the perverse Western
ideas and institutions the Meiji reformers adopted
was a quest for fukoku kyohei (rich
country, strong military) to catch up with Western
empires and to gain national power and wealth,
rejecting traditional appreciation of the virtue
of harmony in Asian civilization as expressed in
Confucianism and Buddhism.
The rise of Japanese militarism is closely
associated with curbs on Buddhism and Confucianism
by Shinto as a state religion with the emperor as
its living god.
A December 15, 1945,
Directive for the Disestablishment of State Shinto
from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
to the Imperial Japanese Government decreed:
In order to prevent recurrence of
the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into
militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda
designed to delude the Japanese people and lead
them into wars of aggression ... The
sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control, and
dissemination of Shinto by the Japanese
national, prefectural and local governments, or
by public officials, subordinates, and employees
acting in their official capacity are prohibited
and will cease immediately. No visits to Shinto
shrines and no rites, practices, or ceremonies
associated with Shinto will be conducted or
sponsored by any educational institution
supported wholly or in part by public funds ...
terms whose connotation in Japanese is
inextricably connected with State Shinto,
militarism, and ultra-nationalism is prohibited
and will cease immediately ...
No
official of the national, prefectural, or local
government, acting in his public capacity, will
visit any shrine to report his assumption of
office, to report on conditions of government,
or to participate as a representative of
government in any ceremony or
observance.
Many Japanese rationalize
wartime Japan's aggression in Asia as a program to
liberate Asians from Western imperialism,
notwithstanding that the Japanese version of
colonialism was infinitely harsher than
Franco-British colonialism. The sad result was
that Japanese colonialism enabled Western
colonialism in Asia to claim its pugnacious self
as a benign system that did more good than harm,
as apologists for slavery also claim for slavery
based on atrocious labor conditions during the
Industrial Revolution. Japan's conflict with its
Asian neighbors is rooted in the indiscriminate
Westernization of its national character, which
might have come from the fact that Japan had been
historically mostly on the periphery of Asian
civilization.
The anti-feudal ideology of
the Meiji Restoration began as a progressive force
to build the modern Japanese state with an
industrialized economy on the European model,
enabling Japan to be the only country in Asia to
withstand the onslaught of Western imperialism and
in the process establish Japan in essence as a
warped version of a Western power located in Asia,
with little contribution to the revival of an
Asian civilization. Ironically, as Japan
integrated itself into the Western economic
system, the Great Depression after World War I hit
Japan harder than any other economy in Asia,
mostly because colonialism had placed most Asian
economies in a state of permanent economic
recession.
Economic collapse in the 1930s
transformed the bright, optimistic political
climate of the Taisho period that began in 1912
into aggressive industrial militarism. Japan's
solution to economic depression was to compete
with the European imperialism by military
conquest, initially in East Asia and later in
Southeast Asia.
Postwar Japan continues to
view itself as a Western power that is more at
ease with Western institutions such as the G7 and
the Trilateral Commission. The long economic
stagnation since the 1990s similarly has given
rise to a new militarism as it did during the
Meiji Restoration. Until this denial of self of
Japan as an Asian country is purged in Japanese
mentality, Japan will not be a constructive force
in Asian geopolitics.
Abe's abduction
fixation Although comparatively young,
Shinzo Abe was given the key post of deputy chief
cabinet secretary in Koizumi's cabinet. His
political star elevated quickly to national
prominence in 2002, when he pressed Koizumi to
take up the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by
North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, a
long-standing pet topic of right-wing extremists.
Abe accompanied Koizumi on a visit to Pyongyang in
2002 and pressed for an official North Korean
admission of, and apology for, the abductions.
As prime minister, Abe has championed the
abduction cause, pledging not to establish
diplomatic relations with North Korea until it
"shows sincerity" on the matter, echoing the Bush
administration's "moral clarity" posture of not
negotiating with an evil North Korea.
"The
abductions are too important an issue for Japan to
compromise on, while it's unclear what Pyongyang
could offer in terms of progress," said Noriyuki
Suzuki, director of Radiopress, a Japanese news
agency that monitors North Korean media.
Abe became LDP secretary general in 2003
and chief cabinet secretary in 2005, positions
traditionally reserved for potential prime
ministers. He took a forceful stance on foreign
affairs, including backing for the joint US-Japan
missile-defense system and comprehensive sanctions
against North Korea. During the North Korean
"missile crisis" in July 2005, Abe called for
Japan to take preemptive military action against
North Korea if Pyongyang tested more missiles,
echoing Bush's preemptive=defense doctrine.
New Japan wants also to be an
international rule maker Abe represents a
young generation of Japanese elite and is a modern
media-savvy politician, acutely conscious of the
power of the media and the importance of public
relations to secure popular support. Yet for all
his modern gloss and progressive exterior, the new
prime minister is deeply beholden to a
neo-conservative constituency.
Abe stands
for not merely a strong Japan, but a powerful
Japan prepared to protect and enhance its national
interest with force projection. He has pledged to
pursue "a new diplomacy under which Japan at times
takes leadership and asserts opinion to set the
world's rules". In other words, Japan is no longer
satisfied with merely playing well the game whose
rules were written by the superpowers, but now
wants a proactive role in writing new rules for
the post-Cold War era. This is not necessarily an
unconstructive approach unless Japan chooses the
path of neo-imperialism through military force.
Abe will work for Japan's permanent
membership in the UN Security Council and see its
preparedness to contribute militarily to UN
peacekeeping as a prerequisite for Security
Council membership. Abe promotes increased
influence for the military in policy planning,
while simultaneously distancing Japan from its
share of guilt and responsibility for World War II
and Japanese atrocities in wartime. Unfortunately,
a denial of history inevitably leads to a repeat
of history.
Domestically, Abe wants to
strengthen the office of the prime minister by the
creation of a Japanese version of the US security
infrastructure, in the form of the Central
Intelligence Agency and National Security Council,
that reports directly to the prime minister. Just
as prewar Japan went down the wrong path by
copying the British Empire, the Japan of the 21st
century is in danger of going down the wrong path
again by copying US militaristic neo-imperialism.
Japan has the potential to shape a new national
destiny as a deserving leader in the Asian
Century. But to fulfill that high destiny instead
of a replay of US Manifest Destiny of colonialism,
Japan must avoid again setting itself apart from
Asia both in terms of geopolitical interest and
value systems to choose once again the low road of
militaristic imperialism.
Revision of
the pacifist constitution Abe stands firmly
behind the revision of the US-imposed 1947
pacifist constitution, asserting that "from a
standpoint of emerging from the postwar regime, I
want to show leadership on a new constitution".
A 1999 Japanese defense white paper stated
that it would not be against Japan's constitution
to make preemptive strikes if it has reason to
believe other countries are setting out to attack
it. This was an echo of US preemptive doctrine
that was abused by the George W Bush White House
to launch the disastrous war on Iraq. Exploiting
evolving new security situations in East Asia,
with a rising China and nuclear-armed North Korea,
Abe rationalizes that a strictly defensive
military posture is no longer a credible
deterrent, nor is the exclusive reliance on a US
nuclear umbrella. By extension, as Japanese
militarism copies US national-security structure,
Japan can be expected also to copy US doctrine of
force-projection capability to carry out
preemptive wars on foreign soil, initially in East
Asia.
The May 1, 2006, Joint Statement by
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, then-US
secretary of defense Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister
of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, and Japanese minister
of state for defense Fukushiro Nukaga states that
the US-Japan security relationship is the
indispensable foundation of Japan's security and
of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
and the linchpin of US security policy in the
region.
The ministers stressed the
imperative of strengthening and improving the
effectiveness of bilateral security and defense
cooperation in such areas as ballistic-missile
defense, bilateral contingency planning,
information sharing and intelligence cooperation,
and international peace cooperation activities, as
well as the importance of improving
interoperability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces
and US forces to preclude duplication. This strong
partnership, they said, is increasingly vital in
meeting global challenges, the scope of security
and defense cooperation to ensure a robust
alliance relationship, and to enhance the
alliance's capability to respond to diverse
challenges in the evolving regional and global
security environment. In other words, Japanese
military must now be restructured to meet a global
challenge, not just defense of Japanese homeland.
Shame trumps guilt in geopolitical
agenda Yet historically, Japan has more
scores to settle with the US and its Western
Allies than with China and Korea, North or South,
or with any other state in Asia. The Japan-US
security alliance exposes Japan unnecessarily to
security threats.
The threats Japan faces
from its Asian neighbors arise from the presence
of US bases in Japan from which US aggression on
Asian locations could be launched. US bases in
Japan have evolved from purely defensive bases for
the purpose of defending Japan from attacks to
offensive bases to support US military actions
outside Japan. Threats against Japan would
evaporate if offensive US bases in Japan were
removed.
At the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference, Western victors rejected the simple
request from Japan, a fellow victor ally, to have
a racial-equality clause included in the League of
Nations Covenant. In 1924, The US passed the
racist Japanese Exclusion Act to shut off Japanese
immigration. The US dropped two atomic bombs on
Japan, which all Japanese viewed as unnecessary
since a demonstration would have served the same
purpose of ending the war. After the war, the US
dictated a curb on the spiritual legitimacy of the
Japanese emperor. These unsettled scores with the
US are scars of national shame that Japan's
samurai culture is not likely to forget or forgive
even in a millennium.
On the other hand,
Japan suffers national guilt but not shame over
its history with its Asian neighbors. This is a
significant point in Asian culture, in which shame
overwhelms guilt in determining behavior, in
contrast to the Judeo-Christian West. The cultural
trumping of guilt by shame explains the difference
between Germany and Japan in the two defeated
nations' attitudes toward war crimes, with Germany
dealing with the issue with remorse while Japan
with denial. US support of a revival of Japanese
militarism for short-term expediency has the
potential of leading to the same blowback as its
Cold War support of extremist Islamic
fundamentalism against communism. The US might
have defeated Japan in 1946, but it has not
conquered the Japanese mind by a long shot.
Indeed, the back-handed praise lavished by
Bush on Japan - that after its defeat by the US it
has become a democracy and close ally, as a
shining example of how US military intervention
can bring democracy to the world - is, explained
Professor Takeshi Inoguchi,
international-relations expert at Chuo University,
"awkward and embarrassing for most Japanese
because it carries so many nuances of the
difficult past".
Following the footsteps
of Koizumi, Abe considers the amendment to Article
9 of the pacifist constitution as vital in freeing
the Japanese military to participate in more
"peacekeeping" mission globally. Like his maternal
grandfather Nobusuke Kishi in the 1950s, Abe
understands that Japan has no choice but to
swallow its national pride temporarily to
cooperate with Washington, only gradually moving
toward more equality in sharing mutual interests
and responsibilities. Yet a truly independent
Japan as an Asian great power would sooner or
later have more historical reckoning to settle
with the US than with China or any other nation in
Asia.
The Greater East Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere The Japanese wartime
vision of a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere was flawed only in its absence of
ingenuity, evidenced by the de facto inequality
offered to non-Japanese member nations.
If
the vision had not been a false front for Japanese
imperialism but had been true to such slogans as
"Asia for Asians", "the liberation of Asian
countries from Western imperialist powers" and
"economic co-prosperity for member nations", a
true Asian enterprise as a forerunner of the
European Union might have evolved from the vision
without bloodshed and the Asian Century would have
been speeded up and its emergence would have been
infinitely less tortuous. Alas, the local
governments set up by Japanese occupation all
turned out to be puppet regimes carrying out
dictatorial orders from Tokyo, and the Japanese
conducted themselves as insufferable, haughty
conquerors with disdain toward the local
population. Copying French imperialism, Japan
imposed programs of "Japanization" with no
tolerance or respect for local culture.
Unlike postwar Germany, which managed to
emerge as a political, economic and moral leader
of the new Europe, Japan has made itself, at US
urging, the main obstacle to Asian unity and
solidarity, in parallel to US policy turning
Israel from a potentially positive force in the
development of the Middle East to a forward base
of US neo-imperialism. The Arab nation would do
well to welcome Israel as a constructive component
of a new Middle East by welcoming the return of
the Jewish state as God's gift to the region, by
turning Israel's national interest to align with
the interests of region rather than with those of
the West.
The fundamental geopolitical
problem with Israel is the Jewish state's view of
itself as a Western state in a non-Western Middle
East, in denial of its Oriental heritage. In that
sense, Japan and Israel have a similar problem of
self-denial of their indigenous roots to make
themselves invasive alien elements in their own
home regions.
Lessons of the Plaza
Accord The lessons of the damages to the
Japanese economy by the 1985 Plaza Accord (to
devalue the US dollar in relation to the yen and
deutschmark by intervening in currency markets)
and the 1997 Asian financial crisis force Abe to
aim at making the Japanese economy more
neo-liberal and global. In doing so, he is
committed to reviving Koizumi's stalled reforms,
to curbing government spending, to privatizing the
public sector and to accommodating cross-border
capital flow to increase foreign direct
investment.
However, it is not altogether
certain that neo-liberalism is suitable to
Japanese socio-economic culture or that it can
provide solutions to Japan's economic dilemma,
which was caused in the first place by none other
than a neo-liberal onslaught under US dollar
hegemony. Still, Japanese mentality is not known
for bold originality, and it would be surprising
if creative new concepts of economic revival were
to originate from Japan. Unless current trends
change, as US influence in Asia declines, Japan
will decline with it.
For example, US
investors and lenders require US-style
transparency and control that are incompatible
with Japanese social manners and traditions.
US-managed Japanese funds want only to make
investments based on narrow, short-term economic
rationality rather than on Japan's keiretsu
long-term relationships. The intrusion of
US-managed global capital would cause the very
social chaos that Japanese politicians badly want
to avoid.
This cultural conflict between
Western-dominated globalization and Asian
traditions holds true throughout much of Asia,
including China. Asia is unable to attract
sufficient global capital to sustain its
growth/recovery targets, and unable to restructure
its economies to generate that capital
domestically because of the trap of export
dependency under dollar hegemony and unwillingness
to allow an uncontrolled influx of US-managed
global capital on non-Asian terms.
Socially, the Confucian ideal of personal
considerations and ritual relationships would be
interpreted by Western standards as collusion, or
worse still as corruption. Politically, Asian
leaders, including those in Japan, are trapped
between the economic demands of a
Western-dominated global system and indigenous
social traditions. They face policy paralysis
resulting from conflicting pressures operating
under incompatible value systems. Inefficiencies
continue, recovery aborted by externally imposed
economic realities, and social tensions reach
boiling points.
Relations with China
and South Korea Simultaneously, Abe must
repair deteriorating relations with China and
South Korea while remaining unapologetic about
Japan's militaristic and atrocious past that still
divides Japanese public opinion.
Before
becoming premier, Abe defended visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine, arguing that such visits as
matters of individual conviction regarding respect
for Japan's war dead while avoiding further
inflaming emotional diplomatic disputes with
Japan's victimized neighbors. Nationalism needed
for successful domestic politics in Japan
conflicts with Asian solidarity necessary for
effective Japanese foreign policy.
At the
time of his elective victory for the premiership
last September, Abe enjoyed 70% popular support.
Four months later, tarred by scandals that
undermined confidence in his judgment and
diminished his political capital, support had
fallen to as low as 39%, close to the dismal
approval rating of George W Bush. Two upcoming
polls, the April local elections and the July
Upper House elections, pose an imminent threat to
the political life of Japan's youngest-ever prime
minister.
Toward a beautiful
nation Abe published a book during his
campaign for prime minister with the title
Toward a Beautiful Nation, a best-seller in
Japan, in which he claims that so-called Class A
war criminals were charged with crimes against
peace and adjudicated in the Tokyo Tribunal after
the war but were not war criminals in Japanese
domestic law.
On September 29, three days
after his inauguration as prime minister, Abe
delivered his first policy speech to a plenary
session of the House of Representatives
emphasizing his determination to promote his
vision of "a beautiful nation" and to continue and
accelerate the course of structural economic
reform. He outlined five policy targets: (1)
constructing an open economy full of vitality, (2)
resolute implementation of fiscal consolidation
and administrative reform, (3) realizing a healthy
and safe society, (4) rebuilding education, and
(5) shifting to proactive diplomacy.
Abe
also laid out his plan for the formulation of a
long-term strategic guideline called "Innovation
25" aimed at the creation of innovation
contributing to economic growth looking forward to
the year 2025; and the promotion of comprehensive
"Challenge Again Assistance Measures", including
expanding the application of social-insurance
coverage to part-time workers; the deep reduction
of expenditures aimed at minimizing the financial
burden on taxpayers and the steady promotion of
fundamental administrative reform to achieve
simple yet efficient lean government; and the
early enactment of a bill to revise the
Fundamental Law of Education, the introduction of
systems for the renewal of teaching licenses and
the implementation of external assessment, and the
establishment within the government of an
"Education Rebuilding Council".
Regarding
revision of the constitution, which he put forward
as an administration pledge during his campaign in
the Liberal Democratic Party presidential
election, Abe declared his hope that a national
referendum bill stipulating revision procedures
would be enacted as soon as possible. Regarding
Japan's exercise of the right of collective
self-defense, which is currently forbidden by the
constitution, Abe attracted attention by
indicating his intention to study specific cases.
"The vision I am aiming for," Abe said at
the beginning of his speech, "is that of 'a
beautiful country, Japan' - a country filled with
vitality, opportunity, and compassion, which
cherishes a spirit of self-discipline, and is open
to the world." He then cited four aspects of the
"beautiful country, Japan" vision: (1) a country
that values culture, tradition, history, and
nature; (2) a country based on a free society that
respects discipline and has dignity; (3) a country
that continues to possess the vitality to grow
toward the future; and (4) a country that is
trusted, respected, and loved in the world and
that demonstrates leadership.
Abe's vision
of a beautiful nation conflicts with the past and
present path of Japan that has led it to reject
its "culture, tradition, history and nature". The
revival of militarism is not likely to win Japan
any "trust, respect or love in the world", and
instead of leadership, it will only generate
resistance to renewed Japanese threat.
Referring to diplomacy and national
security, Abe said, "I will demonstrate the
'Japan-US alliance for Asia and the world' even
further and promote diplomacy that will actively
contribute to stalwart solidarity in Asia." He
went on to declare that "the headquarters function
of the Prime Minister's Office [Kantei] will be
reorganized and strengthened, and intelligence
gathering functions will also be enhanced" and "I
will put in place a framework that ensures
constant communication between the Prime
Minister's Office and the White House in order to
consolidate the trust" between Japan and the
United States.
Regarding relations with
China and South Korea, he said, "It is essential
to make mutual efforts so that we can have
future-oriented, frank discussions with each
other." Regarding the North Korea problem, he
said, "There can be no normalization of relations
between Japan and North Korea unless the abduction
issue is resolved." He also announced the
establishment of a Headquarters on the Abduction
Issue chaired by the prime minister.
With
regard to exercise of the right to collective
self-defense, Abe said, "In light of the changes
in the international situation, such as the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles and the fight against terrorism, as well
as the advancements in military technologies and
the rising expectations toward Japan's
international contribution, we will thoroughly
study individual, specific cases to identify what
kind of case falls under the exercise of the right
of collective self-defense, which is forbidden
under the constitution, so that the Japan-US
alliance functions more effectively and peace is
maintained."
According to the Yomiuri
Shimbun (September 29, 2006, evening edition),
"Cases that have been considered until now as the
exercise of the right of collective self-defense
will be studied individually. If a case is judged
to fall under the right of individual
self-defense, then it will be deemed to be
constitutional." It explained, "It is expected
that cases will be studied that at present are
deemed to constitute exercise of the right of
collective self-defense, for example, the case in
which a ship of the US Navy that is engaged in
joint action with the Maritime Self-Defense Force
undergoes a missile attack, and an MSDF ship
located 1 kilometer away counterattacks."
In his conclusion, Abe quoted Albert
Einstein, who, when visiting Japan, said, "It is
my sincere wish that the Japanese people keep
intact and never forget those traits which you
have intrinsically possessed: humbleness and
simplicity essential to an individual, pure and
calm Japanese heart." Abe commented, "I believe it
is fully possible to build a 21st-century Japan
that retains the Japanese virtues Einstein admired
and is filled with charm and vitality. I believe
that the Japanese people have the ability to
achieve this."
In a commentary analyzing
Abe's speech, the Mainichi Shimbun (September 30)
warned that "the flood of newly created bodies and
the formulation of policies by the Kantei will
take away authority from the ministries and
agencies, so resistance can be expected." The
Mainichi added, "Effectiveness looks likely to be
the issue."
In his policy speech, Abe left
out such expressions from his LDP presidential
election campaign as "breaking away from the
postwar framework" and "open conservatism" that
seem to reflect his ideological bent. The Yomiuri
(September 29, evening edition) commented: "He
seems to have been aware of the eyes of other
countries." It went on, "Abe, who is treated as a
nationalist by some foreign newspapers, apparently
was forced to dilute his conservative standpoint
and proclaim himself to be an ordinary politician
who loves country, community, and family."
Opposition parties expectedly were all
critical of the speech. Naoto Kan, deputy leader
of the Democratic Party of Japan, said, "Abstract
words were bandied about, but the substance was
extremely vague." Mizuho Fukushima, leader of the
Social Democratic Party, commented, "There were
many foreign buzzwords and images but no
substance." Kazuo Shii, leader of the Japanese
Communist Party, said, "It was a step toward
building a nation that conducts war overseas. The
important point is that he stated clearly that
studies would be made to join the United States in
war."
At a press conference shortly after
his inauguration in September, the new premier
made it clear that Japan, as an Asian country,
attached great importance to its Asian diplomacy
and was willing to further strengthen relations
with neighbors such as China, South Korea and
Russia. Describing China as an important country
in Japanese foreign policy, Abe stated that
China's peaceful development is conducive to peace
and prosperity in Asia and he would restart
immediate efforts to improve bilateral relations.
In follow-up speeches in parliamentary
hearings, Abe pointed out it was vital to reopen
summit meetings with China and South Korea and to
conduct candid dialogue. He also pledged to
promote all-around exchanges and cooperation in
all fields with China and South Korea, to build up
future-oriented relations with the two countries
on the basis of mutual understanding and trust.
The new premier showed positive attitude toward
historical issues, acknowledging that Japanese
invasion and colonization during World War II
inflicted bitter sufferings by the peoples and
heavy damages in property in many countries,
especially Asian countries, and reaffirmed Japan's
acceptance of the ruling of the Far East Military
Tribunal on war crimes. Abe's foreign-policy
pronouncements contradict his domestic campaign
rhetoric.
Good beginning with
China In his second week in office, Abe
made an official visit to China, making himself
the first postwar Japanese prime minister who
chose China for his maiden diplomatic tour.
Chinese President Hu Jintao described Abe's visit
as "a turning point in China-Japan relations" and
expressed hope it would also serve as a new
starting point for better relations. Premier Wen
Jiabao said a "window of hope" had been opened.
v In a joint communique issued during
Abe's trip to China, the two governments agreed to
continue to abide by the principles of the
Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of September 29,
1972, Article 3 of which states: "The government
of the People's Republic of China reiterates that
Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of
the People's Republic of China. The government of
Japan fully understands and respects this position
of the government of the People's Republic of
China, and shall firmly abide by the principles
under Article 8 in the Potsdam Proclamation", the
Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of
1978 and the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration of
1998 on Building a Partnership of Friendship and
Cooperation for Peace and Development. The two
sides also agreed to face history squarely and be
oriented toward the future.
The communique
stated that the two countries would properly deal
with problems affecting the development of
bilateral ties and promote bilateral relations
through expanding both political and economic
links. Both sides agreed to make efforts to build
a mutually beneficial relationship based on common
strategic interests and to realize the goals of
peaceful co-existence, long-lasting friendship,
mutually beneficial cooperation and common
development.
Abe's China tour earned him
credit at home. Akihiro Ota, president of Japan's
junior ruling-coalition party The New Komeito,
spoke highly of Abe's visit to China, expressing
the hope that two countries would further
strengthen the mutual understanding.
Mizuho Fukushima, secretary general of the
Social Democratic Party, said she hoped Abe's
visit to China could be a positive turning point
in bilateral ties.
Abe's gesture was
ardently welcomed by the Japanese economic sector,
which hoped for sound political relations with
China, Japan's largest trade partner, so that
Japanese firms could operate under more favorable
circumstances. Kakutaro Kitashiro, chairman of the
Japan Association of Corporate Executive,
expressed hope that summits between the two
countries would be arranged on a regular basis and
bilateral economic relationship further developed.
Abe's visit to China reinvigorated the
stalled Sino-Japanese relationship. Sustaining
hard-won amity would require continued efforts
from both sides. Xu Dunxin, Chinese ambassador to
Japan from 1993 to 1998, was "prudently
optimistic" about the prospects of China-Japan
relations, but he warned that Abe's visit could
not resolve all the problems in bilateral ties as
they were complicated and protracted.
In a
recent exclusive interview with Xinhua, the
official news agency of China, Abe reiterated his
judgment that Japan-China bilateral ties are of
great significance, and preserving and
strengthening of friendship between the two
countries are vital to peace and development of
the region and the world at large. More potential
of the relations is yet to be exploited, Abe said,
adding that China's development means
opportunities for Japan and he is willing to make
efforts to promote bilateral ties further.
On August 4, less than two months before
he was elected prime minister on September 26,
Japanese media reported that Abe had visited the
Yasukuni Shrine the previous April. Abe claimed
the visit was of a personal and non-official
nature. As prime minister, Abe visited a Shinto
shrine on New Year's Day, but stayed away
controversial Yasukuni war shrine in what domestic
media said was an effort to appease
neo-conservative supporters without raising
tension abroad.
On the sidelines of the
East Asia Summit in Cebu, Philippines, in
mid-January, Abe met with Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao, which led to Wen's indication that Beijing
is willing to cooperate in resolving the issue of
Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea. This
was a breakthrough for Abe's diplomacy. Wen also
agreed to visit Japan in April, the first by a
Chinese premier in seven years. Neither Japan nor
China brought up the thorny issue of visits by
Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. The lack of
discussion, however, also means the issue remains
prickly while both side are trying to avoid
escalation on a sensitive issue in the domestic
politics in both countries.
However, a
Chinese Foreign Ministry source has confidently
stated, "Abe will not visit Yasukuni as long as he
is prime minister." Behind that sure pronouncement
was the assumption that not only would Abe visit
China again, but Chinese President Hu Jintao would
also go to Japan. The Chinese source said, "Abe is
not likely to say he won't visit Yasukuni. But
that's all right as long as the net result is that
he does not visit Yasukuni. There has never been a
time with so many scheduled mutual visits by
Japanese and Chinese leaders. The visits are the
symbols of friendship."
Still, Premier Wen
Jiabao has also indicated China has not changed
its fundamental stance on history. Abe, meanwhile,
after pressing the reset button on Japan-China
ties with his visit to Beijing in October, voiced
criticism of China during the his recent European
travels. Abe's diplomatic strategy aims to
minimize friction with Beijing through bilateral
talks and contact, while exploiting Japanese
affinity to Western values to keep pressure on
China. In Europe, Abe repeatedly pushed three
items: North Korean nuclear-weapons development,
the abduction issue, and Japan's concerns with
China's military modernization, with opposition to
lifting the European Union's ban on weapons
exports to China imposed in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen incident since 1989.
Recently,
China has related to Japan that the anticipated
state visit by Hu to Tokyo may not take place this
year as planned, signaling Chinese reservations
regarding Abe's true agenda. Ignoring popular
opposition at home, Abe while in Europe endorsed
Bush's controversial new plan of a troop surge to
war-torn Iraq.
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