Japanese nukes: Voicing the
unthinkable By Hisane Masaki
TOKYO - Despite Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe's repeated commitments to Japan's
non-nuclear-weapons policy, some key figures in
his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and
government keep talking about the need to debate
the possibility of joining the ranks of nuclear
powers, raising concerns both at home and abroad.
In the wake of North Korea's testing of a
nuclear bomb on October 9, Foreign Minister Taro
Aso and Shoichi Nakagawa, chairman of
the
LDP's powerful Policy Research Council, have said
discussion is needed on whether Japan should
possess nuclear weapons. Japan's nuclear-power
industry is so sophisticated that it is widely
believed to be capable of producing nuclear bombs
easily if a decision were made to do so.
Nakagawa said in effect: What if North
Korea launches a nuclear-tipped missile aimed at
Japan? Do we say, "America, please help us"?
Before we can say that, the missile would reach
us. Now is the time to debate the nuclear option.
Nakagawa made such remarks after making a similar
call for such a nuclear debate in Washington. Aso
has offered his support for Nakagawa's proposal,
saying, "If such a discussion is blocked, it would
be criticized as the suppression of the freedom of
speech."
Opposition parties have called
for Aso to resign for his remarks. Ichiro Ozawa,
leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the
main opposition party, blasted the controversial
remarks by Aso and some others in the LDP-led
coalition, saying they "can cause misunderstanding
and damage trust in and outside of Japan".
But Abe has defended the foreign minister.
While reiterating that his government will
maintain the three non-nuclear principles, Abe
rejected opposition calls to fire Aso. Abe has
indicated that discussions on nuclear arms should
not be stifled. Abe said he does not "see any
problem" with remarks uttered by individuals
speaking in a private capacity. "I think it would
be going too far to say that there can be no
debate at all," he said.
It is not as if
there is no criticism within the LDP-led coalition
of the controversial remarks by Aso, Nakagawa and
some others. Even some key executives of the
ruling coalition, including LDP diet affairs
committee chairman Toshihiro Nikai and Defense
Agency Director General Fumio Kyuma, chided Aso
and Nakagawa. Nikai said their comments would
invite misunderstanding. Kyuma also said such a
debate would send the wrong message.
The
comments by Nikai and Kyuma apparently reflected
their concerns over the possible adverse effects
on deliberations of important bills pending in the
diet (parliament) and this Sunday's gubernatorial
election in Okinawa - where a majority of local
residents are opposed to the huge presence of US
bases and forces. Topping the LDP's agenda in the
current extraordinary diet session, which is to
last until mid-December, are revisions of the
Fundamental Law of Education and upgrading the
status of the Defense Agency to a ministry.
Ozawa and his party's secretary general,
Yukio Hatoyama, are just playing politics with the
issue. In fact, they have made statements
themselves suggesting Japan might arm itself with
nuclear weapons. In 2002, Ozawa, then president of
the now defunct Liberal Party, claimed that Japan
could make a large number of nuclear weapons
"overnight" to curb China's "excessive expansion".
In 1999, Hatoyama, then DPJ leader,
defended Shingo Nishimura, parliamentary vice
minister of the Defense Agency, over his remarks
about a possible nuclear armament. "If one is
fired immediately after talking about whether
Japan could be armed with nuclear weapons or not,
we can't hold discussions at the diet," Hatoyama
said at the time, adding, "It's questionable to
argue that such an issue shouldn't be discussed."
Senior civil servants in Japan usually
distance themselves from those remarks by
politicians, however. They say the possibility of
Japan developing nuclear weapons is unthinkable.
To be sure, it is unlikely that Japan will choose
to acquire nuclear weapons, at least in the
foreseeable future. But no matter how remote, the
specter of a nuclear-armed Japan leaves many
countries, including its most important ally, the
United States, as well as Asian neighbors,
jittery.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice visited Tokyo shortly after North Korea
tested a nuclear bomb to assuage fears - and
thereby indirectly urge Japan not to react to the
North Korean test by pursuing development of its
own nuclear weapons - as well as to coordinate
strict enforcement of sanctions against Pyongyang.
Rice reaffirmed the US commitment to safeguard
Japan under its nuclear umbrella, saying
emphatically that it would use the "full range" of
its powers to defend Japan.
But what had
long been considered a taboo subject after World
War II is now being openly discussed, not just by
the right-wing fringe but even in the mainstream.
This apparently reflects the fact that many
Japanese feel more insecure in the increasingly
volatile security environment surrounding their
country.
In August 1998, North Korea
stunned Japan by test-firing a Taepodong-1
missile, which flew over Japan and fell into the
Pacific. Pyongyang has already deployed an
estimated 200 shorter-range Rodong missiles that
can strike almost all of Japanese territory. North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il acknowledged in 2002
that his reclusive Stalinist state had abducted
some Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s to
train spies, sparking an outburst of anger - and
fears - among most Japanese.
Pyongyang's
recent nuclear test, which followed its July
test-firing of missiles, including a failed test
of a Taepodong-2 missile that could reach some US
territory, has significantly heightened concerns
among most Japanese. As a result, Japan has revved
up efforts to deploy its missile defense system in
cooperation with the US.
Shortly after
North Korea's missile launches in July, then
Defense Agency chief Fukushiro Nukaga even said
Japan should consider possessing preemptive
capabilities to strike North Korea's missile
sites. Abe, then chief cabinet secretary, also
said, "If we accept that there is no other option
to prevent an attack ... there is the view that
attacking the launch base of the guided missiles
is within the constitutional right of
self-defense." Nukaga's predecessor, Shigeru
Ishiba, has made similar calls. Only several years
ago, both would surely have been dismissed for
their remarks.
There is growing alarm in
Japan over potential threats posed not only by
North Korea in the short term, but also by China
in the medium and long terms. China, an ascendant
military power, has boosted its defense spending
at a double-digit pace for 18 years - and
increased naval activities in the seas close to
Japan, as exemplified by the intrusion of a
Chinese nuclear-powered submarine into Japanese
territorial waters off Okinawa in November 2004.
China already possesses about 30
intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could
reach the US, and is now arming them with multiple
independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV)
warheads to counter the US missile defense system.
To keep the Japanese nuclear genie in its bottle
in the medium and long terms, the United States
might need to keep reassuring Japan that the US
nuclear umbrella would apply to a threat from the
much bigger nuclear and missile power than North
Korea.
Japan and China are locked in
potentially explosive disputes over uninhabited
islands and gas reserves in the East China Sea.
Heightened security concerns among many Japanese
made it politically possible for Abe's
predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, to stretch the
boundaries of the postwar pacifist constitution,
including deploying non-combat Self-Defense Forces
to Iraq, the first SDF mission to a combat zone
after World War II. Abe apparently wants to push
the constitutional boundaries even further.
Abe, Japan's youngest postwar premier at
52 and the first born after the war, also wants to
have the US-written constitution itself revised
while he is in office, altering the war-renouncing
Article 9. He has advocated a more assertive
foreign policy and called for a "departure from
the postwar regime" to enable the country to take
a higher profile militarily on the global stage.
Still, public opinion polls, including
recent ones, show that the vast majority of
Japanese people remain resolutely opposed to going
so far as to arm their country with nuclear
weapons. Many opponents of a proposed debate on
the possible nuclear option insist that Japanese
politicians have a duty to strive hard to
eliminate nuclear weapons from the globe.
Other critics argue that although Japan
has made a bid for a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council, it should seek to gain
the seat as a non-nuclear nation so as to play a
unique role there. At present, all five permanent
council seats are held by nuclear powers - the
United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom
and France.
The death of a
taboo Japan's three non-nuclear principles
- not to manufacture, possess or allow nuclear
weapons on its soil - were first announced by then
prime minister Eisaku Sato in a speech to
parliament in 1967. The diet formally passed a
resolution adopting the principles in 1971,
although they have never been enacted into law.
The Sato government also signed the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. Sato won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 in recognition of his
announcement of the three non-nuclear principles.
The governments of Sato's successors have
vowed publicly to abide by the non-nuclear
principles. But actually, Japan has secretly
explored the possibility of going nuclear at least
twice. Both studies came to the same conclusion:
ruling out atomic armament as an option so long as
the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella was
maintained.
The first consideration was
made while Sato was in office. The Cabinet
Information Research Office commissioned scholars
and scientists to conduct basic research on
Japan's nuclear policy between 1967 and 1970. The
study was conducted, assuming a nuclear threat
from China. In a report on their findings, the
experts concluded that Japan should not possess
nuclear weapons since they would inevitably result
in diplomatic isolation.
In 1995 the
Defense Agency produced a 31-page internal study
on the benefits and drawbacks of pursuing nuclear
arms, after the 1993-94 crisis over North Korea's
nuclear-weapons program. This study also warned
against moving ahead with a nuclear program on the
grounds that it would cost too much, upset the
power balance in the region, and undermine Japan's
security agreement with the US.
Apart from
those secret studies, however, publicly discussing
the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons had
been considered taboo until recently. In 1999,
Shingo Nishimura, then parliamentary vice minister
of the Defense Agency in the government of prime
minister Keizo Obuchi, was ousted from his post
after making remarks suggesting Japan should be
armed with nuclear weapons.
Prime
ministers and chief cabinet secretaries
customarily try to play down obvious gaffes when a
cabinet minister utters remarks that contradict
official government policies. This usually takes
the form of a warning, but it is not rare that
such problematic ministers are fired.
Some
critics have questioned Abe's leadership
abilities, citing his failure to rein in hawkish
remarks by Aso and Nakagawa. But they may be
forgetting that the prime minister is an equally
hawkish nationalist in his own right.
Before taking office, Abe himself said the
country's constitution does not specifically
forbid development of a nuclear deterrent. This
view was in line with a unified official view
expressed by the government in 1978 that the
constitution does not prohibit the possession of
weapons, whether nuclear or conventional, so long
as they are limited to the minimum necessary to
defend the country.
Abe has been careful
since North Korea's nuclear test to say Japan has
no plan to go nuclear. But he clearly is aligned
with those who feel that the subject of possessing
a nuclear arsenal should be on the table for
study.
Terumasa Nakanishi, a professor of
international politics at Kyoto University and one
of Abe's five close, ultra-conservative
brain-trusters, collectively known as "the
quintet", has called for a review of the three
non-nuclear principles.
"A missile defense
system alone cannot protect Japan from a nuclear
attack," Nakanishi said. "The only way to repress
a North Korean nuclear attack is by possessing
nuclear capabilities." Nakanishi specifically has
called for ditching one of the three non-nuclear
principles to allow the US to deploy such weapons
on Japanese soil.
Echoing Nakanishi's
view, senior LDP lawmaker Takashi Sasagawa
expressed doubts about that principle and said
debate will emerge on whether Japan's security can
be maintained if it continues to prohibit nuclear
arms on its territory. Sasagawa said at a party
meeting that North Korea will definitely seek to
possess nuclear weapons and that he does not think
it is realistic for Japan to continue not to allow
such arms on to its territory, while accepting the
other two principles - of not producing and not
possessing nuclear arms. Sasagawa told reporters
separately that Japan's non-nuclear policy has so
far worked effectively but that he has called for
debate on Japan's response to a nuclear-armed
North Korea.
Some experts say that in
reality, the three non-nuclear principles have
never been implemented in full because US warships
carrying such weapons have been allowed to visit
Japanese ports under a secret agreement between
Tokyo and Washington. To be exact, they say, the
principles are 2.5 principles. However, the US no
longer routinely carries nuclear weapons on its
aircraft carriers, so the issue is somewhat moot.
Critics say that any debate in Japan on a
possible nuclear armament would just provide North
Korea with an excuse to push ahead with its own
nuclear-weapons program. Apart from the
possibility of Japan going nuclear, many experts
worry that even deterrence under the US nuclear
umbrella, based only on the threat of retaliation,
may not work as effectively as expected against
leaders of rogue states like North Korea, who are
more willing to take risks, gambling with the
lives of their people and the wealth of their
nations.
Some people, including in the US,
believe that just discussing Japan's possible
nuclear armament can be important and effective
strategically, not only as a warning to North
Korea but as a "Japan card" to pressure China to
work harder to stop Pyongyang developing nuclear
weapons. Apparently with the Japan card in mind,
US Vice President Dick Cheney once said, "The idea
of a nuclear-armed North Korea with ballistic
missiles to deliver those will, I think, probably
set off an arms race in that part of the world.
That's not in China's interest."
Suspicions seem to be brewing on both
sides of the political spectrum, with Abe's
conservative supporters fearing that he will
further deviate from the nationalistic path they
initially expected him to tread as premier, while
critics of the hawkish views he has expressed in
the past, on history and other issues,
apprehending that he might revert to type before
long.
Hisane Masaki is a
Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on
international politics and economy. Masaki's
e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com.
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