Seoul, Tokyo and the forbidden nuclear
card By Yoel Sano
As hopes
fade for a speedy resolution of the crisis over North
Korea's nuclear-weapons program, there have been
indications that South Korea and Japan - Pyongyang's
principal enemies in the region - might themselves have
been or might be considering embarking on the road to
nuclear weapons, or at least giving thought to the
option, and not for the first time. While the short-term
threat stems from North Korea's nuclear weapons, over
the longer term both South Korea and Japan are
increasingly pursuing a path of "strategic independence"
from their principal security guarantor of the past 60
years, the United States.
If both nations
possessed nuclear weapons, that arguably would defuse
the North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as change the
geostrategic landscape of North Asia. Regardless of what
Washington and Beijing wants, and even though it is not
yet inevitable, the chances that South Korea and/or
Japan may go nuclear in coming years has risen
substantially of late.
Both Seoul and Tokyo are
aspiring to greater global influence, and to this end
they may see benefits from possessing their own nuclear
forces even if North Korea is eventually disarmed. The
big "losers" in any potential arms race could be the US
and China.
Cold War considerations drove Seoul's
early research. South Korea recently revealed that its
scientists had conducted experiments (not authorized by
the government) with nuclear materials in 1982 and 2000.
These experiments were by no means the first time that
Seoul had weighed the nuclear option. Former military
ruler General Park Chung-hee (1961-79) had ordered his
defense and scientific establishment to embark on a
fledgling nuclear-weapons program as far back as 1970,
and proceeded with the project for five years before the
US discovered its existence and pressured Park to
abandon it.
For South Korea, the initial nuclear
drive was triggered by Park's fear of US unreliability
after the administration of president Richard M Nixon
ordered the withdrawal of the US 7th Division from Korea
in 1970. This subsequently reduced the US military
presence in South Korea by 20,000 from 62,000 troops.
Indeed, under the "Guam Doctrine" (1969), Washington had
already begun pressing its allies to do more to take
care of their own security arrangements, so that the US
could avoid losing its soldiers in major wars in Asia.
When the US withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, Park
became increasingly convinced that South Korea had to
become more militarily independent of the US if Seoul
were ever to be able to deter or decisively repulse
another North Korean invasion.
Japan first
embarked on a nuclear-weapons program during World War
II, although Tokyo failed to match the progress made by
the US and the Soviet Union. Ironically, much of Japan's
research and development infrastructure was located in
what is today North Korea, in order to keep those
facilities safe from US bombing raids on its home
islands. After the war, the government of prime minister
Eisaku Sato (1964-72) carried out a special study in
1967 into the desirability and viability of Japan
independently developing nuclear weapons, though the
report recommended against such a move. In 1968, Sato's
administration adopted the "Three Non-Nuclear
Principles" of not possessing, developing, or allowing
the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japanese
territory.
A year later, however, a government
report - the contents of which were only revealed in
1994 - stated that while the country did not need
nuclear weapons "for the time being", Tokyo should "keep
the economic and technical potential for the production
of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will
not be interfered with in this regard".
During
the Cold War, Japan's main enemy was the Soviet Union.
Tokyo remained without a nuclear deterrent, instead
counting on the protection of the United States'
"nuclear umbrella". Whether the US actually would have
risked destruction of its own cities by Soviet nukes if
Washington retaliated against the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics after the USSR invaded or attacked
Japan is something we will never know, since the Cold
War ended peacefully.
Japan, however, is once
again facing the nuclear threat, and this has prompted
growing calls for Japan to break with its Three
Non-Nuclear Principles.
North Korea's nukes a
short-term threat North Korea's nuclear-weapons
program remains the main catalyst for any attempts by
Seoul and Tokyo to go nuclear. At the height of the
crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear program in 1994, the
North threatened to turn the South into a "sea of fire".
Barely a fortnight ago, on September 23, North Korea's
official media warned that Pyongyang would turn Japan
into a "nuclear sea of fire" if the US were to attack it
with nuclear weapons. While these threats may be mere
posturing - Pyongyang's media rhetoric is often far more
apocalyptic than that of its diplomats - neither South
Korean nor Japanese leaders can afford to take that
chance and risk letting six decades of economic progress
and development go up in a mushroom cloud.
Indeed, uncertainty over a mysterious explosion
and mushroom cloud (albeit non-nuclear) over North Korea
on the 56th anniversary of the republic's foundation
(September 9) - and the fact that Pyongyang frequently
test-fires missiles capable of hitting all of Japan as
well as South Korea - underscore the dangers faced by
Seoul and Tokyo. Japan, the only country ever to have
experienced a nuclear attack, will do whatever is
necessary to prevent another Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
Officially, the US would most probably use
nuclear weapons to retaliate against North Korea if
Pyongyang ever used its own atomic bombs against the
South or Japan. Even the comparatively mild-talking
former president Bill Clinton publicly warned North
Korea in 1993 that "it is pointless for them to try to
develop nuclear weapons, because it they ever use them
it would mean the end of their country". However, if
push came to shove, it is not clear whether Washington
would retaliate accordingly, especially given that
Pyongyang is developing longer-range intercontinental
missiles capable of hitting the United States as a
deterrent against Washington.
For both Seoul and
Tokyo, developing their own nuclear weapons would send a
clear message to Pyongyang that regardless of what
actions the United States takes or fails to take in and
around the Korean Peninsula in any new crisis, South
Korea or Japan would be able to respond to any nuclear
strike by the North.
For South Korea, this is
not just a question of deterring a Northern nuclear
strike. The city of Seoul is particularly vulnerable to
North Korea's conventional artillery pieces, some 1,000
long-range units (out of a total of 12,500 guns) of
which target the capital, according to comments this
week by South Korean legislator Park Jin. Pyongyang
therefore has the ability to wreak devastation against
the South even without the use of nuclear weapons. If
the South possessed nukes, it would have a major card to
play against the Northern artillery threat. Japan is out
of range of North Korean artillery, but not out of range
of Pyongyang's short-range missiles, which could be used
to carry chemical or biological warheads. A nuclear card
would serve as deterrence against Pyongyang's dire "sea
of fire" threats.
Seoul, Tokyo seeking
world-power status Beyond the immediate threat of
North Korea, both South Korea and particularly Japan are
seeking a greater global role after decades of junior
partnership with the United States. Their new ambitions
reflect an increasing confidence within both countries,
especially in view of the fact that they are the most
economically developed in the region, and in Japan's
case, the world's second-largest economy. Since the US
withdrawal from South Vietnam in the early 1970s, South
Korea has served as the US military's only base on the
Asian mainland, and it currently hosts 37,000 troops.
For its part, Japan has for decades served as an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier" off the east coast of
Eurasia, and currently hosts 42,000 US soldiers.
Neither South Korea nor Japan is content to
occupy forever the secondary roles they have been
playing until now, auxiliary to the US. While Japan's
leaders have long bemoaned Tokyo's lack of global clout
in relation to the size of its economy, South Korea is
also becoming increasingly assertive. There has been a
generational shift in both countries, which is also
fostering new foreign-policy visions. In South Korea,
the younger, more nationalistic generation edging into
power grew up after the Korean War (1950-53), and it
sees the US - its longtime ally and protector - as the
main obstacle blocking the Korean reconciliation
process.
In Japan, the older generation that
suffered the devastation of World War II is passing from
the scene, and the younger generation feels less
beholden to the US. This has created the conditions for
a more independent strategic posture by both countries.
Although both domestic and foreign critics of South
Korea's and Japan's decisions to send 3,000 and 600
troops, respectively, to Iraq have portrayed these
deployments as traditional bows to Washington, the
missions more accurately reflect the fact that Seoul and
Tokyo are laying the groundwork for military deployments
wherever their interests may be threatened in future. In
view of the fact that South Korea and Japan import the
vast bulk of their oil supplies from the Middle East,
Iraq represents a logical first destination.
In
this regard, while South Korea's troop contingent in
Iraq is bigger than Japan's, Tokyo's overall global
ambitions are greater. Japan is lobbying hard for a
permanent seat on the 15-member United Nations Security
Council. Although nuclear capability is not a
prerequisite for membership, it cannot have been lost on
Japan that all five permanent members - the United
States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France -
are all declared nuclear-weapons-possessing states, and
major military powers.
With both South Korea and
Japan competing to emerge as major powers, the nuclear
dimension also feeds into how the two nations view each
other. Bilateral relations have traditionally been
hostile, owing to Koreans' deep resentment of Japan's
brutal occupation of the peninsula (1910-45). More
recently, as South Korea has come to compete
economically against Japan in vital areas such as
manufactured products, consumer goods, high-tech
components, cars, steel and shipbuilding, the two
nations have found themselves competing in geopolitical
terms. Furthermore, in view of Japan's publication in
2001 of school textbooks downplaying the Imperial Army's
atrocities in Korea, Seoul fears that Tokyo is
unrepentant for past misdeeds, and consequently
politically untrustworthy as well.
Therefore, if
Japan goes nuclear, so will South Korea, and vice versa.
That does not mean that the two countries will target
each other militarily; rather this reflects a
competition for prestige, as has been the case with
longtime allies Britain and France.
China
looms in Korea's and Japan's calculations Aside
from expanding their global roles, South Korea and Japan
must also take into account the aspirations and destiny
of China in their strategic considerations. This is much
more an issue for Japan's defense planners, in view of
China's emergence as a major military power and its
historical distrust of Japan, rather than distrust of
Korea.
Furthermore, Beijing fears that Japan
would allow the US to use its bases in Okinawa and
elsewhere in the Japanese archipelago to stage missions
in the defense of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese
invasion of the island state. Meanwhile, Japanese
leaders fear that the rise of China could lead to its
domination of East Asia and Southeast Asia - regions
over which Japan also is seeking influence. It was such
fears of China as a menacing regional superpower that
prompted Ichiro Ozawa, leader of Japan's opposition
Liberal Party, to warn in April 2002 that his country
could quickly build thousands of nuclear weapons if
Tokyo felt challenged by China. Although Ozawa is more
hawkish than most Japanese politicians, calls for
nuclear weapons have grown louder in recent years.
By contrast, South Korea's perception of China
is more complicated. Although Beijing sided with North
Korea against the South during the Korean War, Seoul has
managed to forge warm ties with China, despite the fact
that formal bilateral relations were only established as
late as 1992. China last year overtook the United States
as the biggest purchaser of South Korean exports, and
Seoul is courting Beijing in the hope that the latter
will use its influence over Pyongyang to improve
inter-Korean relations. Many Korea-watchers believe that
once Korea is reunified, the peninsula republic will
gradually move into Greater China's orbit, as has been
the case in past centuries. However, the recent dispute
between China and South Korea over whether the ancient
kingdom of Koguryo (Goguryeo) was a Chinese or a Korean
entity raises the possibility that a reunified Korea may
press territorial claims on parts of China's neighboring
Jilin province, where up to 2 million ethnic Koreans
live. That won't necessarily mean that China and Korea
will become nuclear enemies, but possession of a nuclear
capability may allow Seoul to speak with a louder voice
in future. (It is also argued by some that China is
laying the "historical" foundation to make a future
territorial claim against a reunified Korea.)
US, China, would lose influence The
biggest losers in the event that South Korea and Japan
went nuclear would be the United States and China. The
US has wielded a strong influence over South Korean and
Japanese security policies over the past six decades
thanks to its military presence on their territories,
its provision of the nuclear umbrella, and the fact that
the South Korean and Japanese militaries buy US weapons.
Indeed, Seoul's decision in March 2002 to purchase 40 US
F-15K fighter planes at a cost of US$4.5 billion instead
of more modern European Eurofighter and French Rafale
aircraft - which would have offered South Korea greater
technology transfers and manufacturing opportunities -
underscores the subservient nature of this relationship.
A nuclear South Korea or Japan would no longer
feel the need to host so many US troops, and might ask
for their withdrawal, as the government of the
Philippines requested the exit of US forces stationed
there in 1991. A US departure from South Korea or Japan
would result in diminished political influence in the
two countries. Indeed, South Korea could subsequently
enter a security relationship with China in the long
term, and even Japan could follow suit by bandwagoning
with Beijing, if Tokyo concluded that Chinese domination
over Asia was inevitable, and resistance was pointless
and futile.
The United States thus would see
reduced influence in one of the most economically
powerful regions in the world, one that increasingly
would become a major transportation hub if the Eurasian
"Iron Silk Road" rail corridor linking South Korea and
China (and possibly Japan, if an undersea tunnel is ever
built) to European and Russia markets is developed.
Furthermore, ever since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the grand US strategy has been
aimed at preventing the emergence of a peer competitor
on the world stage. While many strategic analysts now
see China as filling that role, it should be recalled
that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many in the US
feared that Japan was the next up-and-coming superpower.
While Japan's subsequent decade-long economic slump
reduced such concerns, the fact remains that for some
time Japan will remain one of the very few countries
with the economic resources and the technological and
industrial bases with which to build a first-class
military. Therefore, if Japan were to go nuclear, it
would raise the possibility of greater geopolitical
competition with the United States itself.
For
similar reasons, Beijing does not wish to see a nuclear
Japan that could become a superpower rivaling what China
calls its own "peaceful rise". Nor does Beijing want
South Korea to develop such weapons, since this would
undermine its nuclear hegemony in Northeast Asia and
could prompt arch-rival Taiwan to follow suit. For
Beijing, a nuclear Korea and a nuclear Japan would only
be desirable in the unlikely event that the two
countries moved closer to a full partnership with China
and openly rejected their alliances with the United
States.
Regardless of what Washington and
Beijing want, and even though it is not yet inevitable,
the chances that South Korea and/or Japan might go
nuclear in coming years has risen substantially of late.
While the US is busy fighting a global "war on
terrorism", it may find that the emergence of a nuclear
Northeast Asia - and the emergence of independent new
powers in South Korea and Japan - does more to undermine
its global hegemony than the ongoing insurgency in Iraq
and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.
Yoel Sano has worked for publishing
houses in London, providing political and economic
analysis, and has been following Northeast Asia for many
years.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
