| |
Howard's deft political decision on
Iraq
By Jeffrey Robertson
The
pressure on US-allied states in Asia has arguably never
been greater. Despite the media frenzy over the capture
of Saddam Hussein, the United States still desperately
needs assistance in the occupation of Iraq. Accordingly,
each ally faces a difficult decision - commit to a
dangerous and unpopular occupation and suffer the
domestic political consequences or lose favor with the
superpower that ensures its long-term security. This
conundrum has hit the governments of South Korea and
Japan, both of which are sending troops to Iraq in the
face of a mounting death toll that now includes their
own nationals.
However, one country in the
Asia-Pacific region has escaped this difficult choice.
Long before the pressure built up, conservative
Prime Minister John Howard committed Australian forces
to the US-led effort to remove Saddam. It was a decision
that has proved to be politically deft - not the
decision to support the US, but the decision how to
support the US.
Few Australians were surprised
when Howard announced on March 18 that the country's
forces would participate in the invasion of Iraq.
Critics noted the impossibility of not participating in
a US-led invasion. Australia, under the current
conservative coalition, has continually sought to
reaffirm ties with the United States in both the
economic and security fields. Indeed, with the majority
of Australian forces already acclimatizing in the gulf
region since January, it seemed the decision to
participate had been made a considerable time
beforehand.
Australia contributed about 2,000
service personnel, including an F/A-18 Hornet fighter
aircraft squadron and a Special Forces task group.
Australia was the only US ally, besides the United
Kingdom, to undertake significant combat operations
during the invasion of Iraq.
Domestic criticism
was scathing. Howard was popularly portrayed as an eager
lapdog to an overzealous Texan sheriff with a score to
settle. Howard was, critics argued, endangering
Australia's ability to engage with its Asian, and
immediately Islamic, region. Like Prime Minister Tony
Blair in the UK, John Howard even faced growing
opposition from long-time party supporters.
But
John Howard is no political fool - at least his
political/strategic affairs advisers are not. The
make-up of Australian forces deployed to the Persian
Gulf served a particular niche role in the coalition -
one that would not be required after the end of major
combat operations. It has since been revealed that
Howard resisted US requests for the deployment of a
larger land force that would have been more appropriate
for a longer commitment.
The majority of
Australian troops returned in May, both victorious and
safe, leaving behind Australian representatives to
coalition support and reconstruction operations, as well
as a small troop detachment to protect Australian
interests. Requests from the United States and the
United Kingdom for a further peacekeeping commitment
were denied. As stated by Howard: "It's one thing to
have a short, sharp, highly professional, highly
effective contribution when it's really hot. It's
another thing to have a very long commitment of a large
number of regulars." Howard had apparently drawn his
line in the sand.
As November passed with the
greatest number of coalition troops lost in the war
since the commencement of hostilities, Howard's
commitment of Australian forces to the invasion of Iraq
- but not the occupation - emerged as a decision of
considerable political foresight. Howard minimized
damage both to his domestic political standing and to
the long-term security relationship. His handling of the
Iraq crisis warrants further study as an adept play of
alliance politics.
Every alliance involves a
cost-benefit relationship. In security alliances, states
forgo a certain level of sovereignty, entailing a
political cost in return for the benefit of a security
assurance. Committing armed forces to alliance
operations is one example of cost. Successful alliance
management necessitates minimizing the perceived cost to
alliance partners. This can be partially achieved
through ensuring that the national interests of all
alliance partners are perceived to be served in
coalition operations.
The administration of US
President George W Bush failed to do this. The failure
to organize a convincing raison de guerre prior
to the invasion of Iraq resulted in allied support
coming at a much greater political cost - a cost far too
great for most leaders in Asia. The complexity of the
occupation has further necessitated the administration
putting increased pressure on allies to contribute to a
cause they could not support in the first instance, once
again increasing the cost of participation in the
alliance.
The increased political cost of
participation in an alliance relationship inevitably
results in the usefulness of the alliance being
questioned, particularly at a time when the perception
of threat, and hence the need for a security assurance,
is declining. This is the case now across the
Asia-Pacific, where supporting the US has arguably never
been more unpopular.
In Japan, Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi, a staunch supporter of his country's
alliance with the United States, greatly weakened his
political position by making the unpopular decision to
send the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to support the US
in Iraq - future leaders may well make note of the
damage this has inflicted upon Koizumi's once
unassailable political lead.
In South Korea, the
credentials of reform-minded President Roh Moo-hyun were
severely discredited by his decision to send 3,000
troops to Iraq - future reformers may well consider any
commitment to US operations abroad as a political taboo.
John Howard's decision on how to support the US
avoided damaging what he clearly believes to be
Australia's most important relationship. It is his
belief that there exists an unshakable common ideal
between Australian national interests and US foreign and
security policies. In his words it is "a relationship
that, although expressed in security terms, really
expresses shared values and shared ideals between two
societies". Yet in the end, he made a decision that was
based as much upon domestic political considerations.
In the coming months as the death toll from the
occupation of Iraq inevitably spreads to Asia and the
political leaders in South Korea and Japan are further
assailed by the damaging political fallout, they will
undoubtedly study how John Howard managed to both
minimize the damage to his domestic political standing
while ensuring the stability of the long-term security
relationship with the United States. Undeniably, Howard
made a deft political decision in supporting the
invasion, and not the occupation.
(Copyright
2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
