It requires a slow news day for attention to be paid to meetings of the Group
of 20 (G-20), especially the lesser ones starring the finance ministers and
central bank governors as against the broader conclave that includes political
heavyweights. In the past, the meetings have been about bromides and
insignificant policy broadsides; at worst, the G-20 meetings have produced
dangerous expansions of government attempts to counter the economic slide
beginning in 2007.
This time, a two-day meeting in Busan, South Korea, which concluded on
Saturday, also promised to be yet another
meaningless meeting, but Friday changed all that, with the worse-than-expected
non-farm payroll data from the United States and the declaration of a brewing
sovereign crisis in Hungary that sent risk assets crashing on the day; the
developments made me quite curious about any reaction from the G-20.
Before dwelling on the subject of the most recent meeting though, perhaps it is
a good idea to think back about the "achievements" of recent meetings. After
much chest-thumping and self serving Keynesian nonsense, the most recent
meetings were all about fiscal responses that were supposed to reverse economic
declines. Recognizing that many governments would be unable to move forward
with their own steam, the G-20 also agreed on a more powerful remit for the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Writing about the main G-20 meeting in April 2009, I commented:
As with
the previous rounds of G-20 meetings, I actually did try to read the final,
official statement from the gathering. Unfortunately the assembled brainpower
completely lost me on the fifth point:
The agreements we have reached today, to treble resources available to the IMF
to US$750 billion, to support a new SDR [the special drawing rights, or
currency, of the International Monetary Fund] allocation of $250 billion, to
support at least $100 billion of additional lending by the MDBs [multilateral
development banks], to ensure $250 billion of support for trade finance, and to
use the additional resources from agreed IMF gold sales for concessional
finance for the poorest countries, constitute an additional $1.1 trillion
programme of support to restore credit, growth and jobs in the world economy.
Together with the measures we have each taken nationally, this constitutes a
global plan for recovery on an unprecedented scale.
(Japan, the European Union and China will provide the first $250 billion of the
increase in IMF rescue funds to $750 billion, with the $250 billion balance to
come from as yet unidentified countries, Bloomberg reported. The G-20 said they
would couple the financing moves with steps to give emerging economic
powerhouses such as China, India and Brazil a greater say in how the IMF is
run, the report said.)
In effect, the only tangible result of the G-20 meeting - the tripling of IMF
resources - is astounding. The same people who drove the Latin American economy
into dust and were responsible for widespread poverty in Asia in the aftermath
of the Asian crisis; the very people who encouraged the idiotic accumulation of
market-return independent foreign exchange reserves by Asian countries that
subsequently caused the asset bubbles of the US and Europe; the very people who
had no clue about the impending bubble burst up until the beginning of 2008,
are now supposed to gather up the foresight and skills required to end an
economic crisis whose only recent historic parallel was the 1929 depression in
the United States; an event that took place a good 16 years before the IMF was
itself created. (See
G20 Piles Folly upon Folly, Asia Times Online, April 4, 2009),
In the event, it didn't take long for the withdrawal symptoms to set into the
markets; barely a month after the first such agreement (for Greece) was
initialed, the resulting withdrawal of risk appetite has catapulted not just
Greece but much of southern Europe towards a crisis. The widening of the crisis
mentality to outside the zone, ie to Hungary last week, as well as a focus on
selling off resource-based currencies like the Australian dollar all certainly
merit attention.
Look at the statement from last week's G-20 meeting and two main aspects stand
out: firstly the withdrawal of support for broad-based fiscal stimulus
strategies and secondly the continued fear surrounding the implementation of
any new strictures on banks. The second point of the communique details the
following:
The global economy continues to recover faster than
anticipated, although at an uneven pace across countries and regions. However,
the recent volatility in financial markets reminds us that significant
challenges remain and underscores the importance of international cooperation.
The G-20's strong policy response to the crisis has played a pivotal role in
restoring growth and we stand ready to safeguard recovery and strengthen
prospects for growth and jobs. We welcome the determined actions taken by the
European Union, the European Central Bank and the IMF. We will pursue well
coordinated economic policies. The recent events highlight the importance of
sustainable public finances and the need for our countries to put in place
credible, growth-friendly measures, to deliver fiscal sustainability,
differentiated for and tailored to national circumstances. Those countries with
serious fiscal challenges need to accelerate the pace of consolidation. We
welcome the recent announcements by some countries to reduce their deficits in
2010 and strengthen their fiscal frameworks and institutions. Within their
capacity, countries will expand domestic sources of growth, while maintaining
macroeconomic stability. This will help ensure ongoing recovery. In addition,
structural reforms, development policies, particularly supporting the poorest
countries, and ongoing efforts to refrain from raising trade and investment
barriers and resist protectionist measures are required. Monetary policy will
continue to be appropriate to achieve price stability and thereby contribute to
the recovery.
Ignore the back-slapping at the beginning of the
paragraph and go to the crunch part of the statement: "importance of
sustainable public finances ... fiscal sustainability ... consolidation ...
reduce deficits ... structural reforms ... resist protectionist measures". So
the finance ministers and central bankers at least got the memo from the
markets.
That said, there was no mention of the immediate near-term measures required to
boost confidence, much less any notion of rewinding various commitments on the
fiscal front that could help boost confidence over the near term.
Then the kid gloves came out, when discussing the financial sector. Point four
of the communique is lengthy but also apparently without any discernible
purpose or urgency:
Agreed further progress on financial repair is critical to global economic
recovery. This requires greater transparency and further strengthening of
banks' balance sheets and better corporate governance of financial firms.
Committed to reach agreement expeditiously on stronger capital and liquidity
standards as the core of our reform agenda and in that regard fully support the
work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and call on them to propose
internationally agreed rules to improve both the quantity and quality of bank
capital and to discourage excessive leverage and risk taking by the November
2010 Seoul Summit. It is critical that our banking regulators develop capital
and liquidity rules of sufficient rigor to allow our financial firms to
withstand future downturns in the global financial system. As we agreed, these
rules will be phased in as financial conditions improve and economic recovery
is assured, with the aim of implementation by end-2012. We welcome the progress
on the quantitative and macroeconomic impact studies which will inform the
calibration and phasing in, respectively. We are committed to move together in
a transparent and coordinated way on national implementation of the agreed
rules. Implementation of these new rules should be complemented by strong
supervision.
Emphasized the need to reduce moral hazard associated with systemically
important financial institutions and reinforced our commitment to develop
effective resolution tools and frameworks for all financial institutions on the
basis of internationally agreed principles. We look forward to the FSB's
interim report to the Toronto Summit.
Agreed the financial sector should make a fair and substantial contribution
towards paying for any burdens associated with government interventions, where
they occur, to repair the banking system or fund resolution. To that end,
recognizing that there is a range of policy approaches, we agreed to develop
principles reflecting the need to protect taxpayers, reduce risks from the
financial system, protect the flow of credit in good times and bad, taking into
account individual country's circumstances and options, and helping promote
level playing field. The IMF will deliver their final report at the Toronto
Summit.
Committed to accelerate the implementation of strong measures to improve
transparency, regulation and supervision of hedge funds, credit rating
agencies, compensation practices and OTC [over the counter] derivatives in an
internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way. We called on the FSB
[the Financial Stability Board, tasked with reforming the global financial
system alongside the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] to review national
and regional implementation in these areas and promote global policy cohesion.
We also committed to improve the functioning and transparency of commodities
markets.
Expressed the importance we place in achieving a single set of high quality,
global accounting standards and urged the International Accounting Standards
Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to redouble their efforts to
that end. We encouraged the International Accounting Standards Board to further
improve involvement of stakeholders.
The choices of verbs are interesting and instructive: "committed to reach
agreement ... rules will be phased in ... need to reduce moral hazard ... fair
and substantial contribution towards paying ... express the importance we place
...". Apparently, stronger and more action-oriented phrases like "mandatory
levy", "immediate implementation", "instruct financial firms", "regulate"
couldn't be found in the dictionaries on hand across Busan.
The avoidance of a mandatory banking levy - at the behest of Canada, Brazil and
Japan, where the governments didn't have to rescue banks - is probably welcome
news in that at least the notion of cohesion with respect to such an action was
clearly missing. That does prompt the unfortunate re-emergence of regulatory
arbitrage by banks as they move headquarters around to benefit from the "best"
banking environments.
What does the G-20 communique really mean? I am happy to say "not very much".
That is good news, because it could well be the first time that governments
around the world have so explicitly acknowledged their own lack of ideas with
respect to the financial crisis. Previous attempts to re-inflate assets by the
expedient of using government finances have fallen flat.
In economic terms, the gross domestic product multiplier of new government debt
is probably negative, with even apologists claiming it is neutral at best. In
that environment, the best thing to do would be to cut back the role of
government in the economy; which neatly dovetails with the notion of cutting
back plans for a global bank levy, in turn admitting that future bailouts of
banks wouldn't be quite so easy to engineer.
Simply put, without governments having the capability to bail out creditors,
volatility with respect to banks would likely increase dramatically.
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