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     Oct 30, 2008
Page 3 of 4
Killer touch for market capitalism
By Henry C K Liu

Part I: US government throws oil on fire

defeasance is a technique whereby a corporation discharges old, low-rate debt prior to maturity without repaying it. The corporation uses newly purchased securities with a lower face value but paying a higher interest or having a higher market value. The objective is to produce a more debt-free balance sheet and increase earnings in the amount by which the face amount of the old debt exceeds the cost of the new securities.

Exxon shows how
The use of defeasance in modern corporate finance began in 1982 when Exxon bought and put into an irrevocable trust $312 million of US government securities yielding 14% to provide for the repayment of principal and interest on $515 million of old debt

 

paying 5.8% to 6.7% and maturing in 2009. Exxon removed the defeased debt from its balance sheet and added $132 million - the after tax difference between $515 million and $312 million - to its earnings in that quarter. In-substance defeasance may well the magic bullet to get out from the curse of over leverage.

Global stock markets staged a historic rally on Monday, September 13, as European governments pledged a total of 1.87 trillion euros ($2.55 trillion) to shore up their banking system and the US prepared to unveil its own comprehensive rescue plan a day later. In New York, the S&P 500, which the week before fell 18.2%, rose 11.6% - the biggest daily gain since the volatile trading of the Great Depression. The Dax index of the Frankfurt stock exchange closed up 11.4% while the CAC40 in Paris rose 11.2%. In London, the FTSE 100 rose 8.3%, its second largest one-day gain in history, and in Hong Kong, the Hang Seng index rose 10.24%. Yet, the Treasury announcement on Tuesday, September 14, failed to extend the one-day market rally that had greeted every one of the government's precedent-breaking previous measures. All the governmental spectaculars failed to break the secular bear market in which each rebound fails to breach the previous low.

Three-month sterling Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate) on October 14 was just two basis points lower, at about 6.25%, still more than two percentage points above where markets were pricing UK interest rates and higher than where the rate was set before the coordinated interest rate cuts by major economies in the second week of October.

Similarly, the euro three-month Libor, which was down 7.37 basis points at 5.225% on October 14, remained high. There were only weak signs of relief in the frozen credit markets at the centre of the financial crisis, as the three-month dollar Libor eased to 4.75% from 4.82%, even after the Fed lowered the Fed funds rate target to 1.5% on October 8 and three-month Treasuries were yielding 0.5%. This left the so-called Ted spread, which measures the difference between inter-bank lending rates and risk-free government lending rates, at a hefty 420 basis points.

Recapitalization, while lowering leverage to protect the market value of debt, further depresses asset value. Such are the laws of finance in market economies. For this reason, taxpayers may never recoup their investment in the Treasury's nationalization program of the banking system if government funds received by banks are used to 'de-leverage' rather than new lending.

The US government's misguided approach of monetizing illiquid assets held by distressed institutions to remove insolvency threats is self-defeating. In each step, it has predictably failed to jump-start credit and capital markets under seizure because excessive liquidity cannot be cured by more liquidity. Assets become illiquid because their price stubbornly stays above their market value. Such assets will stay illiquid until price adjustments bring about market transactions. Government monetization of illiquid assets will only prolong their illiquid life span.

Markets are not the best intermediaries of long-term value because, for market economies, markets are the prime intermediaries of short-term value. This is why economist Hyman Minsky thought that a substantial public sector is needed to moderate short-term volatility in the private market sector. When the private market sector dominates the economy, the price regime will be excessively tilted by short-term conditions.

Markets can only function when there are matching numbers of willing buyers and sellers at any one time. When the number of sellers is larger than the number of buyers, prices will fall, or in a reverse situation, prices will rise until the number of buyers and sellers match up. Price is the point where willing sellers and willing buyers meet for a fair transaction. Until the price is right, the market remains in suspension. Price fluctuation then is the key factor in addressing imbalances between buyers and sellers in the market. This is both the strength and the weakness of market economies.

Free markets require an equal degree of market power between buyers and sellers. Ideally, a truly free market always leaves both buyers and sellers happy, each being satisfied that the transaction price reflects their differing judgment of fair market value at the point of transaction. The buyer thinks he will gain from future appreciation and the seller thinks he will avoid loss from future depreciation. Only one party in the transaction will turn out to be right at any future point in time. The probability of being wrong is the risk in the transaction. That is the basic principle of market fundamentalism, which is governed by the principle of fluctuating supply and demand through time, intermediated by fluctuation in price.

When market power is not equally distributed among market participants, a free market is replaced by a coerced market. A coerced market is one when one side, either buyers or seller, has more market power. Uneven market power distorted prices to generate market inefficiency. A failed market is one when there are no buyers or sellers at any price.

The ultimate coerced market is one where the government, which by definition possesses overwhelming market power by virtue of its ability to print money by fiat, is the only buyer or seller. Market fundamentalists are right in their belief that government should stay away from the market to avoid destroying the market. Yet they are wrong in thinking that government should deregulate markets to keep it free. And above all, they are dangerously wrong in thinking that markets can satisfy all economic needs.

Government does some things better
The truth is that there are large segments of the economy that only government can handle effectively and efficiently, national defense being one obvious example. This government economic segment is known in a market economy as the public sector. As Minsky insightfully pointed out, the public sector performs a much-needed function in stabilizing the business cycle in the private sector. A society without an adequate public sector leans towards economic anarchy that will eventually implode.

In finance, to make a market means maintaining ready, firm bid and offer prices in a given security by standing ready to buy or sell at publicly quoted prices in round lots (generally accepted units of trading on a securities exchange - on the New York Stock exchange, a round lot is 100 shares for stock and $1,000 or $5,000 par value for bonds). The dealer is called a market maker in the over-the-counter market outside of exchanges. On the exchanges, the dealer is called a specialist. A dealer who makes a market over a long period is said to "maintain" a market.

The NASDAQ requires that there be at least two market makers for each stock listed in the system. The bid and asked quotes are compared to ensure that the quote is a representative spread. Registered competitive traders in the New York Stock Exchane (NYSE) are market makers because, in addition to trading for their own accounts, they are expected to help correct an imbalance of orders. Registered competitive traders are NYSE members who buy and sell for their own accounts. Because their members pay no commission, they are able to profit from even small changes in market prices, thus tend to trade actively with high volume.

Like specialists, registered competitive traders must abide by exchange rules, including a requirement that 75% of their trade be stabilizing, meaning they cannot sell unless the last trading price on a stock is up, or buy unless the last trading price was down. Orders from the trading public take precedence over those of registered competitive traders, which normally account for less than 1% of total volume.

The central bank cannot be a market maker because the central bank is empowered to create new money. This power to create new money gives the central bank unequalled market power and turns it from a market maker into a market destroyer. Throughout history, the sovereign who enjoys the power of seigniorage refrains from being a market participant for good reasons. When the sovereign owns everything, there is no way to tell how much the sovereign is worth. This is why even in a communist society where the people as sovereign own the means of production, markets are still required to establish prices to efficiently allocate economic and financial resources.

The government's intervention has created a relative advantage for companies to raising funds through guaranteed bank paper versus the asset-backed markets. The ability of banks and other financial groups to raise money via government guarantees means funding through more traditional routes such as asset-backed securities will be much more expensive. In the short-term, the government moves are having an effect. There has not been any issuance in credit cards because all the major banks now have another, cheaper option. In addition to offering banks cheaper sources of funding, the explicit government guarantees on many bank securities have led to a sell-off in bonds issued by mortgage financiers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as asset-backed securities. As a result, the cost of borrowing in asset-backed markets has soared, with the premiums over US government bonds at record highs. This makes private sector funding even less attractive.

There are also signs that government funds are being used by banks to buy rivals rather than provide new lending. On Friday, October 14, PNC Financial became the first bank to make use of the US government's bank recapitalization program to merge with a weaker rival. In the longer term, credit-card debt securitization has to be revived because the government programs are not large enough to cover all the banks' funding needs.

Central banks as market destroyers
The recent opening of the Federal Reserve discount window to borrowings by commercial banks, collateralized by illiquid assets, and the extension of discount window access to investment banks have pushed the central bank across the line of being a lender of last resort to being a market destroyer. It is no wonder that its liquidity injection moves have failed to moderate seizure of global credit markets.

This is because the central bank, not constrained by the supply and market value of money, can set the price of illiquid assets by fiat and thus destroy the very function of the market in setting meaningful prices that can defuse market seizure. Central bank

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