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5 CREDIT BUBBLE
BULLETIN Nationalization and
dislocation Commentary and
weekly watch by Doug Noland
As long-time
readers are all too familiar, I have been a
persistent critic of government-sponsored
enterprises, or GSEs - notably mortgage finance
agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These
behemoths of historic credit excess - instigators
of the mortgage finance and housing bubbles -
liquidity backstops for the ballooning leveraged
speculating community - and instrumental agents
for an unparalleled misallocation of financial and
economic resources - are proving themselves the
Freddie Krueger of systemic distortions and policy
failures.
Two recent comments, the first
from Friday's Washington Post,
paint part of the
picture:
To understand Wednesday's decision
by federal regulators to let Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac set aside less cash to protect
against losses, imagine a family that keeps its
precious antique silver in a strongbox on a high
shelf, beyond easy reach. The regulators have
essentially authorized Fannie and Freddie to
pawn some of their family silver.
Currently, the two firms, known as
government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, have
combined reserves of US$82 billion. This
includes an extra amount that the regulator, the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), required them to hold while they got
their books in order after accounting scandals.
Now it is reducing that extra cushion by $5.8
billion. The newly freed-up money will leverage
the purchase and securitization of up to $200
billion in home loans.
The point,
however, is not to save Fannie and Freddie
themselves but to use the two firms, which buy
mortgages and resell bunches of them to
investors in the form of bonds, to ease the
difficulties of borrowers more generally. It’s
as if our hypothetical family pawned its silver
to help the neighbors out of a financial jam …
This is risky. If all goes well, freeing up the
GSEs will buoy mortgage lending, thus slowing or
reversing the slide in housing prices … But if
housing continues to tank, and the GSEs rack up
new multibillion-dollar losses on top of those
they have already incurred in recent months,
they will have that much less in reserve to fall
back on. The GSEs enjoy an implicit federal
guarantee, but reducing their capital for a
purpose such as this, at a time such as this,
goes a fair way toward making that bailout
promise an explicit one. (Washington Post, March
21)
I found OFHEO director James
Lockhart's interview late Wednesday afternoon on
CNBC also worthy of documentation:
CNBC's Maria
Bartiromo: Some have been arguing that
the blowup in Bear Stearns caused the
Administration to reconsider policy responses to
this crisis. The deal announced today is
basically telling them that that is a fact -
that it really was Bear Stearns that pushed the
government’s hand. Is that true - was it Bear?
OFHEO director James
Lockhart: Not really. We’ve been talking
about this for a long time. I’ve been talking
for many months about the need for these two
companies to raise additional capital. And I’ve
talked for over the last year that once they got
remediated and fixed their books and got them on
a timely basis, we would start looking at
removing that 30% excess capital charge we had
on.
Bartiromo: It seems to
have taken a long time. A lot of people - from
hedge fund companies to certainly the lenders -
have wanted the restrictions eased for some
time. What was the biggest barrier and what went
away over the last several weeks in order to
push your hand?
Lockhart:
I think the key thing was three weeks ago they
did actually produce their '07 financial
accounts on a timely basis. And we’ve gone
through all the consent agreement issues and
they’re virtually finished on them as well. We
thought it really was the appropriate time. They
now have the proper systems and controls -
proper risk management. And we think it really
is a time they can help the mortgage market in a
big way.
Bartiromo: We’re
talking about a big number, too. Some $200
billion in the market. What’s the best case
scenario, sir - what would you like to see -
what specific mortgages do you want these two
guys to buy?
Lockhart:
Well, I think they should be a player in many
segments of the market. I think certainly, as
[Fannie chief executive] Dan Mudd just said, the
conventional mortgage market has really
weathered this storm pretty well because Fannie
and Freddie have been there for the last year.
But they could do more there. They’re just
getting into the 'jumbo' market next month, and
certainly they’ll need capital to do that. [A
jumbo mortgage has a loan amount above the
industry-standard definition of conventional
conforming loan limits.] And there’s a lot more
that could be done in the subprime - refinancing
some of these people into safer mortgages. And,
also, just loan modifications. So there are a
lot of ways that this capital can be used to
improve the mortgage market.
Bartiromo: Are you
expecting the capital at all to be earmarked for
some of the passthrough CMOs [collateralized
mortgage obligation] - I mean the really
troublesome securities that really did in
Thornburg or Carlyle Capital or Bear Stearns,
among others?
Lockhart:
Carlyle Capital was actually holding Fannie and
Freddie’s securities and the spreads widened
dramatically - which they’ve probably come back
this week. But I think they will be looking at
buying their own mortgage-backed securities.
They may look at some other mortgage-backed
securities as well. I think we need to increase
the trading. And as both of them said this
morning, they need to be a bid in the
marketplace to buy those securities.
Bartiromo: And just the
idea that they are a bid in the marketplace to
buy those securities obviously was really
celebrated in terms of investors and the idea
that now there is a buyer there. How long do you
expect this process to take? And how long do you
think it will take to actually get this moving -
liquidity back into the market and a feeling of
stability?
Lockhart: Well,
it may take awhile. The mortgage market is one
issue, but there are some other markets out
there as well. I think this is going to be a
major step forward. As you said, they can do
$200 billion in purchases immediately. And to
the extent they’re guaranteeing mortgage-backed
securities - that could almost get into the
trillions. We’re looking at that they would have
the capacity - between what we did today and the
significant capital raising that they committed
to - they could do over $2 trillion in business
this year if the market needs that
money.
It would be an outright crime
if thinly capitalized Fannie and Freddie were
allowed to increase their Books of Business
(mortgages retained on their balance sheets and
MBS guaranteed in the marketplace) by $2
trillion this year - "if the market needs that
money".
I was shocked when Mr Lockhart
imparted that they were now in a position to
accomplish such a feat. It is certainly a
terrible idea to put Fannie and Freddie
guarantees on millions of new mortgages created
from restructuring loans of troubled borrowers.
This would amount to nothing less than a
despicable transfer of massive prospective
credit losses directly to the American taxpayer
(current owners of this paper should not be
bailed out).
Wishful
thinking I have fully expected the GSEs,
at some point, to be taken over by the federal
government. It may have been orchestrated
subtly, but I can only presume that such a
historic endeavor was accepted last week as the
only means of averting financial dislocation.
And for their regulator to suggest that the GSEs
today have any handle whatsoever over their
unfolding "risk management" challenge is wishful
thinking - at best.
As far as I’m
concerned, much of the US mortgage market was
this week essentially nationalized. I’ll take
the dramatic narrowing in agency debt and MBS
(mortgage-backed securities) spreads as support
for this view. Additional support arrived from
comments from Mr Lockhart, US Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson, and actions by the Federal
Reserve. Having lived contently for years with
the markets’ interpretation of the (grey-area)
"implied" government backing of the GSEs, our
policymakers are surely today satisfied with the
inferred market acceptance of mortgage industry
nationalization. To be sure, the Fed’s splashy
"Sunday Night Special" bailout of Bear Stearns
is rather trivial in both its implications and
consequences when compared to Thursday’s quiet
coup.
I have my own hunches about the
rise and inevitable fall of the GSEs. I’ve
always assumed that the Greenspan Fed was
pleased (relieved?) to watch Fannie and Freddie
morph in the early '90s from conservative
mortgage insurance providers to aggressive
bank-like lending institutions and market
operators. GSE credit creation (and timely
market interventions) worked greatly to
alleviate the forceful economic headwinds
created by an impaired banking system.
I
also (admittedly, rather cynically) pictured
President Clinton, his then Treasury Secretary
(and former Goldman chairman) Robert Rubin, and
Budget Director (and former Fannie vice chairman
and so-to-be chief executive) Franklin Raines
behind the closed doors of the Oval Office
plotting the exploitation of the GSEs,
Wall Street finance, system mortgage credit,
and housing inflation for
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