Doubts cloud closing of anthrax case
By Peter J Brown
This article has been updated to include relevant links to cited material.
An investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, described by
the Department of Justice as the largest investigation into a bioweapons attack
in the country's history, has come to a close. [1]
The Federal Bureau of Investigation released 2,728 pages of its documents on
the case, which it undertook with the department and the US Postal Inspection
Service. [2]
Five Americans died and 17 others fell ill as the result of exposure to
anthrax, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
The person the FBI identified as the perpetrator, Dr Bruce Ivins, committed
suicide in 2008 before charges were filed. Ivins worked at the US Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), based at Fort Detrick in
Maryland.
In the days after his death, many people who knew Ivins or had unusual
encounters with him came forward. One was Ellen Byrne, a wife of one of his
colleagues. In an interview with National Public Radio, she related an exchange
with Ivins at a party, which took place after some suspect anthrax arrived at
USAMRIID for analysis. Apparently, he found the perfect powder fascinating.
"He was leaning over the table, and I was on the other side of the table,"
Byrne said. "And he leaned forward and was just really excited at how finely
milled the powder was."
Ivins gestured with his hands like he was trying to weigh it on a scale and
told Byrne: "It couldn't even be weighed - it just hovered. That was the word
he used - hovered." [3]
FBI Director Robert Mueller made it clear right from the beginning that the FBI
was not ruling out any possibilities [4], while at the same time he explained
the enormous scope of the investigation.
"As most of you know, the FBI is investigating anthrax exposures and suspected
anthrax exposures in Florida, in New York, here in Washington, DC, and
elsewhere around the country where such exposures have been reported," Mueller
said in mid-October, 2001. "While organized terrorism has not been ruled out,
so far we have found no direct link." Since October 1, the FBI had responded to
more than 2,300 incidents or suspected incidents involving anthrax or other
dangerous agents, Mueller said. "And as all of you know, an overwhelming
majority of these incidents have been false alarms or practical jokes. The FBI
will devote whatever resources are necessary to investigate each of these
situations." [5]
More than eight years later, there are many critics who do not agree with the
FBI's conclusions.
One is Norman Covert, public affairs officer and historian at Fort Detrick from
1977 to 1999, who wrote a column, "White Powder and 007" in 2008. Asked by Asia
Times Online if this 2008 column needed updating in light of the FBI's release,
Covert said: "With the FBI's latest decision, my words are still apropos."
Here is an excerpt [6]:
The government mobilized its team of Double-oh
(uh-oh!) secret agents seven years ago to identify a villainous mad scientist,
who, without genuine motive or opportunity, single handedly:
Used a Bio-Containment Level Three lab suite at Fort Detrick's US Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), to develop a highly bred,
weapons-grade strain of Bacillus anthracis (a scientific achievement not
accomplished before, except perhaps in the biological warfare laboratories of
the former Soviet Union);
Manipulated this super bacillus with a silica coating and a slight electrical
charge so that, when opened in the containment cabinet, each particle repelled
others in a brilliant display;
Ensured each particle was no more than five microns in size so that it would
penetrate the fabric of a normal No 10 paper envelope, a product sold by the US
Postal Service in the District of Columbia, Northern Virginia, West Virginia
and Central Maryland;
Managed
to remove the material from the laboratory with
it already placed in at least one envelope, also
likely encased in an impermeable container,
which would be obscured from the security guard;
Managed to avoid leaving any evidence on his clothing, his two automobiles and
van, his house, garage, office and other personal items despite the extremely
"dirty" potential of the dry agent;
Managed, in a fashion unknown to the Department of Homeland Security and the
"Double-Ohs", to have the envelopes placed in a mailbox in Princeton, NJ, with
a note in a handwriting that cannot be identified with any known person;
Managed to obscure this cutting-edge science from a host of colleagues for the
entire development period - a major feat in itself!
Simultaneously he managed to significantly improve an old anthrax vaccine to
protect our troops during Operation Desert Storm; then was a key developer of
the new recombinant DNA-based anthrax vaccine that was undergoing efficacy
trials at USAMRIID.
By September of 2006, the
FBI had 17 special agents assigned to a multi-agency task force that included
10 US Postal Service inspectors. The investigation covered six continents,
logged interviews with more than 9,000 witnesses, conducted about 70 searches,
and issued 6,000 grand jury subpoenas.
In parallel with its massive field investigation, the FBI spent millions of
dollars on a team of US genome experts to undertake a revolutionary new
approach to DNA fingerprinting so that the strain of anthrax used in the
attacks could be identified and isolated.
Still, this investigation was badly tarnished as a result of the treatment of
Dr Steven Hatfill, who had once conducted bioweapons research for the US Army
and was identified as "person of interest" yet ultimately was cleared off all
charges. Hatfill sued former US Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Department
of Justice and the FBI in 2003 for violations of his constitutional rights. In
the end, he was paid more than $4 million.
"Dr Hatfill had nothing to do with the horrific anthrax attacks," his attorney
Thomas Connolly said at the time. "No evidence links Dr Hatfill to the crime,
yet the attorney general and his subordinates have attempted to make him a
scapegoat. In the process, they have trampled his constitutional rights and
destroyed his life." [7]
The FBI website set up specifically to document the investigation makes no
mention of this episode.
Another critic of the FBI findings is Dr Meryl Nass, a leading expert on
anthrax and bioterrorism, who first met Ivins in the early 1990s and was in
contact with him until 2002. She has testified before the US Congress, but not
about the investigation. A Maine-based physician, she runs a blog site -
http//anthraxvaccine.blogspot.com - and raises serious questions about what the
FBI is presenting.
"There is no question that Ivins was mentally ill. What role the intense
surveillance and bullying played to tip him over the edge will never be known.
However, multiple reports of highly unprofessional FBI tactics used against
Ivins and other scientists - simultaneously - tell me it is important that the
defense side of the story be reported," said Nass. "A hoax letter was sent from
the UK while Hatfill was there, in what may have been a further attempt to
implicate him as the anthrax mailer. I have heard no evidence linking Ivins to
the hoax letters that were sent in close proximity to the anthrax-containing
letters. Like [US Senator Leahy], I think that if Ivins had something to
do with the letters; he was not alone."
Her recent critique of the FBI report includes these four following elements:
The FBI's Summary states that "only a limited number of individuals ever had
access to this specific spore preparation" and that the flask was under Ivins'
sole and exclusive control. Yet the body of the report acknowledges hundreds of
people who had access to the spores, and questions remain about the location of
the spore prep during the period in question;
The FBI says that only a small number of labs had Ames anthrax, including only
three foreign labs. Yet a quick Pub Med search of papers published between 1999
and 2004 revealed Ames anthrax was studied in at least Italy, France, the UK,
Israel and South Korea as well as in the US. By failing to identify all labs
with access to Ames, the FBI managed to exclude potential domestic and foreign
perpetrators;
The FBI claims that "drying anthrax is expressly forbidden by various
treaties", therefore it would have to be performed clandestinely. Actually, the
US government sponsored several programs that dried anthrax spores. Drying
spores is not explicitly prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention,
though many would like it to be;
The FBI report claims the anthrax letters envelopes were sold in Frederick
[Maryland]. Later it admits that millions of indistinguishable envelopes were
made, with sales in Maryland and Virginia." [8]
US Representative Rush Holt of New Jersey sees the investigation's abrupt end
as questionable at best.
"This has been a closed-minded, closed process from the beginning. Arbitrarily
closing the case on a Friday afternoon should not mean the end of this
investigation," Holt said. "The evidence the FBI produced would not, I think,
stand up in court. But because their prime suspect is dead, and they're not
going to court; they seem satisfied with barely a circumstantial case. The
National Academies of Science review of the FBI's scientific methods in this
case won't be released until summer, but the FBI doesn't seem to care." [9]
This investigation as well as that of the 9/11 attacks coincided with the
evolution of blogging and social networking. Via the rapid proliferation of
blogs worldwide, the Internet provided multiple fora for uninformed conspiracy
buffs and experts alike. The identities of the participants are masked
sometimes, and yet are often out in the open.
On Nass' blogsite, for example, an entry appears in the comments section from
Dr Drew Richardson, who retired after a 25-year career as an FBI agent and
former scientist in the FBI Laboratory. Richardson was head of the FBI's
chemical biological counter-terrorism response unit (known as the HMRU), and he
was also involved in "lie detection", or polygraph, research for the FBI.
Contacted by Asia Times Online to verify that he had written the comments, he
also made a few additional comments, which he requested not be included here.
"Because I have not participated in this investigation and have not read the
bureau's final reporting on the matter, I do not know which matters have been
addressed and which have not," Richardson had said. "I do categorically believe
that this investigation should remain open as long as there is but a single
relevant and outstanding matter having any bearing on who and how many
individuals were involved in the commission of these crimes.
"Having been an FBI agent for a quarter of a century and having been involved
in case investigations large and small, I can with complete assurance tell you
that such conspiracy theories are complete nonsense. It is not that there is no
possibility that a single individual might not have some misguided notion or
motive that might lead to such, but I can tell you with assurance that there
were hundreds of principled individuals working on this case. Any seed of
misguided activity would not be hidden from the light of exposure for a single
day, let alone for months or years," he added.
Back in November 2001, a New York City Police Department detective named Lucas
Miller wrote in the New York Times about the investigation: "Mistakes can be
overcome; crime-solving is a long and painstaking process. In the end, it
depends a lot on the ability to follow new leads, even as old ones go stale."
[10]
He specifically mentioned Kathy T Nguyen, a Vietnamese hospital worker at the
Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital, who was the only New Yorker to succumb
to anthrax. She died, aged 61, on Halloween night in 2001.
"She might have inhaled random airborne spores somewhere in her travels - in
fact, the city has started testing the subways regularly for traces of anthrax
- but it's possible she somehow happened on the terrorist's anthrax stash.
Perhaps the terrorist intentionally exposed her to spores as an experiment.
It's a long shot, but reconstructing her last days might lead FBI agents to a
killer," said Miller. "This is typical homicide work. Witnesses and friends
have been interviewed. Her phone records and her MetroCard record have been
subpoenaed. Video surveillance systems in places she visited will be searched
to see if anyone accompanied her."
According to Miller, "success in this investigation - as in any investigation -
depends on three variables: the perseverance of the investigators, the
resources available, and luck.
"Luck includes the quality of the evidence as well as some cops' talent for
'stumbling' across the perpetrator. As many New Yorkers know, David Berkowitz,
the Son of Sam killer, was caught due in part to the discovery of a parking
ticket issued to his car near the scene of one of his crimes," said Miller.
"The FBI and local police departments working on these cases are expending
resources and manpower not available in ordinary murder cases. But in this
crime, as in others they solve, they will still need a good amount of luck.
By the way, the title for Miller's submission more than eight years ago is one
that resonates today: "On the Trail of the Anthrax Killers."
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