How Kerry
is different - and how he isn't
By Ehsan Ahrari
Now that US Senator John Kerry has formally accept the nomination of the
Democratic Party's presidential candidacy, a close look at his
national-security policies is warranted. Former Vermont governor John Dean, the
onetime front-runner in the race for the Democratic candidacy, used to call
Kerry "Bush Lite", largely on Kerry's support for the US invasion of Iraq. Dean
was in essence right in his assessment of Kerry, at least on Iraq. However,
when Kerry voted against the bill calling for US$87 billion in aid to Iraq,
President George W Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney started accusing him of
flip-flopping on the issue.
Kerry's problem may be that he is too prudent, and doesn't yearn to deviate too
much from a position slightly left to the center on major foreign-policy
issues. In addition, he also has an established voting record that is
characterized by a frequent change of position. Those specific features of his
candidacy could haunt him now that he is the chief challenger to the sitting
president. His prudence and changes of mind may be reasons he has not yet
impressed the voters that his approach to US national-security policies would
be notably different than that of Bush, even when the US presence in Iraq is
becoming increasingly unpopular among voters.
Kerry's general approach
In general, John Kerry promotes himself as a multilateralist, a believer in
coalition-building, and a man who would consult with the United Nations as well
as major allies on issues of global significance. In this sense, if elected, he
would re-enter the Kyoto anti-global-warming treaty, revisit the proposition of
joining the International Criminal Court, restart endeavors to persuade the US
Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, stop the US production of
bunker-buster bombs, earnestly initiate another round of nuclear-arms reduction
with Russia, and jump-start the moribund Palestinian-Israeli peace
negotiations. But that is where the differences between the national-security
policies of Kerry and Bush pretty much end. What about other major issues?
Implementation of the 9-11 Commission Report
Kerry has deftly captured the momentum by calling for immediate follow-up
actions with a view to implementing major recommendations of the 9-11
Commission Report soon after it was released. Consequently, the Bush
administration was forced to abandon its original neutral-to-lukewarm response
to that report and instantly get into a reaction mode similar to Kerry's
response. However, no one should expect that most of those recommendations will
be accepted any time soon.
The trouble with major recommendations for reorganization is that they seldom
result in altering the process. And any attempt to change the process, in the
final analysis, is seldom proved as revolutionary as its proponents originally
hoped for. One golden rule of bureaucracies is that organizations seldom die;
they only undergo reorganization and in essence survive. Another golden rule
ought to be: There aren't new bureaucratic rules (processes), only a rehash of
the old ones. More to the point, when bureaucrats change organization or
relocate as a result of reorganization, they take their old bureaucratic
habits, turf-mindedness, and institutional parochialism with them.
Applying this rather lackluster description to the 9-11 Commission Report, the
US process of collecting intelligence, analyzing it, and presenting it to a
sitting president in the form of "actionable intelligence" is likely to remain
essentially unchanged. Does that mean intelligence failures and related
bureaucratic faux pas will still occur in the future? Absolutely. Perhaps not
in the immediate future, but they will recur, nevertheless. The need of the
hour in the US is universalization of inter-agency coordination; the sad
reality is that coordination is progressing at a snail's pace, and it remains
problematic. So why implement radical reorganization? Because doing so is part
and parcel of good politics, particularly after a tragedy of the magnitude of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. And Kerry is a good - indeed, one
of the best - politicians of the US political system.
Iraq
On this particular issue there are not likely to be substantial differences
between Kerry and Bush, only stylistic ones. Both emphasize staying put in
terms of keeping America's military presence in Iraq. Any US withdrawal from
there is bound to make it even more of a fertile place for transnational
terrorists than it is now. Besides, any serious consideration of withdrawal of
US troops necessitates the availability of a feasible alternative, which is
sorely non-existent right now. Both Kerry and Bush emphasize dealing harshly
with Iraqi insurgency. Kerry is not likely to be any less harsh in his dealings
with anti-American Iraqi leaders, such as Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, than
Bush. Both of them are equally chary about allowing Islamists much room to
maneuver in Iraq.
What Kerry would do differently is rely more on multilateralism and the UN. But
that is not really different from what Bush is now doing - arguably more
because of necessity than out of a real change of heart about his original
unilateralist penchant. Kerry, on the other hand, would be genuine about his
multilateral approach to the Iraq conflict. It should also be noted that
Kerry's advantage is that he has the benefit of watching Bush fail by being
adamantly unilateralist in his decision to invade Iraq, and adopted
multilateralism willy-nilly.
Negotiating with North Korea and Iran
Toward these two countries, Kerry is likely to have a notably different
approach than the current president. As he watched Bush's hardline approach
toward North Korea run into a cul-de-sac, Kerry may feel amply certain that a
resuscitation of the Agreed Framework negotiated under the presidency of Bill
Clinton should be a point of departure between the two countries once again.
Equally important, since North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is counting on the
election of John Kerry, he is also likely to be more forthcoming in offering
meaningful proposals regarding his country's nuclear-weapons program to the
Kerry administration than he has been to the current US government. However, no
one should think along the lines that the North Korean dictator would abandon
the nuclear-weapons option altogether. That potential reality would pose a
serious dilemma for Kerry, for he cannot negotiate on the premise that
Pyongyang would only "freeze" its nuclear-weapons program and not discard it
altogether. Kim Jong-il has played that game once too often.
Regarding Iran, if one were to were to believe Kerry's speech that he gave at
the Council on Foreign Relations in New York last December 3, he is likely to
open a dialogue that would comprehensively examine a whole slew of issues of
mutual concern with Iran. That list would, most prominently, include Iran's
nuclear program. Yes, Iran insists that its nuclear program is strictly for
peaceful purpose; however, even inside Iran not too many people believe that
explanation. So Tehran will have to convince Washington about the peaceful
intentions of its nuclear program by institutionalizing transparency.
But there is also a major difference between North Korea and Iran. The former,
as long as it remains a Stalinist state, has every reason to worry about
becoming a potential military target of a future US administration. By
contrast, the US and Iran might be able to resolve their strategic differences,
especially if the Mohammed Khatami brand of pragmatism gains an upper hand. At
that time, the US will have to give iron-clad guarantees backed by the European
Union three - France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which are currently
engaged in persuading Iran to keep its nuclear program transparent - that it
will not attack Iran. Under a Kerry administration - since the entire notion of
proactive counter-proliferation and preemption would be given a very low
priority, even if they were not abandoned - Iran's fears regarding
counter-proliferation and regime change might be considerably lower than they
are at this time.
Transforming the Middle East
Here is an issue that will remain on top of the US strategic agenda for at
least the remainder of this decade. However, Kerry's approach is likely to be
much more conciliatory than that of Bush. In addition, Kerry would not have the
baggage of invading Iraq when he approached Arab leaders in his exhortation for
pluralizing their respective polities. However, no one should become
Pollyannaish about the reception of Arab leaders to such suggestions. Regarding
transformation per se, they are not going to be any more cooperative with Kerry
than they have been with Bush. Autocrats are not expected to preside gleefully
over their own demise.
The US presidential election is notable in the sense that national-security
concerns continue to be on top of voters' worry-list. Kerry will have to
convince that his overall approach to national security, even if it is not that
much different, will indeed result in the US getting more respect worldwide
under his watch than under Bush's. Considering the recurring evidence of rising
spirals of anti-Americanism not just in the Middle East, but also in Europe,
that particular aspect of the Kerry difference would mean his election as
America's next president.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia-based independent strategic
analyst.
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