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Exploring the roots of
radicalism
By David Isenberg
Back in the fifth century, the Chinese
strategist Sun Tzu wrote a classic work called The
Art of War. One of the key components of the book
was his belief in preparation and in "knowing the
enemy". Indeed, one point is widely cited to this day,
"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle."
Now fast-forward to the ongoing United States
global "war against terrorism". How well does the US and
its leader, President George W Bush, understand the
enemy? Not well enough, if one relies on public
statements. Consider his remarks to the American Legion
National Convention on August 26.
"They attack
the civilized world because they bear a deep hatred for
the values of the civilized world. They hate freedom and
religious tolerance and democracy and equality for
women. They hate Christians and Jews and every Muslim
who does not share their narrow and violent vision ...
because America stands for freedom and tolerance and the
rights of all, the terrorists have targeted our
country."
This sort of rhetoric reminds one of
the saying of the American writer H L Mencken, "For
every complex problem, there is a solution that is
simple, neat and wrong."
But if the motivation
of terrorists is not hatred of freedom, et cetera, then
what is it? The answer, at least in regard to Islamic
radicals, is that the motivation is complex, according
to a recently-published monograph put out by the
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
The report "Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism?
Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals" by
Alan Richards, a professor at the University of
California, Santa Cruz, argues that explaining the
appeal of al-Qaeda and other followers of Osama bin
Laden requires a "nuanced, complex, historical analysis
of social, economic, political and cultural factors".
In Richards' view, radicalism is a political
response to the deepening economic, social, political
and cultural crisis in the Muslim world. Rapid
demographic growth, educational changes, government
policy failure and rapid urbanization are among the
causes of high unemployment and increasing poverty,
which together with other forces have alienated large
sectors of Muslim youth. The regional crisis has deep
historical roots, and "simple solutions do not exist. A
long-term strategy is needed. Elements of that strategy
include recognition of the limits of American power in
the face of this multi-dimensional crisis, concrete
steps to resolve the Palestinian problem, and improved
intelligence cooperation and covert actions."
Richards believes the unless we try to
understand the roots or radicalism, an effort opposed by
neo-conservatives due to their fear that it will lead
the US to go soft and wobbly, the US will not change any
significant aspect of its behavior, especially its
energy and foreign policies. Rather, the status quo
approach where "We simply have to keep bashing the
miscreants militarily often enough, and then they will
come to understand that we are right and they are wrong"
will prevail.
Such an approach would be an
American version of the "Iron Wall" strategy that
Vladimir Jabotinsky advocated in Palestine.
But,
as Richards points out, the American version of the Iron
Wall is likely to be no more successful than it has been
in Israel, where 50 years after the proclamation of the
state, Israeli citizens feel at least as insecure as
ever in their history. While military action, and even
more, covert operations may be appropriate elements of a
long-term strategy, they are hardly likely to be
sufficient.
An effective strategy would take
into account the multi-dimensional crisis unfolding in
the Muslim world. One aspect of it is the "modernity"
crisis. It is a simple fact that changing from a society
inhabited by illiterate farmers, who are ruled by a
literate, urban elite into an urban, mass-educated
society with an economy based on industry and services,
has always and everywhere been traumatic. In the West it
gave rise to two world wars, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler,
Tojo Hideki , Mao Zedong and his Great Leap Forward,
slavery and the US Civil War.
Much of the
violence of this transition has been perpetrated by
Utopian Islamist fanatics who have imagined a future
that involves the restoration of conditions of life in
7th century Arabia.
These fanatics are part of a
larger social phenomenon, the transnational Wahhabi
(Salafi) movement, which believes that imitation of the
behavior of the Prophet's closest companions should be
the basis of any social order. The ideology asserts that
a return to the practices of the earliest Muslims
constitutes a solution to the many difficult problems
facing Middle Eastern and other Muslim societies.
Such radicals have their greatest appeal when
the transition to modernity is most acute. For example,
without World War I, the Bolsheviks would not have come
to power in Russia, and Hitler would not have succeeded
without the Treaty of Versailles and the Great
Depression.
One factor accounting for the rise
in fanaticism and the popularity of groups like al-Qaeda
is entirely demographic; the huge numbers of young
Middle Easterners. Two thirds of them are below the age
of 30, half are younger than 20, and 40 percent of whom
have yet to reach their 15th birthday.
Thanks to
this population growth, the Middle East now has the most
rapidly growing labor force in the world. It is growing
four times as rapidly as the American labor force and
eight times as rapidly as the European labor supply.
This, at a time, when the demand for labor has grown
sluggishly at best. Given this mismatch, classic
economics says the results must be a falling wages, a
rise in unemployment, or a combination of both.
As a result current levels of unemployment are
high and the problem will get worse in the
near-to-medium term. Second, real wages have stagnated
for roughly a generation and, depending on the specific
country, either remain the same or increased during the
past decade.
Furthermore, the discontent of
young people is exacerbated by the fact that most of
them now live in cities that are crumbling. This will
likely only get worse. The number of urban Middle
Easterners is expected to rise from its current level of
over 135 million to over 350 million by 2025. Such rapid
urbanization strains budgets, legitimacy and governance,
while swelling the ranks of regime opponents. Government
incapacity and the abandonment of public space to
private Islamist schools, mosques and welfare agencies
have done much to advance the cause of Salafi
extremists.
Traditionally, during such times the
safety valve has been international migration. But
Muslim migrants to Europe have tended to stay. Their
children have faced difficulties with respect to
education, employment, housing and identity. Thus, many
of them have been attracted to Salafi doctrines.
Meanwhile, migrants who went to Persian Gulf
countries often returned home richer, but also more
socially conservative, associating their good fortune
with Wahhabi customs and outlook.
The
consequences of poverty are that it provides a
recruiting ground for regime opponents. Some poor
people, particularly the young, join violent opposition
movements. Of course, as Richards is careful to point
out, poverty alone is not the causal issue. Political
structures and ideological environments also play a
role. Just like the 1960s generation in America youth,
politics also focus on issues of identity, justice and
morality.
And, for the first time in history,
many of these youths have received some education,
although there has been a gap between girls and boys in
education, with girls being under-enrolled.
A
consequence of this mass education has been what is
called the "crisis of authority" in Islam. The
widespread diffusion of education, together with the
absence of hierarchical controls on religious edicts in
Islam, unlike, say, Roman Catholicism, produces
"religious anarchy that provides the cultural space for
radicals to promulgate and advocate their messages".
Another consequence is that much of the
education received has been mediocre. It has emphasized
memorization, with little emphasis on analytical
thinking and problem solving. In countries like Saudi
Arabia, 30 percent to 40 percent of all course hours are
devoted to the study of scripture. Thus, while
expectations have been raised, the skills to meet them
have not been acquired. It should be noted that this has
long been accepted in the West as a reason for revolts.
Among social scientists it is known as the J-curve, for
the academic James Chowning Davies who posited it.
In the end, according to Richards, there is no
easy solution. Inevitably, in the current transition in
the region, there will be failures, as well as
successes. He writes, "The truth is that outsiders are
largely irrelevant to the process of deep institutional
and cultural change which, alone, can ultimately
overcome the profound, multi-tiered crisis facing the
Muslim world."
Yet, the US can at least take
steps to keep things from getting worse. Aside from
seeking to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it
should modify its policies toward the Gulf, and,
especially, towards Iran; recognize that past US
policies contributed to the origins of the problem;
understand that genuinely democratic Arab and Islamic
polities will include a strong representation of
Islamists; adopt energy policies that speed the
transition to the post-oil era.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for information
on our sales and syndication policies.)
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