Africa warns China: Money is not enough
By Yitzhak Shichor
The fourth ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was
held in Sharm al-Shaykh (Egypt), last month, reflected, as anticipated, praise
for Sino-African "cooperation" in general and particularly for the positive
Chinese role in Africa.
China announced its readiness to pour more money into Africa, planning more
projects and increased presence with "no strings attached". Yet it is precisely
this emphatic divorce between economics and politics in Chinese external
activities, or between economic aid and political aid, which has triggered
unprecedented criticism not heard of before from some African leaders.
In recent years China's Africa policy has attracted fire from many
quarters outside the African continent - governments, non-government
organizations, the media and academics. African governments, on the other hand,
appeared to have welcomed the Chinese presence and underlined its benefits,
often compared to their negative experience with the Western and even the
Soviet presence, occasionally termed "colonialism" and "imperialism".
Africans, with the possible exception of some opposition groups, have failed to
criticize the so-called Chinese "model". Fully aware of the "Western" sources
of this criticism, Beijing has indeed defied its Africa-policy critics as
competitors who envy China's achievements in the continents that trespass
"their" territory and undermine "their" interests.
When asked by a journalist about this criticism, Chinese Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao replied, "There have been allegations for a long time that China has
come to Africa to plunder Africa's natural resources and practice
neo-colonialism. The allegation in my view is totally untenable. Who is really
asking these questions? Is it the African states or is it the West looking on
nervously?" Indeed, for a long time Africa failed to ask questions about the
implications of the Chinese offensive in the continent. "Africa offers
China…friends who do not judge it," as Reuters reported on November 1. Not
anymore.
African criticism of China
This forbearance was interrupted - apparently for the first time - before,
during and after the recent FOCAC meeting, and not just by opposition groups
and parties but by high-ranking officials. They expressed concern about a
number of issues related to the Chinese offensive.
Thus, Nigeria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Bagudu Hirse blamed China
for financing corrupt and repressive regimes, "We accept what China is doing.
And we welcome their investment. But they must understand that we are very
sensitive to good governance and democracy. We can't start thinking of imposing
sanctions on Guinea or Niger for bad governance and then they [China] go behind
us and strike some other deals. We suspect they do that anyway. They will never
confirm it, but we read the newspapers - we know what is going on."
He was referring to Beijing's decision (reportedly of June 2009) to invest US$7
billion in a mining deal in Guinea, announced by Guinea's military junta
immediately after the September massacre of the opposition when more than 150
protestors were killed. Though Beijing has denied the deal had been signed, it
draws international condemnation and protests by human rights groups. Precisely
a year earlier, a $5 billion oil deal made between China and Niger "in the
greatest of secrecy and with contempt for regulation" has been denounced by
unions and civil rights groups that called for an investigation of how the
funds resulting from the agreement are spent and a general parliamentary
inquiry into the deal, out of concern that the people of Niger would not
benefit from it. Yet China's activities in Africa are not only breeding
corruption.
Mustafa al-Gindi, an
Egyptian independent member of parliament, mentioned the unmentionable. "Whatever
they say, it is a fact that the Chinese come to Africa not just with engineers
and scientists - they are coming with farmers. It is neo-colonialism. […] There
are no ethics, no values." Still, these are kind words compared with the
interview with the Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, published on November 10
by the influential (Arabic and English) daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat (The Middle
East) in which he lashed out at China's Africa policy.
As a former head of Libya's foreign intelligence service (for 15 years), he is
probably one of the Africans most familiar with Chinese operations on the
continent.
In the interview, given on the occasion of the fourth meeting of FOCAC
held in Egypt, the Libyan foreign minister tried to tone down his criticism
by praising China's support for the African "liberation movement", and
contribution to balancing the international system, "but not at the expense of the
[African] people".
He added, "When we look at the reality on the ground we find that there is
something akin to a Chinese invasion of the African continent. This is
something that brings to mind the effects that colonialism had on the African
continent … Therefore we advise our Chinese friends not to follow in this
direction, ie bringing thousands of Chinese workers to Africa under the pretext
of employment, for at the same time Africa is suffering from unemployment."
China's programs of training and employing thousands of Africans
is welcomed "but this welcome does not mean [accepting] the Chinese coming to
settle in Africa".
A
number of themes were singled out in his
criticism. For one, accusing China of a "divide
and rule" policy, he rejected Beijing's refusal to
allow delegates of the African Union (AU) to
participate in the Forum or to consider the AU as
a representative of Africans. It "is an insult to
the African Union. ... Is it reasonable for China
- as a single country - to preside over an entire
continent? This is an injustice. ... China's
unwillingness to accept the presence of African
Union commissioners means that they do not want
the African Union, or African Unity, but rather
China wants to cooperate with Africa as separate
nations, rather than as a union."
He also accused China of betraying the African countries that had facilitated
China's admission to the United Nations and the Security Council. Yet, when the
Chinese reached an international position they "did not support their friends".
"We did not see the Chinese playing an effective role, and [they] did not help
the African [bloc] gain a [permanent] seat on the Security Council, but on the
contrary, opposed it. This caused us to ask the question 'What is the
difference between them and imperialists?'"
Finally, Musa Kusa accused China of evading politics and Beijing of abandoning
the movements and countries that need its support. "Here I am reminded of the
strange Chinese position on the Goldstone report [on military operations
involving Israel and Gaza from December 2008 and to January 2009] …China should
have a more visible position on this, rather than being satisfied with a
tentative vote." In an unequivocal statement he said, "Genuine cooperation must
include politics […] and should not be limited to building roads and schools.
It is true that this is required, but international cooperation is not based on
constructing buildings and giving aid, but rather through political positions."
These remarks highlight one of Beijing's principal weaknesses in the
international system: its systematic attempts to avoid taking clear-cut
positions on global issues in an effort to please all sides. Sooner or later,
Beijing's political passivity will begin to undermine its economic interests.
Implicitly, Libya's foreign minister is warning the Chinese that the countries
and people of Africa (and the Middle East) expect more vigorous political
support and, while they may appreciate China's economic contribution, they have
no intention of becoming subjugated to the Chinese and prefer to keep their
options open.
The origins of Libya's criticism
This criticism is just one additional crack in a series of Sino-Libyan
disagreements in the last few years. The most recent concerns Libya's decision
to block the sale of the Canadian firm Verenex, which controls oil assets in
Libya, to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and to buy it instead
(CNPC's offer was 57.5% higher).
At about the same time and in a similar way, Angola's state-owned Sonangol
announced it wanted to block the sale of Marathon Oil's 20% oilfield stake to
Chinese oil companies (CNOOC and SINOPEC). The Chinese insistence on keeping
local hiring to a minimum has brewed resentment.
"Some in Africa are starting to find the Chinese embrace too tight" The
Australian reported on September 30. This could signal increased intervention
of African governments in the oil sector to ensure more diversification of oil
customers and thus to maximize income and to diminish dependencies, to the
detriment of China. Yet Sino-Libyan friction concerned not only economics but
also politics.
In 2006, the two countries squabbled over Libya's relations with Taiwan. The
deterioration began in January when Sayf al-Islam Gaddafi, chairman of the
Libyan Gaddafi Foundation, met President Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, acting as an
envoy of his father, Muammar Gaddafi. Libya, which had maintained diplomatic
relations with Taiwan from 1959 to 1978, recognized the People's Republic of
China (PRC) in 1971 but delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations until
1978.
Chen was invited for an official "state visit" to Libya and the younger Gaddafi
said that his father was resolved to develop relations between the two
countries, with Libya serving as Taiwan's gateway to Africa. "He hoped that the
two nations sign a memorandum on establishing mutual representative offices
before his departure." [1] Adding insult to injury, this invitation came on
January 19, precisely when PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing was meeting the
elder Gaddafi in Libya. An online Libyan newspaper reported recently that Sayf
al-Islam Gaddafi was officially and practically appointed as successor to his
father.
To be sure, a few months later, in May 2006, Libya allowed Chen Shui-bian to
make a stopover in Tripoli, and used the opportunity to negotiate the issue of
representative offices in the two countries, despite Beijing's protests and
"strong opposition". A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "We demand that
Libya live up to its commitment and immediately cease all official exchanges
with Taiwan in whatever forms so as to maintain the overall China-Libya
relations ... This is a serious violation of Libya's long-term commitment to
the one-China policy and will exert a negative impact on China-Libya
relations."
Indeed and inevitably - it has. Probably in response to Beijing's implicit
threats, Libya sent a low-ranking representative to the third FOCAC and
ministerial meeting held in Beijing in November 4-5, 2006.
Conclusion
These incidents should by no means create the wrong impression. It is far too
soon to eulogize China's Africa policy, one of the most remarkable success
stories in global politics over the last two decades. China is not only heavily
invested in Africa for many years to come, but most African governments and
public opinion still appreciate the Chinese economic contribution, while
overlooking its negative implications such as bad governance, corruption, human
rights abuses and lack of transparency.
Yet, there are signs that Africa's leaders are becoming aware of these
shortcomings based not only on their historical experience but also on current
international norms, greater visibility and demands for accountability. Libyan
leader Gaddafi by no means reflects these norms. Addressing Oxford University
students via satellite on May 17, 2008, he said that both the PRC and the
United States compete for influence in Africa: "American interference has been
much more harmful and hypocritical … China's influence was conducted in a
purely business fashion that did not resort to military adventures and double
standards." Gaddafi does not want to drive the Chinese away as they have played
a significant role in Libya's housing, energy, communication, transportation,
and other sectors. He wants the Chinese to behave themselves and to realize who
is in charge, and it is not Hu.
Notes
1. Office of the President, Republic of Taiwan, News Release, January 18, 2006.
Dr Yitzhak Shichor is professor of East Asian Studies and Political
Science at the University of Haifa, and senior fellow, the Harry S Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Israel.
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