WRITE for ATol ADVERTISE MEDIA KIT GET ATol BY EMAIL ABOUT ATol CONTACT US
Asia Time Online - Daily News
             
Asia Times Chinese
AT Chinese



    China Business
     Nov 13, 2009
Page 2 of 3
CHINA'S REVOLUTION, Part 2
Revolutionary lessons
By Henry C K Liu

Part 1: In the beginning, Tiananmen

were interfered with, every little event in every small provincial town was taken profit of to disarm the people to declare a state of siege, to drill the troops in the new maneuvers and artifices that [Louis-Eugene] Cavaignac, prime minister of France (June 28-December 28, 1848) had taught them. Besides, for the first time since February, the invincibility of a popular insurrection in a large town had been proved to be a delusion; the honor of the armies had been restored; the troops hitherto always defeated in street battles of importance regained confidence in their efficiency even in this kind of struggle."

Later, under Napoleon III, whom historians saw as the prototype of the modern dictator and who was labeled the bourgeois emperor by royalists, Baron Haussmann's baroque city planning was also

  

dominated by the political purpose of clearing the rebel-infested urban quartiers in the old city; of effectively and easily deploying troops on the new, broad boulevards against much-feared popular uprisings; and of preventing the easy erection of revolutionary barricades on narrow streets that had once frustrated government authority in the "Bloody June Days" of the proletariat uprisings of 1848.

Marx linked this defeat of the ouvriers of Paris to definite plans of the old feudal bureaucratic party in Germany to get rid even of their momentary allies, the middle classes, and to restore Germany to the state she was in before the revolutionary events of March (Marzrevolution). The army, loyal to its institutional mandate, again was the decisive power in the state. The vanquished nobles and bureaucrats exploited the solidarity of an army fresh from victories against Napoleonic France and jealous of the great success the French soldiers (whom the German army had defeated in war) had just attained in domestic civil conflict what it had failed to achieve in foreign war and by brushing aside the presumptions of the bourgeois parliamentarians. Could the glorious German army do less?

Marx reported that "by the beginning of autumn [1848] the relative position of the different parties had become exasperated and critical enough to make a decisive battle inevitable. The first engagements in this domestic war between the democratic and revolutionary masses and the army took place at Frankfort. Though a mere secondary engagement, it was the first advantage of any note the troops acquired over the insurrection, and had a great moral effect. The fancy government established by the Frankfort National Assembly had been allowed by Prussia, for very obvious reasons, to conclude an armistice with Denmark, which not only surrendered to Danish vengeance the Germans of Schleswig, but which also entirely disclaimed the more or less revolutionary principles which were generally supposed in the Danish war.

This armistice was, by a majority of two or three, rejected in the Frankfort Assembly. A sham ministerial crisis followed this vote, but three days later the assembly reconsidered its vote and was actually induced to cancel it and acknowledge the armistice. This disgraceful proceeding roused the indignation of the people. Barricades were erected, but already sufficient troops had been drawn to Frankfort, and after six hours' fighting, the insurrection was suppressed. Similar, but less important, movements connected with this event took place in other parts of Germany (Baden, Cologne), but were equally defeated.

Marx observed that "this preliminary engagement gave to the Counterrevolutionary Party the one great advantage, that now the only government which had entirely - at least in semblance - originated with popular election, the Imperial Government of Frankfort, as well as the National Assembly, was ruined in the eyes of the people. This Government and this Assembly had been obliged to appeal to the bayonets of the troops against the manifestation of the popular will. They were compromised, and what little regard they might have been hitherto enabled to claim, this repudiation of their origin, the dependency upon the anti-popular governments and their troops, made both the Lieutenant of the Empire, his ministers and his deputies, henceforth to be complete nullities. We shall soon see how first Austria, then Prussia, and later on the smaller states too, treated with contempt every order, every request, every deputation they received from this body of impotent dreamers."

Marx reported that "we now come to the great counter-stroke in Germany of the French battle of June, to that event which was as decisive for Germany as the proletarian struggle of Paris had been for France; we mean the revolution and subsequent storming of Vienna, October 1848. But the importance of this battle is such, and the explanation of the different circumstances that more immediately contributed to its issue will take up such a portion of The Tribune's columns, as to necessitate its being treated in a separate letter."

Liberals, with middle-class backing, called for the many German states to send representatives to the Frankfort Assembly for the purpose of uniting Germany. The assembly decided to offer the crown of emperor to Frederick William IV of Prussia. This was to be a limited constitutional monarchy. To their horror, he turned it down saying that he would not "pick up a crown from the gutter". The Prussian king thus undermined the liberal movement and caused it to fail. Like Italy and Hungary, German unification failed. That was Marx analysis of the 1848 revolutions in Europe.

On September 30, 1862, Otto von Bismarck made his famous speech to the Budget Committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies: "The great questions of the time will not be resolved by speeches and majority decisions - that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood."

Still, notwithstanding the political failure of liberalism, 1848 liberal proposals such as social insurance, public education, and expanded suffrage were incorporated into Bismarck's social programs after German unification.

In Britain, socialist ideas gave new energy to further parliamentary reform. The working-class anti-capitalist Chartists, deriving its name from the People's Charter of 1838, circulated a petition signed by half of the adult males in the population in Britain calling for electoral reform to allow working class representation in parliament. It was rejected by the House of Common by a vote of 287 to 49, fearing that political democracy would threaten property rights. Liberal democracy was not considered a safe institution until a property-owning middle class became the majority class in Europe. In America, representative democracy has always been the political instrument of the propertied class.

Lenin's dashed hope for European revolution
Lenin declared himself as not being a "socialist chauvinist". He and the Bolsheviks sent all possible aid to the radical leftist fringes in Germany, Sweden and Italy to combat reactionary obstacles. The Soviet Party even considered sending troops to help Hungarian Bolshevik Bela Kun.

The Second International had failed to rally socialist parties in European states to oppose participation in World War I. The Third International (Comintern) after the war accepted the Bolshevik Revolution as the true fruition of Marxism and declared itself as a weapon for world revolution - but the revolution never came. Reaction in the advanced countries to the international Bolshevik "menace" gave rise instead to fascism in post-war Europe.

Lenin's neglect of non-European agricultural societies
The Russian Bolsheviks did not consider non-European agricultural societies ripe targets for revolution. Lenin's anti-imperialism was administered by the Comintern as a longevity drug for European imperialism, not directed at national or personal liberation for the non-European peasant victims of European imperialism. The revolutionary target was clearly and decisively European capitalism, not non-European agricultural feudalism. The segment of the population deemed ripe for liberation was the industrial factory worker, not the farm peasants.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) under Li Lisan, who had joined the communist party as a student in France before returning to China, followed this biased line of organizing urban workers for armed uprisings in cities. This line was met with repeated failures that almost destroyed the CPC until Mao Zedong turned the party into a revolutionary political instrument of the Chinese peasants.

The October Revolution
The October Revolution was an unexpected metamorphic anomaly in the metabolism of revolution because geopolitical circumstances of World War I caused it to take place in Russia, a pre-industrial country on the fringe of Europe, the majority population of which was rural peasants rather than urban factory workers, and the main socio-economic conflict was between the feudal landlord class and the landless peasant class rather than between the capitalist class and the worker class.

It was then a revolutionary task after the revolution to create a proletariat class in Russia and the other Socialist Republics within the USSR as quickly as possible through rapid industrialization, not merely to catch up with the more industrialized West but to hasten revolutionary dialectics of transition from feudalism to capitalism to socialism. Socialism was recast from an ideological social movement to a venue for post-Word War I nationalism. After World War II, socialism was transformed by Cold War superpower geopolitics as the nemesis of capitalistic liberal democracy.

Thus the early modernization strategies of the Soviet revolutionary government were fundamentally different from the imperialist Westernization strategies of Tsar Peter the Great of Russia. It is wrong to see Soviet industrialization as inter-imperialist rivalry, the way the Western anti-communist left does. Social engineering had to be speeded up through revolution to accelerate historical dialectics. This new post-revolution proletariat class, not having existed before the revolution, had not had the experience of being oppressed by capitalists. In fact, there was a shortage of capitalists against whom to mount a triumphant class struggle that was supposed to be the victorious outcome of the revolution.

Continued 1 2 3  

 

 

 

 
 



All material on this website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings), Ltd.
Head Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East, Central, Hong Kong
Thailand Bureau: 11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110