Chinese President Hu Jintao is visiting the United States, perhaps his last
state visit as president before China begins its generational leadership
transition in 2012. Hu's visit is being shaped by the ongoing China-US economic
dialogue, by concerns surrounding stability on the Korean Peninsula and by
rising attention to Chinese defense activity in recent months.
For example, China carried out the first reported test flight of its
fifth-generation combat fighter prototype, dubbed the J-20, during US Defense
Secretary Robert Gates' visit to China the previous week.
The development and test flight of China's J-20 is not insignificant, but it is
also by no means a game changer in the US-China
defense balance. More intriguingly, the test highlights how China's military
increasingly is making its interests heard.
The J-20 flight and China's strategic concerns
The J-20 test flight shone a light on China's strategic concerns and reflected
some of the developing capability that addresses those concerns. The Chinese
fear a potential US blockade of their coast. While this may not seem a likely
scenario, the Chinese look at their strategic vulnerability, at their rising
power and at the US history of thwarting regional powers, and they see
themselves as clearly at risk.
China's increased activity and rhetoric in and around the South and East China
seas also clearly reflect this concern. For Beijing, it is critical to keep the
US Navy as far from Chinese waters as possible and delay its approach by
maximizing the threat environment in the event of a conflict. Though the J-20
is still a work in progress, a more advanced combat fighter - particularly one
with stealth capabilities - could serve a number of relevant roles toward this
end.
The Chinese are still in the early stages of development, however. They are
experimenting with stealth shaping, characteristics and materials, meaning the
degree to which the J-20 can achieve low observability against modern radar
remains an open question.
Significant changes to the design based on handling characteristics and radar
signature can be expected. And true "stealth" is the product of more than just
shaping. Special coatings and radar-absorbing materials only top a lengthy list
of areas in which Chinese engineers must gain practical experience, even
allowing for considerable insight gained through espionage or foreign
assistance.
China still is thought to be struggling with indigenously designed and
manufactured high-end jet engines, not to mention the integration of advanced
sensors, avionics and the complex systems that characterize fifth-generation
aircraft. It is too early to infer much from the single flight-tested
prototype, something the United States learned during the Cold War when initial
US estimates of the Soviet MiG-25 attributed far more sophistication and
capability to the design than proved to be the case after a Soviet pilot
defected with his aircraft years later.
The Chinese role for the J-20 is based on a different set of realities than
those the Soviets and Americans faced during the Cold War, meaning the J-20
prototype should not be judged solely by the American standards for
fifth-generation aircraft. More than having the most advanced aircraft in the
sky, the Chinese value the ability to maintain high sortie rates from many
bases along the country's coast to overwhelm with numbers the superior US
combat aircraft, which would be expected to be operated from aircraft carriers
or from more distant land bases.
The J-20 test's timing
Perhaps more interesting than the test was its timing, with its associated
political implications. For weeks before the test flight, Chinese message
boards and blogs were filled with photographs of the new prototype on the
tarmac, conducting taxi tests in preparation for its first test flight.
Foreign military and defense observers closely monitor such sites, and their
"leaked" images renewed attention to China's fifth-generation development
program, about which there has been plenty of speculation but little hard
detail. Chinese defense and security officials also closely monitor such
boards, but the officials chose not to shut them down - clearly indicating
Beijing's intent to draw attention to the test.
Gates asked Hu about the test when the two met in Beijing. According to some
media reports citing American officials present at the meeting, Hu appeared
surprised by the question and somewhat perplexed by the details of the test -
the implication being that Hu was unaware of the test and that the Chinese
military may have acted out of turn. Gates told reporters that Hu had assured
him the timing was coincidental.
After being asked for his own thoughts regarding the relationship between the
military and the political leadership in China after his meetings with Chinese
civilian and defense leaders, Gates noted that he had become concerned about
that relationship over time. He added that ensuring civilian and military
dialogue between the two countries was important.
Although Gates did not say the Chinese military tested the J-20 without
political clearance from Hu, the idea was certainly suggested by the media
coverage and Gates' response. On the surface, this seems rather hard to
believe. Hu, as president of China and general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, also serves as chairman of China's
parallel Central Military Commissions (one is under the government, the other
under the party, though both have exactly the same makeup).
That the head of China's military would not know about a major new hardware
test coming a week before his trip to meet with the president of the United
States and coinciding with a visit of the US defense secretary seems a reach.
Furthermore, given the amount of attention just beneath the surface in China to
the imminent test, and the subsequent attention in the foreign media, it would
be startling that the Chinese president was so poorly briefed prior to meeting
the US defense secretary. If indeed the test surprised Hu, then there is
serious trouble in China's leadership structure. But perhaps the issue isn't
one of knowledge but one of capability: Could Hu have stopped the test given
the timing, and if so, would he have wanted to stop it?
The rising influence of China's military
Rumors and signs of the rising influence of the military establishment in China
have emerged over the past few years. Since the 1980s, China has focused on and
invested in a major reorientation of its military from a massive land army
focused on territorial defense to one that emphasizes naval and air
capabilities to protect China's interests in the East and South China seas and
beyond into the western Pacific. This has included expanding China's reach and
a focus on anti-access and area-denial capabilities, with accelerated
development in this arena in recent years.
Some systems, like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, are uniquely
tailored to countering the US Navy. Others, like an expanding and more
aggressive Ocean and Fisheries Administration, is directed more at China's
neighbors in the South and East China seas, and at asserting China's claims to
these waters.
This change in focus is driven by three factors. First, China sees its land
borders as being fairly well locked down, with its buffer territories largely
under control, but the maritime border is a vulnerability - a particular
concern for a trade-based economy. Second, as China's economy has rapidly
expanded, so has Beijing's dependence on far-flung sources of natural resources
and emerging markets.
This drives the government and military to look at protection of sea-lanes,
often far from China's shores. Third, the military leadership is using these
concerns to increase its own role in internal decision-making. The more
dependent China is on places far from its borders, the more the military can
make the case that it is the only entity with both the intelligence and the
understanding to provide the necessary strategic advice and perspective to
China's civilian leadership.
There is also the issue of a modernizing military looking out for itself,
battling for its share of China's budget and economic pie. A key part of former
Chinese president Jiang Zemin's fundamental military reforms was stripping the
military of much of its business empire. At the time, the state - while funding
the military - assumed that military-run industry would supplement the defense
budget. In short, the military ran industries, and the profits were used to
support local and regional defense needs. That kept the official state military
budget down and encouraged enterprising commanders to contribute to China's
economic growth.
But over time, it also led to corruption and a military where regional and
local military commanders were at risk of becoming more intent on their
business empires than on the country's national defense. Money that largely had
gone to support the living of the troops was sidelined and funneled to the
military officials.
And the faster the Chinese economy grew, the more profit there was for the
taking. Regional military leaders and local governments teamed up to operate,
promote and protect their own business interests regardless of the state's
broader national economic or social priorities. China's central leadership saw
troubling parallels to older Chinese history, when regional warlords emerged.
In response, Jiang ordered the military largely out of business. Military
leaders grudgingly complied for the most part, though there were plenty of
cases of military-run industries being stripped of all their machinery,
equipment and supplies, which were then sold on the black market and then
unloaded at bargain prices to the cronies of military officials.
Other companies were simply stripped and foisted on the government to deal
with, debts and all. Jiang placated the military by increasing its budget,
increasing the living standard of the average soldier and launching a ramped-up
program to rapidly increase the education of its soldiers and technical
sophistication of China's military. This appeased the military officials and
bought their loyalty - returning the military to financial dependence on the
government and Communist Party.
But the success of military reform, which also involved seeking greater
sophistication in doctrine, training, communications and technology, has also
given the military greater influence. Over time, the military has come to
expect more technologically, and China has begun experimenting with
technology-sharing between military and civilian industry to spur development.
The drive for dual-use technology, from the evolving aerospace industry to
nanotechnology, creates new opportunities for military officials to promote new
weapons-system development while at the same time profiting from the
development. As China's global economic power has grown, the military has
demanded more funding and greater capabilities to protect national interests
and its own prerogatives.
But China's military officials are also growing more vocal in their opinions
beyond the issue of military procurement. Over the past year, Chinese military
officers have made their opinions known, quite openly in Chinese and sometimes
even foreign media. They have addressed not only military issues but also
Chinese foreign policy and international relations.
This step outside the norm has left the Chinese diplomatic community
uncomfortable (or at least left it expressing its unease with the rising
influence of the military to their foreign counterparts). This may be an
elaborate disinformation campaign or a slightly higher level of the griping
typical of bureaucrats, or it may in fact reflect a military that sees its own
role and significance rising and is stepping forward to try to grab the
influence and power it feels it deserves.
One example of the ostensible struggle between the military and the civilian
bureaucrats over Chinese foreign policy played out over the past year. Through
nearly the first three-quarters of the year, when the United States carried out
defense exercises in the Asia-Pacific region - whether annual or in response to
regional events like the sinking of the Cheonan in South Korea - the
Chinese would respond by holding their own series of exercises, sometimes on a
larger scale. It was a game of one-upmanship.
But the Foreign Ministry and bureaucracy purportedly argued against this policy
as counter-productive, and by the fourth quarter, China had shifted away from
military exercises as a response. Instead, it once again pushed a friendlier
and more diplomatic line even as US exercises continued. By the November 2010
crisis over North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, China had returned to
its standard call for moderation and dialogue.
If this narrative is accepted, the military response to being sidelined again
was to leak plans to launch an aircraft carrier in 2011, to reinvigorate
international attention to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles, and to test
the new Chinese fifth-generation aircraft while Gates was in Beijing and just
before Hu headed to Washington. A Chinese military motivated by nationalism -
and perhaps an even stronger interest in preserving its power and influence
within China - would find it better to be in contention with the United States
than in calm. This is because US pressure, whether real or rhetorical, drives
China's defense development.
But the case could as easily be made that the Chinese political leadership has
an equal interest in ensuring a mixed relationship with Washington, that the
government benefits from seemingly endless U.S. criticism of Chinese defense
development. This is because such criticism increases Chinese nationalism,
distracting the people from the economic troubles Beijing is trying to manage.
And this is the heart of the issue: Just how well-coordinated are the military
and civilian leadership of China, and how stable is their relationship?
An end to the Chinese miracle
The Chinese miracle is nearing its natural conclusion, as Beijing begins to
face a reality like that seen by Japan, South Korea and the other Asian Tigers
that all followed the same growth pattern. How that crisis plays out is
fundamentally different depending upon the country: Japan has accepted the
shared long-term pain of two decades of malaise; South Korea saw short, sharp,
wrenching reforms; Indonesia saw its government collapse. The reliability of
the military, the capability of the civilian leadership and the level of
acceptance of the population all combine to shape the outcome.
A divide between the military and civilian leadership would mean that China,
already facing the social consequences of its economic policies, is facing
another significant issue at the same time: the balance of civilian-military
relations. However, a carefully coordinated drive to give the appearance of a
split may help China convince the United States to ease economic pressure to
avoid exacerbating this "split" while also appealing to nationalistic unity at
home.
But even small signs of a split now are critical because of the stresses on the
system that China will experience when its economic miracle expires in the
not-so-distant future. Mao and Deng were both soldiers. Their successors were
not. Neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao has military experience, and incoming
President Xi Jinping similarly lacks such training. The rumors from China
suggest that the military plans to take advantage of Xi's lack of experience
and use its influence to shape his policies. The leadership transition may
provide a chance for the military to gain more influence in an institutional
way, allowing it to drive a hard bargain and buy a bigger share of the pie in
the fifth generation set-up.
For most of modern China's history, the military has been an internal force
without much appetite for more worldly affairs. That is now changing,
appropriately, due to China's growing global prominence and reliance on the
global economy. But that means that a new balance must be found, and China's
senior leadership must both accommodate and balance the military's perspective
and what the military advocates for.
As Chinese leaders deal with a generational transition, expanding international
involvement and an increasingly difficult economic balance, the military is
coming into its own and making its interests heard more clearly. How this
balance plays out will be tremendously significant.
(Published with permission from STRATFORr,
a Texas-based geopolitical intelligence company. Copyright 2011 Stratfor.)
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