HONG KONG - China's power center in Beijing has in recent years encouraged
regional authorities to introduce anti-corruption policies to combat official
corruption and increase transparency. It's become known as the "Sunshine"
policy.
Some people wonder why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot devise a
national "Sunshine" policy and enforce it. The US has so-called "Sunshine" laws
that require that government data be made available to the public. After all,
though regions have an increasingly greater say in economic affairs, political
power in China is centralized under the CCP's control.
In reality, however, things are not as simple. Though China is ruled by the CCP
and its political power is centralized, this does not guarantee that regions
follow Beijing's word to the letter. In
any society there are privileged people and interests, and China is no
exception. Any new policy that affects these interests naturally meets with
opposition.
Even with his unchallengeable authority, it was difficult for paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping to start the country's process of economic reform and opening up
- nearly every step was a hard struggle. In today's China, there is no
"strongman" like Deng, and there are even more interest groups, due to the
economic growth and wealth redistribution of the past three decades.
Given rampant official corruption, one could say that party officials are the
largest interest group. Officialdom is also the biggest opposition to plans for
a "Sunshine" law that the government proposed last year that would see
officials declaring their assets and those of their spouses and children.
The policy was opposed by the CCP's central committee, and the power center has
since tried to "encourage" localities to implement anti-graft policies in the
hope of "bottom-to-top" change. Many reforms in the past 30 years started at
the grassroots level.
With or without a proper understanding of Beijing's intentions, some
governments at the grassroots have began to introduce transparency measures.
The most impressive example is Baimiao township under Bazhou district of
Bazhong city, Sichuan province. A township is the lowest-ranking administrative
unit in China's bureaucratic hierarchy.
Baimiao is by Chinese standards, with a population of less than 10,000, a tiny
township, though it still has its own party committee and government. This
otherwise unknown and remote place became famous this year when it implemented
what has been called a full "Sunshine" policy.
The policy, publicized on the local government's website [1], details
government revenues and expenditure as well as the salaries and fringe benefits
paid to incumbent and retired officials. Baimiao government became fully
transparent, so much so that media dubbed it China's first "fully naked"
government.
Baimiao's experiment, first reported by a Sichuan newspaper in mid-March,
quickly attracted national attention. The website of the Baimiao government
drew many hits as netizens flocked to express their opinions. Some praised the
move, some questioned it or cast doubts.
In an interview, Baimiao township party secretary Zhang Yingshang said the idea
for his transparency exercise came two years ago while he was studying at a
Bazhong city party school. Supported by a leader of the school he began the
experiment at the beginning of this year.
Answering a charge raised by a blogger that Baimiao had hidden accounts and
that the online ones were fake, Zhang said all expenditures had to be
scrutinized by the township's party disciplinary inspection commission (jiwei).
(See China's fearsome jiwei
take on graft, Jun 8, '10) Other netizens were curious about details of
why money was spent on this and that, and Zhang replied to all of them.
The case of Baimiao's government, where a grassroots unit has taken the lead in
what could become nationwide reform, has reminded many of the role that the
little-known Xiaogang village played in the implementation of privatization
reforms in China's agricultural production.
In 1978, 18 farmers in Xiaogang village in east Anhui province signed a secret
agreement to divide communally owned farmland into individual sections called
"household contracts". At the time, this should have been regarded as a hefty
"counter-revolutionary crime". But the experiment won the support of Deng and
was quickly implemented across the nation, becoming the first major
breakthrough in economic reform and opening up.
However, times have changed. In the late 1970s, Chinese farmers and rural
cadres were frustrated with the commune system, seeing it as an obstacle to
improving agricultural production and their lives. Thus, Xiaogang village's
privatization experiment quickly won popular support and was opposed only by a
few diehard Maoist ideologues and conservatives.
A full "Sunshine" policy like the one piloted in Baimiao would destroy the
"hidden rules" prevailing among officials and business people that ensures
opaque governance and allows corruption. The resistance is strong. Baimiao
could be compared to a 21st-century Don Quixote taking on a giant windmill.
Even before Baimiao received the blessing of the power center to introduce its
"Sunshine" policy, it ran into delays and "punishments" from officialdom and
business circles. The pushback has continued since.
According to a report by Chengdu Commercial Daily on June 7, township party
secretary Zhang has complained that since the "Sunshine" policy was widely
reported in mid-March, Baimiao government operations have been virtually
boycotted by higher-level authorities.
"Now much fewer officials from our superior government make work trips to
Baimiao. Those who do come refuse to dine with us, even during meal times. I
find it sad and hard to understand. Given our normal work relations, it's
nothing strange for them to have lunch or dinner with us. Why do they prefer to
leave with an empty stomach?" Zhang said.
He is likely aware of where the problem lies. Under Baimiao's "Sunshine"
policy, the names of officials entertained would be publicized. No official
wants his name published alongside a list of guests treated to a meal on public
funds. Even business people avoid being named on such a list in fear of being
accused of "collusion with officials". No wonder Zhang complains that in past
months it has been difficult for Baimiao to lure investors or business people.
In China, business is often negotiated at dinner tables. No wining and dining
(and often bribes), no business. This is even true for government-to-government
business. The "Sunshine" policy has effectively cut off Baimiao's guanxi
(connections) with the outside world. Many of the Baimiao government's projects
have been shelved or boycotted.
Director of Baimiao township Ou Mingqing told Chengdu Commercial Daily that to
improve people's livelihoods the local authorities had devised projects to
expand and renovate the township's water and electricity supplies, and road
network. The projects were approved and supported by leaders of the Bazhou
district.
"However, only the city bureau of electricity said it would try to help later
this year. All other relevant authorities either said they did not have the
funds or plans for our projects," a frustrated Ou said.
Ou and Zhang's concerns have attracted public sympathy. Media commentaries and
netizens call for support of Baimiao, accusing interest groups in the
bureaucracy of trying to kill a "Sunshine" policy in its infancy.
But given the strong resistance from officialdom, it seems unlikely that the
center will step in and help Baimiao, despite the public support. This makes
Baimiao's experiment in transparency even less likely to ever be implemented
nationwide.
If Beijing wanted to undertake the dramatic reforms needed to change the
current politico-social environment, it could, but it appears to lack the
necessary will. It seems the "Sunshine" policy will not be penetrating the rest
of the country in the foreseeable future.
Notes
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