Page 1 of 2 Gates closed out of China
By Peter J Brown
Just a few days after United States Navy Admiral Robert Willard, commander of
the US Pacific Command, departed from Beijing in late May after a face-to-face
meeting with Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the People's
Liberation Army's (PLA) general staff, China waved off a visit by US Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates.
China announced that this was not a "convenient time" for Gates to visit.
Willard's talks with Ma in Beijing were part of the second round of the ongoing
China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Willard was there as part of the huge
US delegation that was headed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Immediately prior to the dialogue, China had been contemplating two very
different expressions of the current state of US-China
relations under the Barack Obama administration. The president's 52-page US
National Security Strategy (NSS) issued in early May, for example, was an
engagement-centric, restrained and diplomatic overview. The NSS spoke of US
relations with China using carefully crafted words such as "we will encourage
China to make choices that contribute to peace, stability and prosperity as its
influence rises". The NSS did not rock the boat and was really not a formal
strategy, unless repeating the word "engagement' more than three dozen times is
acceptable as such.
A few days after the NSS was unveiled, however, "AirSea Battle: A
Point-of-Departure Operational Concept" (ASB) was presented by four analysts
from the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA). It was almost a polar opposite of the NSS in its treatment of China.
The ASB, which was 123 pages long and fell just short of being an actual
blueprint for an armed confrontation between the countries, made a case for
"offsetting actions" on the basis that "the strategic balance in the Western
Pacific will become unfavorable and unstable". Missions involving US Navy
ships, submarines and the US Air Force (USAF) "in the early days of a war",
were examined. [1]
ASB has taken years to evolve, and among other things, ASB is an indicator of
the CSBA's growing influence in Gates' inner circle. US Navy Under Secretary
Robert Work, a former US Marine Corps artillery colonel, is a former CSBA
analyst. A participant on Obama's Pentagon transition team in 2008, Work became
the navy's second-highest-ranking civilian in May 2009. He was recently
described by Defense News as "a deeply experienced military strategist and
wargamer".
Earlier this year, Work described ASB as "focused on one thing and one thing
only. Joint operations in an anti-access environment against a high-end
competitor who has achieved parity or near-parity in guided weapons warfare and
battle networks. So it's very much how the air force and the navy would operate
in such an environment to prevail and gain dominance over the opposing battle
network."
It could be a regional power who has gotten all sorts of high-end systems from
another power," said Work as he put Iran on notice, too. "Air-Sea Battle was
secretary-directed to the Air Force and the Navy to say, think about it, how
would you go about this problem? And don't come up with separate service
solutions, I want you two services to work together like the army and air force
did in the 1980s on air-land battle." [2]
Besides working on ASB, CSBA has produced several monographs known as the
so-called "Strategy for the Long Haul" series. And in 2008, Work was part of a
team that put together one entitled "The Challenge to US National Security" in
which chapter two - "Hedging Against a Hostile China" - sets a tone that is all
about a form of US engagement with China that is downplayed considerably in the
new NSS.
Work's other recent monographs for CSBA include "The US Navy: Charting a Course
For Tomorrow's Fleet" that speaks of a "US grand strategy seeking to
avoid/deter war with other great powers, and to defeat them if deterrence
fails".
"Only the most powerful states, such as China or perhaps Russia, will be able
to build battle networks on a scale comparable with the United States," said
Work. "Moreover, many of their supporting capabilities will be arrayed
throughout the depth and breadth of their large territories.
The navy and the joint force must therefore be prepared to conduct
counter-network operations over continent-size landmasses. At the moment, the
pacing threat for this preparation is the burgeoning maritime
reconnaissance-strike network that China is building in the Western Pacific."
[pg 55]
CSBA has always contended that China poses a unique challenge to US forces,
something quite "unlike those posed by other US adversaries within the
post-Cold War context". CSBA spells out the threat of China's so-called
anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and the fact that China will
never challenge the US military symmetrically.
This has meant that the US must constantly adapt to successfully deal with
China's often novel approach to military power. In mid-2010, CSBA justified ASB
by stating, "The US military today faces an emerging major operational
challenge, particularly in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations. The PLA's
ongoing efforts to field robust A2/AD capabilities are threatening to make US
power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts,
prohibitively costly."
"Hence the US's strategic choice: to risk a loss of military access to areas
vital to its security - and those of key allies and partners to whom it is
committed by treaty or law - or to explore options that can preserve the stable
military balance that has seen the region enjoy a period of unparalleled peace
and prosperity," said CSBA.
Is the CSBA pushing the PLA in one direction or another in the process? Or is
the PLA simply taking all of this in stride?
"This is not to suggest that the United States seeks a confrontation with
China, let alone a war. Indeed, even during the period of unparalleled US
military dominance following the Cold War, the US sought to engage China, not
attack or coerce it," said the CSBA. "A 'roll-back' of the PLA's military power
is not the objective here. Nor is containment of China proposed. Rather, we
advocate simply offsetting the PLA's unprovoked and unwarranted military
buildup."
There is no doubt that "offsetting" and "prevail and gain dominance" mean two
different things entirely to the Chinese. The difference in meaning here is
especially relevant as the mood inside the White House itself shifts.
United States military officers have recently painted a very compelling picture
of what is now underway in Obama's camp. Obama's top advisors are reaching out
to the Pentagon in an urgent effort to assemble a collection of covert strike
plans that take things a step further than anything allowable under the
previous administration.
While this planning is strictly intended for "Special Operations" purposes only
- well away from Chinese territory thus far - Obama is perceived as far more
receptive today to a "much more aggressive" stance across the board, and he has
a very open mind when it comes to a wide range of offensive options. [3]
The US defense secretary who stood in front of photographers and shook hands
with General Ma in Singapore in early June at the opening of the latest
so-called Shangri-La Dialogue that is an annual Asian military summit held in
Singapore, had recently entered a pivotal period in his career, and Gates was
viewed by many as a more disruptive force as well, both at home and abroad.
In 2010, Gates expected the top-heavy Pentagon to reduce the number of senior
US military officers - too many generals and admirals are under his command -
while he grappled with the enormous budgetary constraints created by the US
economic downturn that has exerted considerable pressure on the Pentagon's
procurement list. Gates also faced another significant problem in the form of a
growing number of junior officers in combat zones who are deciding after
multiple tours of duty not to continue onto command assignments.
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