US peeks into China's nuclear fortress
By Peter J Brown
The Chinese government is probably unhappy about a new report by a
Virginia-based, non-partisan think-tank called Project 2049 [1] that reveals
significant and previously little known details about Base 22 in the Qinling
mountains in Shaanxi province, China's primary storage facility for nuclear
weapons. Publicity about this new report - "China's Nuclear Warhead Storage and
Handling System" - first appeared in Defense News in early March. [2]
One can quickly understand the reason for Beijing's displeasure. Although the
existence of this strategic storage complex in northwest China has been known
for years, what has been said in the report about the size - 400 square
kilometers, the tunnel complex inside Taibai Mountain, and the railway lines
leading to
this mysterious fortress is not the kind of detailed information that China is
eager to share with the outside world.
"I would expect the Chinese government to be a little disconcerted about such
information appearing in the public domain, but the report's author, Mark
Stokes, has noted elsewhere that China is becoming more open so I would expect
Chinese readers to react across the spectrum, from rage to shrugs," said Dr
Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-proliferation
Initiative at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation.
Stokes, a former US defense attache who worked at the US embassy in Beijing in
the early 1990s, is now executive director of Project 2049. He is probably not
the most popular person in Beijing these days, but his report actually paints a
very positive picture of the rigid yet reliable system of controls put in place
by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission (CMC) to ensure
the absolute safety and security of China's nuclear warheads. Base 22 and the
entire centralized storage and handling system falls under the control of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery.
"The key thing is that China appears to manage its limited nuclear inventory in
a responsible manner, and it is worth examining ways to deepen and broaden
cooperation in safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials on a global basis,"
said Stokes.
Any report that includes new details about China's strategic weapons let alone
the infrastructure that China has built surrounding these weapons is bound to
compliment as well as fuel the ongoing attempt by US conservatives to confront
and ultimately defeat US President Barack Obama's plan to dramatically reduce
the US stockpile of nuclear weapons. In addition, this report comes at a time
when US conservatives are focused on implementing a grander missile defense
scheme to counter what is unfolding in Iran, North Korea, and China.
Of course, the US Congress has been preoccupied with health care lately. Stokes
makes it clear that when the dust settles surrounding health-care issues, US
Congress will wake up to what he is really saying about China. Stokes has not
seen any reaction to his report on Capitol Hill thus far.
"I am not as well informed as I should be about political issues with regard to
US nuclear policy," said Stokes. "In short, I am just not that concerned with
China's limited nuclear deterrent. It is the conventional capabilities that
could be used in a Taiwan scenario that concern me more."
Those are words that will certainly stir up the hard-line faction of
conservatives in the US Congress who are already pressing for a stronger stance
against China across the board, and for F-16 sales to Taiwan. These same
members of Congress continue to fend off at least one key Obama nominee for a
senior post at the US Department of Defense who is perceived as being too quick
to cancel missile defense spending.
Because his report also addresses China's possible development of a
conventional capability that may or may not mirror work by the US on the
so-called "Prompt Global Strike" conventional missile-based attack system, a
vocal response should be forthcoming. (See
US's strike threat catches China off guard , Asia Times Online, Feb 4,
2010)
Lewis, on the other hand, does not expect or does not see why US conservatives
might be so outraged by the findings of this report.
"It suggests the Chinese storage and handling arrangements reflect a force that
is kept off alert and under tight central control. If anything, this suggests
China continues to rely on nuclear weapons for core deterrence," said Lewis.
Stokes is not viewed as a simply another right-wing China hawk from the US who
writes reports that are more ideologically driven than based on actual research
and supported by hard facts.
"I worked with Mark for a couple of months at the Pentagon. He is a hawk, but
he does not let his politics get in the way of his analysis," said Lewis. "If I
had a meeting on China's strategic modernization, Mark would be on my invite
list."
Despite the possible impact of this report in both Beijing and Washington,
Stokes finds the media coverage especially in China to be balanced and
acceptable. A report in Xinhua, for example, injects not even a single word of
commentary. [3]
"The only responses I've seen have reflected Western reporting of the report.
Huanqiu Ribao [Global Times] and Xinhua have both covered in a fairly objective
manner. The most recent Xinhua reporting summarized the study in some detail
and pretty accurately," said Stokes. "I am not exactly sure what to make of the
coverage, but I assume there is some context with the pending release of the
new US Nuclear Posture Review, the upcoming Nuclear Summit which [President] Hu
Jintao may attend, and the five-year review of the Non-proliferation Treaty
[NPT] set for May."
Stokes emphasizes that his report is very relevant to the NPT review.
"Of course, one of the key issues in the NPT is nuclear safety and security,
and presumably transparency, which is the primary theme of the paper I did,"
said Stokes.
Dr Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China Project manager at the
Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) describes the work by
Stokes as "a solid report" and he agrees with the conclusion that, "Beijing
adopts a responsible and serious attitude with regards to nuclear security and
safety."
"That does need to be qualified, however. Several years ago, UCS hosted a
Chinese fellow from their nuclear weapons research facility in Mianyang at our
offices in Cambridge. He was here to conduct research on nuclear security and
safety," said Kulacki. "It was clear from his research that China had given
very little consideration to what is often called the 'insider threat' ; the
threat of theft or sabotage facilitated by an insider."
Despite his earlier comment, Kulacki criticized the report, and pointed out
that, "some of the Chinese sources cited in this report do not contain
information that substantiates the claims made in the text".
China certainly might not have expected - or wanted - some of the information
that Stokes has released to be spilled out in the public domain, but despite
any sign of anxiety on Beijing, Stokes does not see his report as breaking new
ground.
"There is not [much new information in my report] per se, beyond pulling
together various sources from China itself. It may be the first time Chinese
sources have been summarized for Western audiences though in some detail. [The
Federation of American Scientists] has covered some of the storage facilities
in its reporting over the last couple of years," said Stokes.
That said, Stokes does not expect everyone to agree with his depiction of the
potential mismatch or imbalance that exists between the actual number of
nuclear warheads that China possesses, and the number of military personnel it
has assigned to its strategic forces. Stokes also admits that there is bound to
be disagreement over what he has to say about one of China's long-range
missiles as well.
"I suspect there could be some disagreement with a couple of my conclusions.
For example, that there does not appear to be much significant growth in number
of warheads despite growth in the number of [PLA] missile brigades,' said
Stokes. "Another area of possible disagreement could be a conventional mission
for the 8,000-kilometer range DF-31 [missile]."
Stokes describes his overall work as "preliminary" and deserving more study.
"The Second Artillery, for some time now, has been expanding the use of
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. Whether conventional DF-21s count as
'long-range' depends on what you mean by 'long'," said Lewis. "The distinction
is usually that the Second Artillery troops are 'operators' - which is to say
responsible for the handling and use of the weapons. That does not mean that
they play a dominant role in policymaking. Indeed, I suspect one reason for the
growth in conventional missiles is that it increases service autonomy."
Stokes argues that China may be placing more emphasis on a massive conventional
missile strike capability than many experts in the West are prepared to accept.
"The reality is that we do not really know how many warheads China has had in
the past. I just did not see any obvious sign of a significant growth in
warhead inventory," said Stokes.
Stokes avoided going into more detail on this topic because this was not really
the focus of his study. Besides, he discussed China's extended conventional
strike capabilities in a report last September.
"There is a significant body of literature regarding a conventional DF-21,
specifically the DF-21C and maybe DF-21D [designated an anti-ship ballistic
missile or ASBM] in the near future. A conventional DF-31 is certainly possible
if technical issues can be overcome with regard to a terminal guidance system
on a missile traveling at higher reentry speeds," said Stokes.
Kulacki identifies parts of the report that deserve more careful scrutiny. For
example, in his discussion of the Second Artillery, and the expanding use of
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, Stokes writes that, "the distinction
between ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear and conventional payloads is
becoming increasingly blurred".
"I concur. But there are indications China is considering turning conventional
strike missions over to the [PLA Air Force]," said Kulacki. "If so, this should
help draw a clearer line between nuclear and conventional payloads." [4]
As far as efforts to persuade China to accept the need for more transparency,
this is where this report makes its mark.
Stokes credits China for managing its limited stockpile of nuclear weapons in a
responsible manner. At the same time, he wonders if many in China "may want to
know where nuclear warheads are and if they are safe. Public interest grew in
the wake of the May 2008 earthquake, with the epicenter being fairly close to
sensitive civilian defense industry facilities. I suspect there has been some
conscious effort to calm whatever public concerns may exist," said Stokes in
response to comments in the blog on www.armscontrolwonk.com.
The emphasis on increased transparency "could reflect greater confidence in the
survivability of the country's nuclear deterrent. Recent conclusion of major
Second Artillery infrastructure projects over the last decade, initial
operational capability of the mobile solid-fueled DF-31A, and increasingly
sophisticated missile defense countermeasures may have contributed to the
greater degree of confidence," Stokes added.
Lewis describes the overall impact of this report as something that moves
everyone ahead slowly towards a safer world.
"The impact of the report just depends on the person and the politics inside
China. It will make some Chinese more leery of transparency, but others will
observe that the information got out and the world didn't end, so there may be
less to fear from transparency," said Lewis.
Stokes raises enough questions here both about China's capabilities, and
unexplained gaps in the US knowledge base such that US hardline conservatives
may come away feeling even less comfortable with the current state of affairs.
Notes
1. To view the report, click here.
2. The Defense News (March 8) article entitled, China's Central Nuke Storage
ID'd, can be seen along with numerous comments by Mark Stokes by clicking
here.
3. Articles in the Chinese media about the Project 2049's report can be seen by
clicking here:
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