Iron fist wrapped in the hand that gives
By Willy Lam
The Hu Jintao administration has significantly tightened policy over Tibet in
an apparent attempt to ensure the proverbial "long reign and perennial
stability" of Chinese Communist Party's in the restive region. Hardline cadres
are being appointed to run the region.
While unprecedented aid has been pledged for the estimated 6.5 million Tibetans
living in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and neighboring provinces of
Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai, the bulk of new infrastructure projects also serve
to speed up Han Chinese migration. These multi-pronged measures seem geared
toward defusing possible disturbances in the event of the demise of the
75-year-old Dalai Lama. Meanwhile, prospects for the resumption
of dialogue between Beijing and the exiled spiritual leader are more dismal
than ever.
The most eye-catching personnel change is the appointment of the hawkish Pema
Thinley (aka Padma Choling), 58, as TAR chairman, or governor. Pema, a former
executive-vice chairman who had also been promoted TAR vice party secretary,
replaced 62-year-old Qiangba Puncog, who has become head of the region's
People's Congress, or legislature.
Given that Qiangba is three years shy of the normal retirement age for
provincial chiefs, it is likely that the relatively moderate - but ineffective
- Qiangba was penalized for failing to deal harshly with the spate of
anti-Beijing protests that erupted in the spring of 2008 and 2009.
Pema, by contrast, is one of only a few senior ethnic-Tibetan cadres with solid
military experience. He served in the Qinghai and Tibet military districts from
1969 to 1986. When Hu was TAR party boss, Pema was secretary of the party cell
of the regional government's General Office and deputy head of the Nanshan
District. Moreover, Pema, who has since the early 2000s been responsible for
law and order in the TAR, has the reputation of a hardline enforcer of
Beijing's ironclad strategy against the so-called "three evil forces" of
separatism, terrorism and religious extremism.
The party-and-state apparatus' tough tactics toward ethnic minorities were
endorsed at a January 8 politburo meeting devoted exclusively to Tibetan
issues. In the meeting, Hu, who was party secretary of Tibet from 1988 to 1992,
heralded two goals for the TAR in the coming decade: "seeking a
breakthrough-style [economic] development" and "maintaining long-term
stability".
In an apparent effort to win the hearts and minds of Tibetans, Hu promised that
the central government would help Tibet in four ways: boost investment,
transfer technology, and send in more qualified officials as well as "experts
and talents". The region's gross domestic product is set to grow by 12% this
year, while fixed-assets investments are expected to jump a whopping 18%.
Under Hu's dictum of "going down the road of development with Chinese
characteristics and Tibetan flavor" (zhongguo tese, xizang tedian),
additional input has been focused on areas including infrastructure, tourism,
mining and manufacturing. Little wonder that the share prices of a dozen-odd
Tibet-related construction, transport and mining companies listed on the
Shanghai Stock Market jumped sharply at the beginning of the year.
Foremost among infrastructure schemes mooted for the 12th Five-Year Plan period
of 2011 to 2015 is what the official Chinese press bills as "the world's
highest airport". Construction of the 1.8 billion yuan ($263.5 million) airport
in Tibet's Nagqu prefecture, which has an elevation of 4,436 meters (14,639
feet), will begin late this year.
According to local media, the Nagqu Airport would, together with ultramodern
facilities such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, "perfect a three-dimensional
transport network that will envelop all Tibet". Exiled Tibetans and Western
Tibet experts, however, have reacted negatively to Beijing's supposed new deal
for the impoverished region. The Dalai Lama's representatives have complained
that Chinese investment in the TAR mainly benefits businessmen and skilled
workers from other provinces - and that modernized transport systems in
particular will facilitate Sinicization through the migration of Han Chinese
into the region.
Commenting on the Hu leadership's new policy on Tibet, Columbia University
Tibetologist Robert Barnett noted that China "seems locked into conflict'' with
Tibetans. "Either Beijing's leaders lack the political capital to admit that
existing policies might have failed or ... they believe that Tibetans will be
won over by the current mix of repression and enforced, culturally corrosive
modernization that stimulates migration," he said [1].
Hu and his advisers haven't mentioned what kind of "experts" will be dispatched
to Tibet. In the wake of ethnic violence in both Tibet and Xinjiang last year,
however, more soldiers and officers of the paramilitary People's Armed Police
(PAP) have been stationed in the two regions. It is significant that Hu last
month promoted a former head of the Tibet People's Armed Police (PAP) garrison,
Lieutenant-General General Wang Jianping, as the commander of the national PAP,
whose strength is estimated at close to 1 million.
Particularly compared to so-called splittists in Xinjiang, "anti-Beijing''
elements in Tibet are pacifist and non-violent in nature. Yet Chinese
authorities anticipate redoubled resistance as they crack the whip on monks and
other potential troublemakers in the TAR as well as Tibetan districts in
neighboring provinces. Beijing is stepping up a controversial drive to register
the "qualifications'' and other background materials of all living Buddhas,
monks and nuns in the region.
In the past few months, several monks and dissidents were given severe prison
terms. For instance, liberal filmmaker Dhondup Wangchen was sentenced last
month to six years in jail for producing a documentary attacking Beijing's
Tibet-related cultural policies.
Moreover, Beijing seems to have closed the door to on-again, off-again
negotiations with the emissaries of the Dalai Lama. The CCP's relations with
the Nobel Peace Prize laureate have soured particularly in the wake of the
latter's visit late last year to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian province that
Beijing considers to be Chinese territory. Chinese diplomats are also pulling
out all the stops to prevent politicians of Western countries from meeting the
head of the Tibetan movement-in-exile.
Diplomatic analysts say the Hu administration is not keen on reopening a
dialogue because Beijing thinks that the momentum is going China's way. After
the Dalai Lama's death, the Tibetan movement will be devoid of a globally
recognized leader and may well be splintered along factional lines.
Columbia University's Barnett thinks that while Beijing may not have ruled out
the possibility of reopening talks, possibilities of a compromise are slim.
"The Chinese side might agree at the last minute to a token meeting with the
Dalai Lama to avoid the ignominy of forcing him to die in exile,'' said
Barnett. "But until they see a link between policy failure and protest, they
seem unlikely to offer the Tibetans anything significant.''
At the same time, Hu, who is the politburo standing committee member in charge
of ethnic-minority affairs, has beefed up the state security net in the
Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR). The regional government is due to spend 2.89
billion yuan on maintaining law and order this year. This is 87.9% more than
the 2009 figure.
XAR Chairman Nur Bekri, a member of Hu's Communist Youth League Faction, said
last week that "strengthening social security and striking hard with an iron
fist against the three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism will
remain top priorities for Xinjiang''. The CCP leadership's hardened stance on
the two autonomous regions has made it even more unlikely that the
ultra-conservative party secretaries of TAR and XAR - Zhang Qingli and Wang
Lequn - will be replaced any time soon.
This is despite reports in the Hong Kong-media late last year that the
65-year-old Wang, who was first stationed in Xinjiang in the early 1990s, would
be transferred to a less sensitive post soon.
One of the most detrimental results of the conservative turn in Beijing's
policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang is that moderates on both sides have been
cowed into silence. For example, before the July 5 riots in Urumqi last year,
quite a number of Xinjiang and Han Chinese intellectuals had run websites
advocating reconciliation across racial lines. At least unofficially, liberal
Chinese cadres have also advocated a return to the flexible and tolerant ethnic
policies associated with illustrious figures such as former Communist Party
general secretary Hu Yaobang and former vice premier Xi Zhongxun, the late
father of Vice President Xi Jinping.
In the wake of the crackdown on free-thinking websites and liberal
non-governmental organizations, however, voices of reason and moderation have
been marginalized. Moreover, nationalism, including growing intolerance toward
the perceived alien cultures of Tibetans and Uyghurs - and attacks on the West
for abetting pro-independence movements in China - seems to be on the rise
among young Han Chinese.
The latter's fulminations against allegedly ungrateful and unpatriotic Tibetans
and Uyghurs can often be found in the chatrooms of popular websites. Given the
news blackout on Tibet and Xinjiang, it seems that the Hu politburo's harsh
policies have succeeded at least in the near term in quashing all
manifestations of defiance. Over the long haul, however, heavy-handed
suppression as well as Sinicization is unlikely to foster the kind of
understanding and comradeship among different nationalities on which lasting
stability and prosperity are predicated.
Note
1. Author's interview with Robert Barnett, January 15, 2010.
Dr Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He
has worked in senior editorial positions in international media including
Asiaweek newsmagazine, the South China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific
Headquarters of CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders,
New Challenges. Lam is an adjunct professor of China studies at Akita
International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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