Page 2 of 2 Beijing in a high-level balancing act By Jing-dong Yuan
Iran's nuclear program is another case in point. China's growing appetite for
energy supplies has prevented Beijing's full endorsement of Washington's calls
for tougher actions on Tehran. Iran is among the biggest providers of oil to
China. Chinese economic ties and investments in Iran are sizeable. Barring
unequivocal evidence of noncompliance, Beijing is reluctant to move quickly
along the sanctions path, preferring that the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the P-5 plus one mechanism continue to take the lead. Granted,
Russia's hardened position on Teheran and Obama's reported behind-the-scene
pressure may explain China's endorsement of the IAEA censure on Iran. However,
it remains to be seen what Beijing's
position will be if the issue is forwarded to the United Nations Security
Council with requests for new sanctions.
A major area of potential US-China cooperation in 2010 would be nuclear
disarmament and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in
May. Chinese responses to Obama's call in Prague for a nuclear-free world were
positive but Beijing and Washington remain divided on specific steps, their
sequence, and priorities. Most Chinese analysts endorse the general principles
of a nuclear-free world and support the prohibition and destruction of nuclear
weapons. They also argue that the United States and Russia should take the lead
in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals.
However, some have argued that instead of pursuing a nuclear-free world by
cutting stockpiles, the focus should be on changing the role of nuclear weapons
in national security policies. The fewer nuclear weapons incorporated into
military strategies, the better the prospects for nuclear disarmament.
Proponents of this perspective also call for the nuclear weapons to be banned.
Depending on how the US Nuclear Posture Review turns out early next year, there
could be differences over the role of nuclear weapons and pace of their
reduction.
Beijing may take a rather cautious view of the road to zero and carefully
analyze the implications of different scenarios for China's national security
interests.
On the NPT Review Conference in May, Beijing and Washington may have common
interests in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, enhancing
nuclear materials security and preventing nuclear terrorism, but they could
differ on the adoption by all nuclear weapons states of the no-first-use
principle and the proper balance between the three pillars of the NPT - nuclear
disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Power transition and China's arrival
While Beijing and Washington have agreed to build a bilateral relationship for
the 21st century that is positive, cooperative, and comprehensive, China's
continued rise to great-power status raises serious questions on how power
transition can be managed and, if and when such transition takes place, whether
it would be peaceful rather than create the conflict history shows to be the
norm rather than the exception.
China's ascendancy gives Beijing greater confidence and influence than ever
before, while at the same time stoking apprehension, not only in the United
States but also in Asia. With impressive growth amid global recession and
financial meltdown, foreign exchange reserves exceeding $2.3 trillion, and
poised to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy, there is no
question China's voice will likely carry more weight, just as its ambitions may
also expand.
Dispelling the concerns of its neighbors, and managing the perceived threat and
challenge it poses to the US, remains a major task for the Chinese leadership.
Beijing's good-neighbor policy since the 1990s and the willingness it has
demonstrated to embrace multilateralism and dialogue as principles for regional
security has reassured states on its periphery and helped resolve boundary
issues with erstwhile enemies. But convincing Washington that China's rise will
remain peaceful and that Beijing harbors no ambitions to usurp the US ranking
as a superpower will require diplomatic skill, resolve and, most of all,
Washington to accept Beijing's pledges at face value.
And this leads to the concept of “strategic reassurance” as proposed by US
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. Simply put, Washington would welcome
China as a prosperous power but would expect assurances that its developments
and actions would not come at a cost to other powers, including the US.
Compared to past notions of "congagement", hedging, and being a strategic
stakeholder, the Obama administration's newest China policy emphasizes
dialogue, accommodation, and areas of common interests, while addressing a
range of important sources of mistrust.
China's military modernization and its power projection draw increasing
attention from Washington. Recent encounters between the two countries in the
South China Sea, including the incident over the US navy survey ship
Impeccable, raises US alarm over Chinese assertiveness over its exclusive
economic zones and the issue of freedom of navigation. Future incidents could
lead to major escalation and maritime conflicts. Perceived Chinese anti-access
capabilities and programs beyond the Taiwan Strait would heighten US
suspicions.
Likewise, Beijing remains wary of US intentions in the region and considers
American alliances in East Asia, ballistic missile defenses, and space
weaponization as potential threats to its security interests. The absence of an
explicit pledge from Washington not to neutralize China's limited nuclear
deterrence capabilities and US superiority in conventional weapons undermine
what Beijing considers as necessary for so-called strategic stability between
the two countries. In that context, China will be very attentive to the
upcoming US Nuclear Posture Review.
The Taiwan issue remains sensitive despite improvements in cross-strait
relations since Ma Ying-jeou came into power 20 months ago. The recent setback
for Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party in local elections serves to remind
Beijing that the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party (DPP) could return
to power. In this context, US policy toward Taiwan and cross-strait relations,
particularly in regard to arms sales, could hurt Sino-US relations. Indeed, the
Obama administration's decisions in coming months will be a major test of the
so-called "strategic reassurance" as Beijing would argue that respecting each
other's core interests is the key to this formula.
A slow or jobless US economic recovery would renew pressure from labor and
trade unions - Obama's electoral base - and Congress for measures to protect
American jobs, demanding yuan revaluation and action on issues from trade
imbalance to intellectual property rights. Should the US president succumb to
domestic political expediency instead of standing up for the long-term
stability of economic ties with China, serious fallout can be anticipated.
Even in areas where Beijing and Washington claim to share common interests,
such as climate change, the Copenhagen climate summit showed major differences
on each other's obligations, how the burden of costs to reduce emissions would
be shared, and the potential for the loss of jobs which, in China's case more
directly, raises questions over social stability.
While many of the developments in Sino-US relations this year have been
positive and encouraging, significant challenges remain if a positive,
cooperative, and comprehensive relationship is to be sustained at a time when
Beijing and Washington both face complex and conflicting issues. It will need
all the political will, diplomatic skills and strategic vision they can muster
to overcome potential and actual obstacle in the coming years.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of East Asia Non-proliferation Program at
the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, and an associate
professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies.
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