COMMENT China: A need for strategic reassurance
By Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - United States President Barack Obama's eight-day trip to
four Asian countries, starting in Japan on Friday, comes at a time of
significant changes and growing anxiety about what appears to be an
increasingly marginalized US role in the region.
America's traditional alliances are under significant strain. The Yukio
Hatoyama administration came into power after his Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) unseated the long-time ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August's
elections. Tokyo is
trying to renegotiate the terms of the US-Japan alliance and is advocating a
regional community (the East Asian Community) that may well exclude the US.
Likewise, the failure to move forward with a US-South Korea free-trade
agreement signals retreat from regional economic arrangements. Obama will try
to make amends, reassure America's allies, while refrain from lecturing Tokyo
and Seoul on their obligations.
But the most critical segment of his visit is in China. Here, a fundamental
issue facing the Obama administration, almost four decades after president
Richard Nixon's historic visit in 1972, is how Washington should define its
relationship with Beijing. Certainly, there are increasingly more common
interests between the two countries, from restoring global economic and
financial stability to managing climate change.
At the same time, the nature of the bilateral relationship, and hence US policy
towards China, remains to be defined, agreed on, and actively pursued. Three
fundamental issues immediately come to mind.
First, whether and to what extent China's rise represents a fundamental
challenge to US interests remains undecided and constantly under debate. Thirty
years after it embarked on a path of economic reform and opening up to the
outside world, China has emerged as a dynamic economic power, with its gross
domestic product (GDP) soon to surpass that of Japan. It has the largest
foreign exchange reserve in the world (US$2.5 trillion), and a resilient growth
rate amid global economic recession and financial meltdown. If anything,
China's influence and clout have only risen in the wake of the current crisis.
China's newly acquired power and influence have enabled Beijing to expand its
presence beyond Asia to Africa, Central Asia and Latin America, looking for
resources and establishing economic and political ties. Chinese activism also
extends to areas of international peace-keeping, international fora on
important global issues, and leadership in regional institutional-building.
This raises a serious question for the United States. Historically, the rise of
great powers typically has been accompanied by periods of power transition and,
except in a few cases, rarely peaceful. While Beijing has on many occasions
sought to reassure the world, the US in particular, that its intentions are
peaceful, Washington has yet to be convinced and continues to harbor deep
concerns.
Second, what specific policy should be adopted by the Obama administration? The
issue is how to strengthen cooperation where the two countries have common
interests and how to manage disputes where they disagree. This is perhaps the
most obvious and yet the most daunting task for Washington.
During the 1970s and 1980s, when China was still relatively backward and when
the common threat they faced was aggressive Soviet expansionism, it was
possible for the two countries to shelve their differences and focus on common
interests.
Since the end of the Cold War, the pendulum of US China policy has swung
between containment and engagement, between strategic partnership and strategic
competitor, and from hedging China's rise to demanding that China become a
stakeholder in the international system, where its growing power comes with
greater responsibilities.
Obama has inherited a bilateral relationship that has been characterized as
cooperative, comprehensive and candid. The new administration is attempting to
redefine the ties as positive, cooperative and comprehensive. Given residual
mutual concerns and suspicions between the two countries, even as their common
interests and the degree of their interdependence have never been more numerous
and deep, a concept is emerging that calls for "strategic reassurance". In
terms of this, the US would not seek to impede China's rise, while Beijing
would ease Washington's concerns.
Whether "strategic reassurance" would redefine and inform the US's China policy
and constitute the basis of an implicit bargain between the world's fast-rising
power and its reigning one, is not clear. Much will depend on how the concept
itself is interpreted. But most importantly, how the actual policy is developed
and implemented. This is the third issue.
Four principles, if observed, should help the two powers better adapt and
adjust during a period of power transition and enormous changes.
First, the China-US relationship is complex and defies labeling. Is it one of
rivalry, competitors, or partners? It could be all of the above. Specific
issues. such as pragmatism and cool-headedness, not high expectations and
unreasonable demands, should be the defining features of the relationship.
Second, managing this complex relationship requires vision, statesmanship and
constant nurturing that promote and expand areas of common interests, that is,
where cooperation can and should be deepened. At the same time, the
relationship must be able to anticipate, prepare and manage where differences
exist and where disputes could arise, so that any negative impacts are
minimized.
From solving the North Korean nuclear issue to dealing with climate change and
environmental challenges, Beijing and Washington have been working closely and
they could further strengthen their cooperation. On trade disputes, human
rights and the Taiwan issue, efforts should be made to seek understanding and
solutions rather than punitive measures, and escalation of tension and the
imposition of one's views.
Third, it is critical to institutionalize the bilateral relationship at
different levels of interactions, from regular summit meetings to dialogue on
important strategic issues. Most importantly, military-to-military exchanges
and crisis-management mechanisms are critical and yet underdeveloped elements
of the relationship.
Finally, Beijing and Washington should recognize that their relationship is no
longer characterized as purely bilateral; it has significant implications for
regional and global developments. Therefore, they need to manage their ties
with the understanding that cooperation and partnership could further global
causes, such as financial stability and climate change, and contribute to
regional stability, from the Korean Peninsula to the Iranian nuclear issue to
the development of multilateral institutions.
Obama has a rare opportunity to reassure the Chinese leadership, including the
core members of the upcoming fifth-generation of leaders, that the US seeks a
pragmatic and cooperative partnership with China. He also needs to convey to
his interlocutors that America also values its allies in Asia as much as it
places growing importance in China. The trip should define a relationship based
on vision, pragmatism and common purposes, rather than labels.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program
at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies.
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