Page 2 of 2 China's fishing fleet sets challenge to US
By Lyle Goldstein
Various modern methods, such as vessel monitoring systems for example, have
been introduced into FLEC management practices. Nevertheless, interagency
difficulties are amply evident, for example in a study written by faculty
members at China's coast guard academy in Ningbo (a part of the People's Armed
Police of the Public Security Ministry), which states: "The fisheries
enforcement department has the function of escorting fishing vessels … but are
unarmed… The public security maritime police … [are] equipped with all types of
weaponry … [but] because of limitations on jurisdiction can only play a
supporting role, and are in an awkward position" [11].
The further development of China's maritime enforcement capabilities, perhaps
in the direction of a unified coastguard, could
have profound consequences for both regional maritime governance and Chinese
ability to better enforce its maritime claims in the region.
Yet, Chinese fishing fleets' activities are much more than a regional issue.
Although China's distant water fishing (DWF) fleet was only created in the
mid-1980s, by 2006 it had grown to nearly 2,000 vessels operating on the high
seas and in the EEZs of 35 countries [12].
The Chinese DWF fleet is supported by subsidies from the central government as
part of an effort to divert Chinese fishermen out of local waters that have
been fished out. For instance, according to an authoritative source, the number
of Chinese fishing vessels in West African waters at any one time could be
close to 300 vessels [13]. With relatively low technology compared to European
distant water fishing fleets, Chinese vessels are not pursuing prized blue fin
tuna, but are more likely to be fishing for mackerel and other lower value
species.
Often, this fishing is legal within the EEZs of the given state, but it is
precisely these fish that have previously sustained coastal fishermen around
the developing world, creating the possibility that Chinese fishing practices
could contribute to a food crisis in Africa and other poor countries. Indeed,
one theory informally circulating in maritime circles posits that piracy in the
Gulf of Aden is actually a byproduct of overfishing by external powers, who
have forced local Somali fishermen into other "careers". China has thus far
refused to ratify the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (in force as of 2001), though it
should be noted that some concrete reforms have been undertaken by Beijing to
control and monitor its DWF fleet.
Beyond the potential for dislocations associated with unsustainable fishing
practices, there are a number of implications of China's major role in world
fisheries for international security.
First, it is quite plausible that China's wide-ranging fishing fleets offer
quite extensive opportunities for enhanced "maritime domain awareness" in
certain strategically sensitive sea areas, ranging from the Indian Ocean to the
Central Pacific. If China adopts a more expansive blue water naval posture in
the coming decades, with an enlarged presence in the Indian Ocean and off of
Africa's coasts for example, then these fishing fleets will have been important
in developing China's knowledge base with respect to prevailing local
conditions.
Second and consistent with the Chinese tendency towards close integration of
civil and military institutions, China's large fishing fleet is already
integrated into a maritime militia that could render crucial support in a
hypothetical military campaign, whether ferrying troops across the Taiwan
Strait or laying mines in distant locations. The sheer number of fishing
vessels that could be involved would present a severe challenge to any
adversary attempting to counter this strategy.
Most importantly, there is the unfortunate potential that a fishing dispute
involving loss of life - which happen in East Asian waters with disturbing
regularity - could serve as tinder for nationalists on one side or another,
provoking actual hostilities between disputing and well-armed claimants in the
region.
Finally, there is the strong likelihood that Beijing will continue to use the
Chinese strategy of "defeating harshness with kindness" (yi rou ke gang)
and thus deploying unarmed fishing vessels or fisheries enforcement vessels to
confront foreign vessels operating in its EEZ and claimed waters.
Despite the above concerns, evolving Chinese fisheries policies could also
serve as a catalyst for cooperation with other states in East Asia, as well as
with Washington. Indeed, the US Coast Guard has been working for more than a
decade in the North Pacific with the China FLEC to enforce a UN prohibition on
drift net fishing. This cooperation has involved FLEC personnel temporarily
being assigned to US Coast Guard cutters - a highly innovative form of
cooperation.
Other forms of operational and scientific cooperation might address
environmental, weather emergency, rescue, and enforcement aspects of fisheries
management. One further encouraging example is that fisheries are now playing a
role in the important warming trend between Beijing and Taipei, itself a major
fishing power.
Indeed, this warming trend has gone a long way to calming tensions in East
Asian waters of late. China's counter-piracy mission off the Gulf of Aden is
another example of the great potential of Beijing's positive contribution to
international maritime security and stewardship. Recent tensions in the South
China Sea area should not spoil the new climate of cooperation and collective
responsibility.
The evolution of Chinese fishing practices in the Pacific and around the globe
will provide a useful and concrete gauge of Beijing's intent to abide by global
norms of international security and environmental sustainability as a genuine
responsible, maritime stakeholder.
Notes
1. The State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008 (Rome: United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009), p 11.
2. See, for example, the discussion in Sun Jingping, Notes on Maritime Security
Strategy in the New Period in the New Century, China Military Science, June
2008, p 77.
3. Li Zhujiang (ed), The Ocean and the Fishing Industry: Emergency Management
(Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007), p 299.
4. This paragraph draws on information from "Fishery and Aquaculture Country
Profiles: China," and also from Li Deshui, Wang Shugang, China Marine
Statistical Yearbook 2004 (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2005), pp XI-XVI.
5. Mu Yongtong, Fisheries Management: Focusing on a Rights-Based Regime (Qingdao:
China Ocean University Press, 2006), p 292.
6. Yunjun Yu and Yongtong Mu, "The New Institutional Arrangement for Fisheries
Management in the Beibu Gulf," Marine Policy 30 (2006), p 251.
7. "Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: China," p 3.
8. Mu, Fisheries Management, pp 292-93.
9. Ma Yingjie, Research on the Legal Protection of Chinese Treasured, Rare and
Endangered Marine Species (Qingdao: China Ocean University Press,
2008), pp. 92-100.
10. Mu, Fisheries Management, p 292.
11. He Zhonglong, Ren Xingping, Feng Shuili, Luo Xianfen, Liu Jinghong, Research
on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard (Beijing: Ocean Press,
2007), p 40.
12. Guifang (Julia) Xue, "China's Distant Water Fisheries and Its Response to
Flag State Responsibilities," Marine Policy 30 (2006), p. 653.
13. Wang Ning (ed), Handbook on Long-Distance Fishing Technology and Economy
(Beijing: Ocean Press, 2002), p 74.
Lyle J Goldstein, PhD, is director of the China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI) of the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
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