Page 2 of 2 A midsummer tale of two Chinese spies
By Peter J Brown
espionage efforts of the PRC and other states in aerospace are just as
prevalent [or more so] today than it was 10 years ago," said Weeden.
Fisher notes the fact that in the decade since the Cox Report was released, the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has consistently listed China as the
principle espionage threat in the US.
"This has to tell us that China's general espionage effort is growing," said
Fisher. "The Chi Mak and Greg Chung cases tell us that China places a very high
priority on targeting ethnic Chinese working in the US defense sector with
nationalist and other appeals. Sadly, the Mak and Chung cases are proof that
China has and will continue to succeed with ... appeals to convince
Chinese-Americans to undermine the security of a nation that has enabled their
professional and personal success.
"Tragically, this threat will only continue for as long as US government
officials confine their response to law enforcement and ignore the need for
political outreach, dialogue and education," added Fisher. "I know of one
Ministry of State Security 'scholar' posing as a visiting fellow at a US
university who bragged to me of his op-ed writing for Chinese-language US
newspapers. How many US officials, elected or otherwise, take the time to
respond?"
Brett Kingstone, an expert on China's economic and military espionage
activities in the US, estimates that China has more than 3,500 operatives in
the US specifically to steal US secrets. These people hold student and H1B or
special work visas.
"What has happened in the last 10 years has been a transformation in the way
China gathers its information," said Lieggi. "It is less likely that they
specifically send out 'spies' because US authorities are more likely to
identify these individuals. However, there seems to be a more informal
recruitment of Chinese nationals living or traveling to the US or elsewhere who
may have access to information that would be useful. In some cases it is for
financial gain; in others nationalism seems to be the driving factor."
The Kuok case underscores another shift that is underway not in the realm of
espionage, but in the vital realm of how China quietly obtains sensitive
technologies from the US.
"The Internet is creating a new market place for sensitive items that is harder
to monitor and control," said Lieggi. "EBay, the e-commerce company, does not
see itself as selling or exporting anything, and expects the seller and buyer
to work out the legal issues; however, in many ways eBay could be seen by the
government as the 'broker' of the deal and thus must consider export control
implications. I doubt they are putting that much time into it, although after
[the Kuok] case they may."
Weeden sees the Internet as a game-changer. The combination of new social
engineering trends and virtual communities such as MySpace and Facebook, and,
the enormous amounts of information in the public domain that flows via the
Internet makes it harder to prevent espionage.
"Much of what is known as 'hacking' is actually manipulation of people and not
computers. The Internet allows easier collection of [operational security] and
personal information which could allow for social engineering attacks which
could then allow a spy to gain access to a classified system or materials,"
said Weeden.
"Unclassified information that is still controlled via the Munitions List is
undoubtedly on many government and contractor computers that are attached to
the Internet, and it is very feasible for cyber-espionage to gain access to
that data."
As for the overall effectiveness and the legacy of the Cox Report, there are
decidedly mixed opinions about this.
"The sensationalized report, largely debunked by both political and technical
analysts very quickly, has become urban legend 'truth', and government policy,
to the detriment of the US aerospace industry and US national security," said
Dr Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making
Department at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. "The
recommendations for strengthening the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
[ITAR], and, putting satellite and related technology on the Munitions List
were seized upon by the US State Department and in fact extended even further -
to the delight of the anti-China Blue Team in Washington."
"When aerospace industries, particularly in California, began to suffer,
finger-pointing and questions about 'how did this happen' quickly surfaced,
including from those in Congress who had been the biggest supporters of
stronger regulations," Johnson-Freese added. "US efforts to control sensitive
technology have been so diffused that the new challenges have received less
attention than they deserve because so much time is spent on 'protecting' often
superfluous items and satisfying an impossible process."
For Weeden, the real question at hand is whether the recommendations concerning
space and missile technology proposed by the Cox Commission, and implemented
primarily through the Strom Thurmond National Defense Act, have improved the
strategic economic and military position of the US.
"There is strong evidence that the answer is no. The end result of these
recommendations has been the stifling of the US aerospace industry and the
creation of a vacuum which was summarily filled by a host of international
aerospace firms, notably those from Europe," said Weeden. "US industry has lost
a significant portion of its global aerospace technology lead and market share,
and the PRC has been able to continue to have access to advanced aerospace
technology. Obviously, some will argue that the ITAR regulations need to be
strengthened even more to prevent China from acquiring advanced aerospace
technology through commercial transfers. But this ideological position does not
jive with the reality of the situation nor real world evidence of the last 10
years."
According to Fisher, the fact that there never any attempt to implement the
first recommendation made by the Select Committee for a semi-annual report to
the US Congress on PRC espionage is troubling.
"There has long been a need for such a report on par with the Pentagon's report
on Chinese military modernization which has been mandated by the US Congress.
For example, there has been no public assessment of China's ability to exploit
the US university system to train military engineers and to accelerate military
technology development. A regular public report on China's espionage efforts
and methods could become a vital tool to educate public and private sector
officials about this threat," said Fisher.
Espionage cases involving China and the US space and missile sectors are
nothing new. China is intensely focused on obtaining whatever it needs to
become a more powerful player in space. And because so many doors are opening
quickly - and sooner than many might have expected - China may find itself
buying much of this technology instead of attempting to steal it.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer based in the US state of Maine.
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