Page 2 of 2 Mixed signals over Chinese missiles
By Peter J Brown
According to Rajagopalan, China's growing missile capabilities - both in actual
numbers and the types of missiles - and the proliferation of those missiles
have triggered regional insecurity and resulted in a spiraling arms race in the
region.
"If China increases the number of ICBMs from even 20 to 25 in a year, this
small growth is something that India, US, and Japan might watch out for. It may
not have reached any dangerous proportion, but this is something that needs
close monitoring," said Rajagopalan. "Development of these missile forces and
the ever-growing submarine force indicate that China prefers to implement an
area denial strategy. Such a capability will allow
China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in
turn will increase the difficulty for others to operate close to the Chinese
mainland."
Weeden is also eager to examine several recent projections of Chinese
submarine-launched nuclear warheads in greater detail, too.
"Recent predictions that China could have upwards of 400 sub-launched nuclear
warheads within the decade are absurd. The newest class of [Ship Submersible
Ballistic Nuclear] SSBN (JL-2) has 12 launch tubes, each of which can hold a
missile with one warhead. There is no way that China is going to be able to
roll out 30-plus SSBNs in a decade."
For Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Vice Admiral and former Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commander, who is the director of the Okazaki
Institute in Tokyo, the debate over numbers does not tell the whole story.
While he agrees with Fisher's assessment, he finds China's persistent lack of
transparency involving its overall nuclear strategy, not to mention its entire
military strategy, unsettling given the steady increase in Chinese defense
budgets since the mid-1980's. China's focus on ASATs, and other countermeasures
intended to disable otherwise effective missile defense systems, and China's
efforts to secure its position as a third nuclear superpower, while
"anticipating the trend of global nuclear reduction" are important developments
that Kaneda elects to highlight.
When asked which specific Chinese missile-related trends disturb him, he
responded simply - "Every trend."
"The Japanese government will review its "National Defense Program Guidelines
[NDPG]" by the end of this year. I hope the revised NDPG would effectively
address all my concerns as expressed here. Though it depends on which parties
[achieve] political dominance in the next general election," said Kaneda.
Certainly, the recent debate over Japan's possible adoption of a preemptive
strike capability as a reasonable measure has cast the emerging NDPG in a
different light.
Kaneda would not comment on how open he felt the Japanese people are today to
his point of view. A longtime and somewhat hawkish advocate for a greater
emphasis on ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Japan, he also would not comment
on the BMD efforts now underway in Japan involving all the existing branches of
the JSDF. He also did not comment on whether or not he would prefer to
consolidate BMD developmental and testing activities under one command or under
a single agency in a manner similar to what is now in place in the US under the
Missile Defense Agency.
No matter how you interpret the numbers or what upward curve you select, Fisher
finds them disturbing.
"PLA nuclear missile numbers are growing to a point to which we can drop this
notion they have a 'minimum' nuclear deterrent force. An early nuclear missile
force in excess of 120 is plausible, and they could be divided roughly evenly
between land and sea-based platforms," said Fisher. "This means that all PLA
nuclear missiles will be harder to find, and that China will become
increasingly aggressive toward the US and other navies operating in the South
China Sea, the best place for their SSBN operations."
As for the PLA Navy's (PLAN) development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)
capabilities, Weeden emphasizes that the real story is not what PLAN is doing,
but what the US Navy is not doing.
"The Chinese are not doing anything new with ASBMs. The concept dates back to
1955 and was pioneered by the US. The main issue is that the US Navy has not
really been paying attention to the threat and is not really prepared to defend
against it," said Weeden. "There are multiple technologies that can defend
against it, but right now the navy is not really tackling it seriously."
At the same time, Weeden cautions that any description of China's missiles as
"being technologically advanced is true when compared to the likes of Iran and
North Korea, but China's ICBMs and SLBMs are still decades behind that of the
US, Russia, France, and Great Britain".
"China's sole SSBN has never done a deterrence patrol. China has still yet to
MIRV any of its nuclear delivery vehicles, something that the other powers did
a long time ago. The significance of MIRVing cannot be understated," said
Weeden.
"In the NASIC report, [it states] that 'the number of ICBM nuclear warheads
capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the
next 15 years'. So the growth is 'considerable' compared to how many warheads
China has capable of reaching the US now, but negligible compared to what
Russia already has deployed and historically had deployed."
Fisher, on the other hand, wants readers to understand that the number of
Chinese nuclear missile warheads could grow more quickly than has been
suggested by recent US open or unclassified intelligence reports.
"My sources suggest the DF-5A already carries up to six warheads, and that
future versions of the DF-31A and JL-2 could carry three to four warheads. If
true, then it is plausible to consider future PLA nuclear warhead counts that
reach 500, again, no longer a 'minimum' force," said Fisher.
Fisher like Kaneda wants to firmly establish the links between Chinese ASAT and
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) components in a broader public debate about US and
Japanese defense policies.
"Even though the PLA has conducted multiple ASAT tests leading up to its
success in 2007, no unclassified [US intelligence] report since has commented
on how the PLA ASAT program may also indicate the existence of a larger PLA ABM
program. The PLA's first ABM program took place from 1963 to 1980. If you can
shoot down a satellite then you can shoot down a missile warhead," said Fisher.
"The potential for the PLA's future no-longer-minimum nuclear force also being
defended by an ABM system should be causing the Obama Administration to halt
its nuclear disarmament plans. Such may also help explain why the Russians do
not want to go below 1,500 deployed warheads, a reduction that I think would
still be foolish for Washington and Moscow."
According to Fisher, while experts in Japan, India and the US may disagree at
times over what is going on and why, "Americans are quite fortunate to have
access to any level of [US intelligence] assessment of the PLA, which is issued
at a level of detail that would put any Chinese commentator in jail."
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