Page 2 of 2 No Chinese rockets for US satellites - yet
By Peter J Brown
the health of the space-industrial base. Specifically, we are controlling
technologies that are not critical to our national security and are readily
available in the global marketplace," said Young.
He specifically mentioned commercial communications satellite systems that are
widely available today, along with weather satellite technology.
"The result of this over-control is that our space industry loses international
sales; other countries conclude it is more advantageous to develop indigenous
capabilities rather than be
subject to our export control requirements; and countries that throughout the
space age have been our partners in space exploration no longer consider the US
the partner of choice. Instead of maintaining our leadership, this over-control
has been a catalyst for other nations to develop their own capabilities," said
Young.
Mike Gold, director of Arizona-based Bigelow Aerospace's Washington, DC office,
chairs the US Federal Aviation Administration's Export Controls Working Group
under the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. (His comments are
his own and do not reflect that of the Working Group.) He wants the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy to immediately establish a new division
for export control reform.
"The current ITAR regime does not need to be torn down, it just requires some
remodeling in recognition of current realities," said Gold. "Bigelow Aerospace
is a great example, we took a Russian nuclear missile and used it to launch an
American satellite with a rocket faring from Ukraine and support from Canadian
subcontractors. An international team transforming a weapon of war into a tool
for peaceful commerce is what it's all about, and it was truly inspiring to be
a part of that. The pitfalls are that we don't want to make it easier for our
technology to be used for negative purposes, such as war and causing harm to
our fellow man. This is why export control has its place."
Gold sees both the positive and negative consequences of the Eutelsat
announcement. "On the positive side, it will help bring attention to the issue,
and the ability of the Europeans to produce 'ITAR-free' hardware serves as an
excellent example of both the failure of our current policies and the need for
reform," said Gold. "On the downside, I fear that this incident will be used to
by some to fan the flames of fear in regard to China, a fear that I believe is
largely misplaced."
Japan sees the outcome of this debate in the US as affecting the future course
of the entire Chinese space program, according to Furukawa.
"In general, Japanese space stakeholders are concerned with the orientation of
the Chinese space program, given that it is military-driven, and do not
favorably view the Chinese space program since its objectives and intentions
remain unclear," said Furukawa. "Such space technology export may contribute to
strengthening Chinese space infrastructure which Japan views nervously. The
Japanese export control authority [leans] in the direction of strengthening the
deemed export control system contrary to the discussion in the US."
Nardon has cautious advice for anyone who wonders about how, or even if, this
broad export control reform activity in the US might improve transparency and
confidence-building measures in the rapidly growing global space sector.
"Perhaps, it will allow better data exchanges. In the past, ITAR has been an
obstacle to information sharing. Actually, remember that it was the failed
launches of US satellites by Chinese launchers in the 1990's, that triggered
adoption of 1998 ITAR rules. The US companies had been blamed for sending too
many technical details to the Chinese. And that was before the ITAR rules were
established," said Nardon.
As the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) carefully tracks this debate
under its so-called "High-Risk Series", which is entitled "Ensuring the
Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to US National Security
Interests" - GAO stated that, "[The DoC] needs to develop procedures and
negotiate access for conducting on-site reviews for dual-use items transferred
to China as part of its validated end-user program."
But most of all, however, GAO stresses that whatever changes are made to US
export control policies, the changes or updates have to be included as part of
a much more comprehensive system of export controls, hence the "validated
end-user" dimension noted above.
One US expert on arms regulations and export controls who has observed this
debate closely for years hesitates to be too optimistic about the outcome.
"While I remain skeptical that the ITAR will be substantively reformed anytime
soon, reform is more likely now than at any point in the last 15 years. Why?
Because, unlike the Republicans, the Democrats now in power and are not riven
by conflict between their dueling pro-business and anti-China tendencies," said
Scott Gearity of BSG Consulting in Cleveland.
With US national security concerns so intensely focused on China's rapid
military build-up - particularly as it relates to China's space capability -
Scarlott is waiting to hear what DTSA has to say. Its views regarding national
security considerations related to the dissemination of US technology and the
necessary scope of the ITAR hold tremendous weight. At the same time, one
cannot ignore two high profile cases in March involving attempts to illegally
export aerospace components from the US to Iran. Specific mention is made of a
Chinese company in one case, and an Iranian company involved in ballistic
missile development in the other. DTSA in particular will take a very dim view
of any further evidence of ongoing smuggling activity involving parties with
even indirect or remote connections to China, and this does not bode well for
those advocating a relaxation of satellite export controls in 2009.
"To my knowledge, DTSA has not yet spoken publicly on the issue of ITAR reform,
but we can expect DTSA to take a very conservative approach, particularly vis a
vis controls on exports to China that might further its military [space]
capabilities. The continued development of the Long March family of rockets is
of particular concern to DTSA, the DoD, and a wide spectrum of public
policymakers," said Scarlott. "The use of the Long March rocket by Eutelsat
will not weaken these concerns. Indeed, it may only harden resolve, since
revenues generated by such launch contracts are viewed as aiding and abetting
further development of China's rocket and missile capabilities and by
extension, increasing China's threat to the US."
Peter J Brown is a satellite journalist from Maine USA.
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