ENGAGING CHINA IN SPACE, Part 1 A fresh start or a protracted showdown?
By Peter J Brown
United States president-elect Barack Obama has some tough choices to make with
respect to how he will deals with China in space. He might prefer to proclaim
the advantages of cooperation with China in terms of space exploration and
other activities, but the execution of any plan where the US is perceived as
letting its guard down is going to draw a lot of criticism from conservatives,
a wing of the US Congress which has been deeply suspicious of the Chinese space
program from the start.
In Section 3 of "The Impact of China’s Space Program on US
Security", the latest report issued last week by the United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, it states:
The potential
effect of China’s space program on US national security is significant. First,
it is steadily increasing the vulnerability of US assets. Improvements in its
imagery and intelligence satellites will enable China to locate US assets such
as carrier battle groups more accurately and rapidly and from greater
distances. Improved communications satellites will enable China to pass
important targeting information more quickly and securely to guided missiles or
other weapon systems. Improved GPS-type navigational and weather satellites
will enable missiles to fly more accurately to their targets. Finally, the
cycle is completed by the battle damage assessment that imagery and
intelligence satellites provide to Chinese commanders as weapon systems engage
their targets.
Many US weapon systems and deployed military forces depend on space support for
targeting, navigational, and communications support. A large portion of the US
space systems’ architecture consists of ground-based nodes and centers located
around the United States and the globe far from the battlefield.
The ground nodes and centers in space or on the ground are critical elements of
US military power. As such, they are potential targets for China. Some Chinese
strategists believe that space-related installations, including ground
stations, are so critical that they are valid targets during a conflict. China
could choose to engage these critical assets physically with missiles or
non-kinetically through means such as a computer network attack.
In the 21st century, any showdown over Taiwan in particular involving the US
and China could immediately escalate into a series of attacks on space assets,
according to Eric Sayers, a national security research assistant at the
conservative Heritage Foundation, who addressed this scenario in the October
issue of the Armed Forces Journal.
"At present, and according to the 2009 Pentagon review of China’s military
capabilities, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has judged that the possession
of proficient anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies could deter the US from
entering into a conflict over Taiwan," wrote Sayers. "According to the
judgments of PLA strategists, the US is unlikely or less likely to intervene in
conflicts where it runs the risk of being the target of a space 'shock and awe'
strike which may leave its conventional forces seriously disadvantaged against
Chinese forces and equally incapacitated in other global theaters of
operation."
As a result of these and other considerations, the incoming Obama
administration must cope with numerous constraints which limit its options in
terms of any wide-ranging bilateral space-related agreements with China,
according to Eric Hagt, China program director at the World Security Institute
in Washington, DC.
"Obama’s overall tone has suggested he would be far more open to discussions
with others on key space security issues. But that is different from
cooperation," said Hagt. "I see the [prospect of] the US and China working
together on space programs of any substance [as] highly unlikely, simply
because the larger political and security relationship, not to mention a change
in legislation [impacting on US International Traffic in Arms Regulations
controls and sensitive export laws] would need to be in place before actual
cooperation between space agencies can occur."
Hagt points to important and relevant statements made by Obama about policy
that will help set a better tone, including Obama's endorsement of a worldwide
ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites.
Here is an excerpt of "Advancing the frontiers of space exploration", posted at
www.BarackObama.com.
Keeping our space assets free of threats of
disruption will be an Obama priority. This is not only a military concern, but
also an issue relevant to commercial and scientific operators. Developing an
international approach to minimizing space debris, enhancing capabilities for
space situational awareness, and managing increasingly complex space operations
are important steps towards sustaining our space operations.
Negotiating Agreements on "Rules of the Road": Barack Obama will work with
other nations to develop "rules of the road" for space to ensure all nations
have a common understanding of acceptable behavior.
Opposing Weaponization of Space: Space assets are increasingly important to our
national security and our economy, but they are also extremely vulnerable.
China's successful test of an anti-satellite missile in January 2007 signaled
the beginning of a potential new arms race in space. Barack Obama opposes the
stationing of weapons in space and the development of anti-satellite weapons.
He believes the United States must show leadership by engaging other nations in
discussions of how best to stop the slow slide towards a new battlefield.
Protecting America's Space Assets: Recognizing their vulnerability, Obama will
work to protect our assets in space by pursuing new technologies and
capabilities that allow us to avoid attacks and recover from them quickly. The
Operationally Responsive Space program, which uses smaller, more nimble space
assets to make US systems more robust and less vulnerable is a way to invest in
this capability.
"He said he would only support a missile defense system that was
proven to work [which is] probably code for a much more cautious approach than
[President George W] Bush. The first is a direct reference to space and the
second, while indirect, is very important since many, including China, see a
multi-layered missile defense program as strategically threatening and
destabilizing," said Hagt.
John Logsdon, professor emeritus at George Washington University and former
director of GWU's Space Policy Institute, also finds Obama's detailed space
policy statement - which was made in August - to be highly supportive of
increased cooperation.
"[Obama] identified enhanced international cooperation as a key element of his
approach to civilian space activities. I expect that the preliminary dialogue
on areas of interest that has already started between NASA and its Chinese
counterparts will continue and perhaps increase in priority," said Logsdon.
"But our space relationship with China is at a very early stage, and we will
need to cultivate mutual understanding and trust for it to develop into a
significant partnership. With respect to national security space, I think it is
up to China to demonstrate that it will not continue the kind of developments
that lead to the 2007 ASAT test."
Logsdon describes Obama as opposing weapons in space, but unsure as to how
exactly he will approach achieving this objective. "[Whether this will happen]
through a treaty-based regime or through a 'bottom-up' process of developing
rules of the road, a code of conduct, or similar incremental steps towards
space security remains to be seen," said Logsdon.
Given the current state of US-China space affairs, the choice for the new Obama
administration is really one of continuing to view all Chinese space activities
primarily as a threat to the US - which could be technological, to military
space assets, or political and leadership threats in the area of exploration -
or it could try to identify areas where cooperation is possible, while
acknowledging that competition will likely continue in others, according to Dr
Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Decision Making Department
at the US Naval War College.
"Few relationships are purely cooperative or competitive. It appears that the
Obama administration will be more open to the latter, in line with broad
positions already stated by the new administration indicating that diplomacy
will have more of a role in US foreign and security policy considerations,"
said Johnson-Freese.
Hagt asserts Obama will probably put less emphasis on - and reduce funding for
- military space control and force application programs, and put more on space
protection, space situational awareness (SSA), and operationally responsive
space (ORS) as well as space science exploration.
"That is, he will try to change the perception that the US strives for absolute
dominance in space as the Bush administration has done," said Hagt. "Banning
space weapons, along with other technical and policy measures, to protect US
national interests in space is an imperfect solution but Obama realizes it is
the best one."
All of this depends on increasing mutual trust and to accomplish that, there
has to be a significant increase in transparency, something that the US accuses
the Chinese of having ignored for far too long.
"A greater degree of transparency is essential if cooperation beyond simple
data exchanges or coordinated mission[s] is to develop. The US has a good
record of transparency in its cooperative undertakings, [and now] it is up to
China to demonstrate a similar approach to working together," said Logsdon.
When discussing transparency in space, Brian Weeden, technical consultant at
the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation, conjures up the Cold War, and the
fact that not so long ago both sides realized the value in using space to
verify arsenals and arms control arrangements.
"Both sides were wary to disrupt each other's satellites for fear of
destabilizing the situation," said Weeden. "However, those lessons don't appear
to have been transferred to the post-Cold War regime in the area of SSA. All
the states with such capability tend to view SSA data as military secrets and
rarely share it with the world. The end result of this is reduced transparency
and increased tensions. The real irony is that much of the positional
information on satellites that the states attempt to keep secret is not, and is
easily obtained by anyone with a backyard telescope and an inquisitive mind."
Weeden is hopeful that all parties in space will realize the benefits that
could be gained by sharing certain types of SSA data.
"It would not only increase transparency and stability, but also the pooling of
data would benefit all parties. Europe is already making some progress in this
area with the European Space Situational Awareness System currently under
consideration," said Weeden, "A data sharing policy within Europe would allow
for all the members to access SSA data on some level and to use it for a
variety of reasons, the most significant being safer operation of satellites."
Johnson-Freese has looked closely at efforts by the US and China to address
transparency, and she advocates a subtle but important shift in the US
approach.
"Transparency is of course important as an enabler for more cooperation and an
overall better relationship between China and the US," said Johnson-Freese. "It
is part of a need to better understand the Chinese political process and their
'ways of working'. Part of that too is communication."
For example, some Chinese delegates at recent space conferences have suggested
that the word transparency carries connotations in Mandarin that they are not
comfortable with - ie that it suggests revealing information in ways that could
be associated with espionage, adds Johnson-Freese. "The suggestion was made
that requesting clarity of intent might work better. While I think some lack of
transparency on the part of the Chinese has been cultural and intentional, if
phrasing our requests differently gets better results, I think we should try
it."
Peter J Brown is a satellite journalist from Maine, USA.
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