Page 2 of 2 Iran keeps China in a chokehold
By Yitzhak Shichor
rather than at the Strait - hitting Kuwait's Sea Island offshore supertanker
export oil terminal as well as two US-owned oil tankers.
Another HY-2 was fired in early December 1987 bringing the number of
Iranian-fired HY-2s to seven that year. Since then Iran has deployed along a
number of more advanced anti-ship missile batteries, either Chinese or
license-produced using Chinese technologies, along the strait [9].
Some of these missiles are installed on Chinese-made fast missile boats,
notably type Houdong, of which Iran has received
10 to 15, or according to some sources, about 40 [10]. Iran was also the first
customer of at least five C-14 China Cat Class fast attack missile craft, each
equipped with up to eight C-701 anti-ship cruise missiles.
In addition, over 11 French-designed missile patrol boats are equipped with two
to four Chinese-made anti-ship missiles [11]. However, while most attention is
focused on Iran's Chinese-made missiles and missile boats, an equally
significant Chinese-made weapon that is specifically relevant to a possible
closure of the Strait of Hormuz should by no means be overlooked.
In the 1990s, Iran purchased from China sophisticated EM-52 and EM-53
bottom-tethered mines. Their rocket-propelled 300-kg warhead is capable of
hitting the hull of its target vessel at speeds in excess of 80 meters per
second. They "are thought to be deactivated by coded acoustic signals to allow
the safe passage of friendly vessels, and again activated to prevent the
transit of those of an enemy" [12].
So unless Tehran provides Beijing with the codes (which is inconceivable),
incoming or outgoing Chinese shipping in the strait could be hit by
Chinese-made weapons. Given its indirect presence in the Gulf, how would
Beijing behave in case of a confrontation in the Hormuz Strait?
Escape from predicament
It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would intervene in such a confrontation.
Following its time-honored behavior, Beijing would likely avoid any
involvement, calling to settle the conflict peacefully by diplomatic means.
In the situation escalation China would fail to use its veto power and Tehran
knows it - either before or after the strait is blocked. Iranian editorials and
commentaries occasionally warn the government not to trust Beijing (and
Moscow), and an article in the Iranian press questioned China's (as well as
Russia's) decision to veto UN Security Council sanctions on Zimbabwe but
approve sanctions on Iran.
While the Chinese do not likely intend to actively protect their assets in the
Gulf in case of a crisis, they have undoubtedly made preparations to minimize
the damage.
As mentioned above, although the Chinese are heavily dependent on Persian Gulf
oil, they are less vulnerable than other Asian countries, as China still
provides about half of its oil needs and sources for the other half are
distributed all over the world aware of Iran's risky situation.
In early 2006, Beijing accepted Saudi Arabia's offer to supply China with
whatever oil it needs in case of sanctions or use of force against Iran. Yet,
if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked by Iran, no Saudi oil could flow to China.
Possible alternatives for Beijing are to increase oil imports from Oman and
Yemen, though this could be no more than a stopgap solution as their oil export
capabilities are substantially smaller.
Compared to Saudi Arabia's crude oil reserves, estimated at nearly 267 billion
barrels, Oman's reserves are estimated at 5.5 billion and Yemen's at 3.3
billion. While Saudi Arabia's share in the world's total oil production in 2007
stood at over 12%, Oman's share was 0.85% and Yemen's 0.38%.
Another alternative is to ship Saudi oil through the 745-mile long Petroline
(or East-West Pipeline) crossing from Abqaiq to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu.
This would not only add four to five days travel time, not to mention its
smaller capacity, but would also force oil transportation to pass through Bab
al-Mandab, another risky chokepoint that could be blocked, possibly by
terrorists.
Finally, in early 2007 the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction
Corporation (CPECC) signed an agreement with Abu Dhabi's International
Petroleum Investment Company to build a pipeline that would bypass the Strait
of Hormuz.
The project involves the construction of a 360-km, 48-inch diameter pipeline
with a capacity of 1.5 million bpd of crude oil from Habshan west of the Strait
to al-Fujayrah east of the Strait, crossing the UAE and Abu Dhabi. Construction
work started in March 2008 and the project is expected to be completed in March
2010 [14]. Still, when completed, it will be a drop in a bucket compared to the
17 million bpd of crude oil that passes through the Hormuz Strait today.
It is clearly in Beijing's interest that the closure of the Hormuz Strait (and
much more so an overall confrontation) should be avoided and prevented at all
costs - preferably by satisfying Tehran's claims and demands by political and
diplomatic means. Yet, if a confrontation could not be avoided, its effects on
China would be relatively limited.
A brief and early conflict means less disruption while China is less dependent
on the Persian Gulf, while a longer and a later conflict means greater
disruption and instability as China would be much more dependent on the Gulf -
and therefore US protection.
Notes
1. Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores (Yingyai shenglan,
1433), tr. by JVG Mills (Halikut Society, 1970), pp 165-172.
2. The Chinese are, of course, aware of the problem. See "The Persian Gulf
Bottleneck" (Bosihai pingjing) in: Wu Lei, China's Oil Security (Zhongguo
Shiyou Anquan), Beijing, 2003, pp 152-158.
3. EIA, "International Oil Reserves", updated August 27, 2008.
4. Http://netoilexports.blogspot.com; EIA, Persian Gulf Region (June 2007).
5. China Custom Statistics quoted by: Walid Khadduri, "China's Oil Consumption
Increased despite Price Hikes," al-Hayat, July 29, 2008.
6. Anthony H Cordesman, "Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz," CSIS
(Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, March 26, 2007), p 6
7. SIPRI,
updated September 1, 2008.
8. China's Missile Exports and
Assistance to Iran. 9. Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran,"
MERIA, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 2, No 2 (May 1998), pp
5-6.
10. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/hudong.htm.
11. Cordesman, op cit p 5.
12. Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "China's Undersea
Sentries," Undersea Warfare, Vol 9, No 2 (Winter 2007).
13. EIA, "International Oil Reserves", updated August 27, 2008. 14.
www.zawya.com/projects/project.cfm/pid211106110219?cc .
Dr Yitzhak Shichor is professor of East Asian studies and political
science at the University of Haifa, and senior fellow, the Harry S Truman
Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Israel.
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