Page 3 of 4 CHINA'S MASSIVE WRENCH, Part 1 Change in the face of foreign devils By Francesco Sisci
development. This is a deep cultural change, confirmed by the official Chinese
rhetoric about stability. When the leaders stress the need for stability, they
are looking for some balance in a situation that has inherently rejected it.
And if everything fails, the government thinks, there must be something to
appease the public. In the West, those appeasements were traditionally sports
and religion.
A sporting life
Public sporting events, attended by both aristocratic and common people, have
been popular since ancient times in the West. The tradition of the Olympic
Games was that all Greek cities would suspend activities so that the entire
population could enjoy the
events in the spirit of uniting all citizens through common cultural and mutual
interests.
The spirit of the Roman circus was the same. Patricians and plebeians would
attend to share in the common enjoyment of the show, in the process renewing
the cultural bonds linking the two sections of society. The games had also a
link with war, the other crucial occasion on which the high and the low stood
side by side, this time to shed blood in defense of the common motherland. In
Greece, war was suspended during the games; in Rome, games were a recreation of
war with fights between gladiators.
Sports thus played a crucial political and ritualistic function in creating a
sense of common belonging. This was extremely important as both Greek and Roman
societies were split into separate strata on the basis of birthright. In
Greece, the aristocrats were concentrated in the upper portion of the city, the
Acropolis, and the common people had the lower square of the "agora".
A similar structure could be found in Rome, where the aristocrats were centered
on the senate and the plebeians would live in the lower strata of the "urbs".
Upward movement was possible, but very difficult and uncommon.
This social difference, determined by birth, was very hard to overcome and
created a huge social gap that the common attendance at games or participation
in war helped to bridge.
The system was highly effective. Even now, there are families in Rome claiming
a lineage back to Julius Cesar, living in the same area and the same buildings
for millennia, despite many changes in the ruling elite of the land. The
concept of aristocracy, of blue-blood privileges, was very strong for centuries
in the West. Apart from the many crowned heads of state in Europe, Britain's
House of Lords in London is a modern vestige of the old Roman senate: a group
of grandees - largely chosen by the merits of their forefathers - ruling the
nation of common people.
In ancient China, there were no games or circuses to bond the upper and lower
stratas. However, there were also no birth-determined social divides, and
upward mobility based purely on merit had been encouraged and idealized since
very ancient times.
The Mozi (Mocius), by the philosopher Mozi (470 BCE ca - 391
BCE), possibly the earliest text of systematic philosophy in China, begins its
earliest part (4th century BC) by discussing the importance of promoting
capable people as high officials (Shangxian pian, or to venerate the
wise). It is claimed this is an ancient tradition from the Shang Dynasty (2nd
millennium BC), which in turn was taken from the most legendary ancient Chinese
emperors - Yao, Shun, Yu and Tang - who selected their successors on the basis
of merit, regardless of origin. Shun and Yu had very humble origins.
Confucius, about a generation older than Mozi but referring to the earlier
cultural tradition of Zhou (starting around 1,000 BC), also stressed the
paramount importance of education and upbringing over birthright in the
promotion of officials.
The original and enduring Chinese cultural belief is of a self-made man - the
senior official born out of a peasant family or the top general starting off as
a foot soldier. In this sense, social mobility was encouraged, and this may
have created a strong bond in society.
In fact, as we have seen, there were two channels for upward mobility: the
selection of officials, which was open to all, and the revolution (geming).
The second is particularly important in comparison to Western tradition. Since
the early first millennium BC, there has been a tradition of change (ge)
of the Mandate of Heaven (ming).
Essentially, the idea was that the dynasty would rule until it was overthrown.
The toppling was seen as legitimate when it was successful, evidence that
heaven had withdrawn its graces from one emperor and granted them to another.
The emperor, Son of Heaven, had to hold onto its power. His success in so doing
proved his ritual and religious legitimacy. Large natural disasters and social
uprisings confirmed the waning of heaven's favors.
Besides selected officials, each dynasty had its court of aristocrats -
relatives of the emperor or descendents of the closest comrades of the founder
of the dynasty. They, and the relatives of the senior officials, had varying
influence. But this influence faded with the decades, as the generations grew
away from the original connection. Furthermore, each change of dynasty
completely wiped out the former aristocracy and established a new one. The
Mongols eliminated the Song aristocrats, so did the Ming with Mongols, the
Manchu with the Ming, and the communists with the Manchu.
This created a situation in which there is no aristocratic continuity
stretching back hundreds of years, as there is in Europe. At most, Chinese
aristocrats can claim a lineage of 300 years. Presently, there is no official
aristocracy, but the siblings of senior leaders are called taizi dang (princelings).
However, even they can claim an aristocracy that is less than 100 years old.
This means that social mobility is strong, and aristocracy has not played as
conspicuous and continuous a role as it has in Europe.
Now the communists have started looking to sports - especially mass gatherings
like the Olympic Games that are attended by both common people and senior
officials - to create a new social bond. There are more occasions for the
people to feel a sense of unity. There are also new and old systems for social
mobility: promotion of officials, career opportunities in business, a weak
aristocracy, and more occasions of coming together for sports.
The present attention to sports is still weaker than in the West, often because
of extreme corruption in local tournaments. But there is also a phenomenon
unknown in Western societies: great attention to sports from abroad. Chinese
people love football (soccer) played in Italy, England, Germany and Spain, as
well as basketball from the United States. This appreciation of foreign sports
has also created positive attention for developments in the countries in which
the favored sports are played, almost creating a kinship with the people of
those nations.
Religious to a point
China traditionally has not had a religious system that is comparable to the
monotheistic religions of the West or the polytheistic religions of India and
other countries. There was Buddhist-Taoist lore full of metaphysical
explanations for various phenomena. In addition, there was a system of civil
values without any metaphysics, which we may call Confucian ethics.
Both of those systems were criticized by modernist intellectuals during 1919's
anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement and were then smashed in Mao's times and
replaced with an atheist religion that idolized Mao Zedong. In the early 1980s,
at the end of the Maoist era, China was without any kind of values system,
either religious or civil.
Since then, China has seen a marked return of the traditional Taoist
semi-religious respiratory practice of Qigong (deep-breathing and
meditation exercises). Chinese leaders eagerly practiced this discipline, which
promises an earthly long life. They arranged the return of Qigong masters
(who sometimes were just self-taught), organizing them as sports trainers and
registering them under the Sport Federation. Many Qigong schools
flourished all over the country.
Their popularity increased after the Tiananmen crackdown on the pro-democracy
movement in 1989, when many young people became disillusioned with politics and
went into meditation. Furthermore, in early 1995, Deng Xiaoping had a stroke
and almost died. He was saved, according to Beijing's rumor mill, by the
intervention of revered Qigong masters. This episode obviously helped
increase the popularity of Qigong.
By the mid-1990s, police, soldiers, officials and students were all practicing
various forms of Qigong. Among them, the most successful were members of
the Falungong, a spiritual practice introduced to the public in China by Li
Hongzhi in 1992.
It was well organized with cells, a central committee and a politburo modeled
after the Communist Party. Its set of beliefs was a mish-mash of old and new:
faith in the coming end of the world, the idea that extraterrestrial beings are
among us and have taken the shape of men, the denial of modern science and
medicine, and a strong xenophobic attitude. The last sentiment well suited the
many aging leaders who had joined the party in their youth with nationalist
sentiments.
The Falungong movement grew so strong that it demanded recognition as an
official religion and to no longer be classified as a sport. When it failed to
obtain that classification, followers organized a series of demonstrations in
early 1999, with the support of senior Chinese intelligence and military
officers. The government saw these demonstrations - backed by crucial officials
- as a powerful threat, an attempted coup d'etat, and commenced a gradual yet
merciless crackdown.
This moment was crucial in China for the return of religion. The whole
Falungong episode convinced the party that what was formerly believed - that
there had been too much opening up - was not true. In fact, there was too
little opening up. This had made it
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