Page 2 of
2 SPEAKING
FREELY The peacekeeping dragon is on
safari By Yin He
to the
enhancement of its national strength and provided
Beijing with more resources for increased
engagement in international affairs, including
UNPKO.
The American preoccupation with
anti-terrorism as well as Iran and North Korean
nuclear issues has also led to Washington's
growing acceptance of China's increasing role in
international affairs. In September 2005, the
then-US deputy secretary of state, Robert B
Zoellick, proposed the idea of the Chinese being a
"stakeholder", as a means to encourage Beijing to
"be selectively active and do something
worthwhile" (you suo zuo wei) while
allowing China to continue to maintain its
strategy to "keep a low
profile" (tao guang yang
hui).
China's mindful engagement
approach China's growing interest in UNPKO
reflects its growing flexibility in normative
principles under specific circumstances. However,
such flexibility is far from an absolute
"normative shift". Traditional security is still
the priority of China's national security
concerns.
Compared with internal barriers
such as normative principles, external ones
including the "China threat" theory have even more
negative impact on Beijing's active policy on
UNPKO and present the Chinese leaders with a
dilemma. Although it is willing to shoulder more
responsibilities of a great power for
international peace and security, China also
wishes to avoid being regarded as too "assertive"
by the West.
For example, China has to
date not contributed any PLA combat troops to
UNPKO. Beijing's refusal, which limits the number
of peacekeepers it could potentially contribute,
is not only because of its aversion on the use of
force during peacekeeping operations, but more
importantly, because it is wary of the "China
threat" theory. Beijing is mindful of how the
sight of Chinese PLA combat troops operating
outside its own territory might project a wrong
impression and fuel the mistrust of those who
remain wary of China.
China is also alert
that its increased participation in peacekeeping
at the price of flexibility in normative
principles will attract suspicion or even
hostility from the developing countries as well as
the relevant parties in the conflict-affected
areas. The Darfur rebels' denouncement against
Beijing's enthusiastic deployment of an
engineering unit to Darfur last November implies
that more responsibilities might mean more risks
for the peacekeepers themselves, all of whom are
volunteers, as well as for Beijing.
China
today has ample resources and political will for
peacekeeping. It also has many interests in
peacekeeping. Besides realizing its strategic
agenda as mentioned above, peacekeeping-related
comprehensive training and field practice can
improve the skills and professionalism of
personnel, and contribute to the modernization of
Chinese military and police forces.
In
particular, improved force projection capabilities
can improve China's crisis management response
effectiveness, especially in humanitarian
operations, both inside and outside of China.
International exchanges under the umbrella of
peacekeeping not only present China an opportunity
for it to learn from the world, but also serve as
a good point to integrate China into the
international community.
In particular,
such activities function as a vehicle for China to
improve relations with other key UN plays both in
the UNSC, as well as the other active middle
powers such as Australia and Nordic countries.
Cooperation on peacekeeping has become one
important topic when Chinese leaders meet with
their foreign counterparts and Chinese
peacekeeping facilities feature prominently on the
itineraries of visiting state guests.
Some
may accuse China of blocking the West-advocated
action against Myanmar. Whatever the reasons for
Beijing's use of veto power in this particular
case, China is, comparatively speaking, rarely an
obstructionist at the UN Security Council. Since
its admission into the P-5 in 1971, China has up
until now only used its veto powers six times, far
less than any other P-5. To put things in
perspective, as of the end of 2007, the UNSC P-5
members have used the veto power a total of 259
times. Compared to the Soviet Union/Russia's (123
times), the US (80 times) , Britain (32 times) and
France (18 times), China, has only used its veto
power six times.
In a recent visit to
Beijing, Jean-Marie Guehenno the UN under
secretary general for peacekeeping operations
suggested to the Chinese to consider contributing
an infantry battalion for peacekeeping operation.
For that to happen and in order for Beijing to
become an even more active peacekeeper, the
international community would have to give Beijing
more encouragement and assure the Chinese
leadership that such contributions would not be
treated with suspicion or disdain.
Yin He is associate professor at
the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center in
the Chinese Armed Police Forces Academy. This
paper covers the basic aspects of the author's
monograph "China's Changing Policy on UN
Peacekeeping Operations", which has been published
as an Asia Paper by the Institute for Security and
Development Policy in Sweden. The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not represent
the views of CPCTC, the Ministry of Public
Security or the Chinese government. The author
would like to thank Christopher Len for his help
with this paper.
(Copyright 2008 Yin
He.)
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