China targets more than a
satellite By Patrick M Cronin
China hit more than a weather satellite on
January 11 when it launched a medium-range
ballistic missile into space; it also hit alarms
in Washington and elsewhere.
Recent media
reports highlighting China's growing influence and
successful use of "soft power" failed to
anticipate this abrupt assertion of "hard power".
The missile launch created the largest
space-debris incident in history and gave new
meaning to the phrase "peaceful rise". More
important, Beijing disturbed the
strategic-planning circles of
its neighbors.
Every country will view the
obliteration of a satellite through a different
prism. Although perhaps not intended, one major
effect of the anti-satellite attack was to signal
China's intent to contest US primacy in space, as
well as in the Asia-Pacific, should conflict break
out. Last October, President George W Bush
authorized a new national space policy, which
superseded an earlier policy laid out during the
administration of president Bill Clinton.
Bush openly asserted America's need to
maintain its dominance in space, not least because
the US armed forces rely overwhelmingly on
space-based assets for command and control and
intelligence, and the US military's ability to use
space is seen as a competitive advantage that
should be preserved. The "hit to kill" test with a
kinetic interceptor may have been the result of
mere organizational programmatics, but the
implication left in Washington was that its
supremacy in space was not permanent. China
wants a tranquil re-emergence, but the
anti-satellite test (ASAT) suggests it is willing
to accept the risk of being perceived as a
military threat rather than cede future
superiority in space to the United States. China's
general strategic direction is increasingly a
matter of record. On December 29, just a fortnight
before the anti-satellite strike, China published
its fifth defense white paper. The document
explained that China's high rate of defense
spending was justified, given the expansion of the
country's economy, and necessary given Japan's
reassertion of military power, Taiwan's
intimations of independence, and North Korea's
nuclear program.
China's objective, the
report continued, was to compete with the United
States in what used be dubbed the "revolution in
military affairs". The Chinese report claimed that
it would create a high-tech military by laying "a
solid foundation" by 2010 and making "major
progress" by 2020. Once derided as the world's
largest military museum, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) fully intends to compete in military
might and not just economic power.
In
January 2006, China initiated a 15-year
Medium-to-Long-Term Plan for the Development of
Science and Technology. The plan advances China's
goal of becoming an "innovation-oriented society"
by 2020 and a world leader in science and
technology by 2050. It commits China to developing
indigenous capabilities that will allow it to
leapfrog into leading positions in new
science-based industries by the end of the plan
period. Aerospace is listed as a crucial theater,
lasers as a frontier technology, and manned space
exploration as a critical project.
The
anti-satellite attack was not a complete surprise
to the Pentagon, which had accurately assessed
China's ambitions in space in its 2005 report to
Congress. "China seeks to become a world leader in
space development and maintain a leading role in
space launch activity," the report plainly
asserted. But, as some critics have pointed out,
the Pentagon reports have said that the only way
China could shoot down satellites was with nuclear
weapons.
The ASAT test makes it more
difficult for the US to ignore China's potential
as a peer competitor in space, whether as a
producer of satellites or manned space program or
advanced space-based command and control targeting
capabilities. As assistant secretary of defense
Richard Lawless pointed out after the test, there
is growing concern about China's rapid military
modernization and its expansion into realms beyond
traditional air, land and sea domains, and it is
not certain whether the result will be peaceful.
Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry
belatedly confirmed what the world already knew,
the concern is that the tests suggest there is
even less transparency in Beijing's
decision-making than many thought prior to the
test. Others have suggested that concern over a
possible space arms race might spur closer
dialogue and cooperation. However, the notion of
new arms-control talks to limit space activity
seems challenged by the fact that neither the US
nor China appears interested in more international
constraints on their freedom in space.
An
early indicator of possible Chinese development of
anti-satellite weapons was improvement in
satellite tracking. At present, and as last
month's attack intimates, China's ability to
destroy or disable satellites remains limited to a
kinetic kill by launching a ballistic missile (or
perhaps using a space-launch vehicle armed with a
nuclear weapon). However, one of China's top
research priorities is laser technology, and China
has the technical ability to develop a
ground-based laser ASAT weapon. China asserts that
it wants neither weapons in space nor a space arms
race; a ground-based laser would appear to fall
into neither category.
Perhaps China was
driven to the test by a desire to ascertain the
vulnerability of its growing number of satellites.
The Chinese are launching about 10 satellites
every year and expect to have 100 in orbit by 2010
and 200 by 2020. China has in the past five years
launched its first manned spacecraft, two
remote-sensing satellite programs (Ziyuan-1 and
Ziyuan-2) and an oceanographic research satellite,
Haiyang-1 (HY-1). Moreover, China is developing
micro-satellites.
As noted, the ASAT test
affects countries differently. The US response is
to highlight China's opaque military-modernization
program while seeking cooperation in a variety of
fields - as well as other policy priorities such
as dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons. One
area of potential cooperation that has been
mentioned is manned space activity. While such
cooperation was always likely to be problematic,
the test will make that partnership even more
difficult to consummate. Despite considerable
cooperation between China and the US, space is
likely to remain one of the areas of competition.
Taiwan no doubt will view the test,
coupled with the PLA deployment of some 900-1,000
missiles opposite Taiwan, as added coercive and
deterrent pressure aimed at keeping Taipei from
moving further toward independence. Meanwhile,
many in Japan might see this test as a provocation
designed to separate further China's military
prowess from Japan's. Although Japan has a highly
professional force, it continues to take cautious
steps toward resuming a normal military posture,
in particular avoiding offensive weapons and
power-projection forces.
In short, the
test may be seen as an attempt to demonstrate
China's comprehensive and growing power when Japan
is reconsidering everything from its pacifist
constitution to what to do in the event of future
nuclear proliferation.
We are not likely
to find out soon, but even North Korea's Kim
Jong-il may have been discomfited too. The
anti-satellite launch came only weeks after China
privately chastised North Korean officials for
sowing regional friction by testing missiles in
July and a nuclear device in October. Of course,
an offensive ASAT weapon also would be an issue of
concern for all modern states with independent
satellite programs, including Australia, India and
others.
Dr Patrick M Cronin(Cronin@iiss.org) is director of studies of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies
in London.
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