A number of advanced warships will
gradually in the next two years come into service
in the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN). The bulk of these ships will belong to two
new guided missile destroyer classes called 052B
and 052C. The 052C will be fitted with an advanced
integrated air-defense system, supposedly similar
to the US Aegis phased-array radar display, with a
high capability to engage multiple targets
simultaneously.
Evolution of the
Chinese fleet Chinese shipyards have
already completed two 052C class ships, which are
expected to be commissioned this year. It is
probable that the PLAN intends to bring at least
six ships of this class into service, deploying
them in the three main operative battle groups
that form the bulk of Beijing's fleet. This
strengthening of forces will constitute a notable
improvement in the performance of China's
high-seas forces. The 052C class warship is
equipped with an air-defense system based on a
sensor apparently similar
to the Aegis device and
equipped with an HQ9 surface-to-air missile (SAM),
considered a long-range vertically launched
missile with a 90-kilometer range (56 miles).
The HQ9 will be installed in eight
vertical-launch-system, revolver-like stations
(six forward, two aft), each with six missiles.
Destroyers of this class will also have the
capability to conduct long-range surface war
missions using two kinds of surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs): the HN3 (a modern cruise missile
with a range of 2500 kilometers or 1553 miles and
capable of delivering a conventional or nuclear
warhead) and the YJ12 (a supersonic missile with a
range of 200 kilometers (124 miles). Also, if air
defense will be the main duty of 052C class ships,
the presence of a variable depth sonar array is
expected to give them good anti-submarine warfare
performance.
Deployment of this class is
proceeding parallel with the construction and
acquisition of a number of new surface and
submarine vessels. This emerging situation
suggests some foreign policy scenarios related to
Beijing's moves in the next years.
In
regard to China's surface fleet (currently
consisting of 64 large combatant units: 21
destroyers and 43 frigates), for the next decade
Beijing will be committed to the demanding process
of replacing with more modern units obsolete
ships, that had for so long reduced the Chinese
Navy to a mere coastal fleet. For this reason,
PLAN continues to bring into service units of
Russian Sovremenny class destroyers, while
pursuing the construction of 052B and 052C class
warships, in addition to the construction of a
completely new ship, being built in China's Dalian
shipyard, that is expected to be very large and
loaded with heavy surface armament (probably
similar to Russia's Slava class cruisers).
At the moment, the creation of an
extensive ship-borne air force by building and
deploying aircraft carriers does not seem to have
priority in China. Beijing appears more interested
in studying foreign equipment (as in the case of
the aircraft carrier Varyag, a former Soviet
carrier initially acquired from Ukraine, which is
badly deteriorated and only 70% completed in terms
of becoming militarily operational) and then
proceeding, in the future and without particular
haste, to build its first domestically built
aircraft carrier.
For its underwater fleet
(currently consisting of 57 units: 51 diesel
submarines (SS) and six nuclear powered attack
submarines or SSN), PLAN is following the same
pattern of its surface forces. With significant
help from Russia, PLAN is modernizing the diesel
sub fleet as highlighted by the decision to
acquire eight other Kilo class boats, following
the first four-unit batch purchased during the
1990s; as for Sovremennys, the possibility of
having and deploying top units (in their category)
will enable the Chinese fleet to achieve a
considerable upgrade in both operative
effectiveness and technological standards (in
particular in the sensor and weapon fields).
PLAN, at the same time, is proceeding with
the construction of diesel submarines based on
domestic projects (Type 039 and 039A), which has
been slowed down by a number of problems
discovered in the planning phase. However, in the
next few years, this process will give rise to the
complete replacement of the large but ineffective
diesel submarine force (packed with old
Soviet-design vessels) with a modern and efficient
diesel fleet. The building of the new SSN Type 93
class is proceeding in the same direction; these
vessels, according to PLAN's intentions, should
allow a significant improvement in Chinese
submarine warfare capabilities, especially if the
rumors suggesting that the Type 93 class can
perform like the Soviet Victor III class or even
like the early US Los Angeles class are confirmed.
It is important to note that construction
of the new Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic
missile class submarines (SSBN) is proceeding very
slowly, even if China can now deploy one unit of
this kind (Xia-class).
Regional crisis
and the protection of sea lines of
communication The naval construction plan
as a whole indicates that the duties that PLAN
will be called upon to tackle in the next few
years will be the protection of sea lines of
communication to keep open the "choke points"
relevant to China's trade flow, and power
projection in areas identified as vital for
China's national interests. All these tasks
coincide with China's anxiety to acquire and
protect the necessary natural resources
(especially oil) to sustain the growing energy
requirements of its national industrial system.
Increased dependence on overseas resources will
bring Beijing to require a greater effort by
Chinese naval forces to protect the trade flows
and show the flag in ports of countries that are
considered important trading partners.
Moreover, PLAN will be required to conduct
long-range missions in the open sea to defend
exclusive economic zones and to control areas with
uncertain sovereignty, as in the case of the
Spratley Islands. These isolated islands, situated
in the South China Sea, are claimed by China,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines,
due principally to the rich oil deposits believed
to be located there. The ships commissioned by
PLAN will enable China to conduct missions of this
kind, with the aim of deploying a fleet
overwhelmingly superior to those of all other
Asiatic countries (especially Taiwan) with the
exception of the Indian and Japanese navies, which
Beijing can try, at least, to counterbalance.
The submarine fleet will have the same
duties as surface vessels, but is also expected to
be assigned the hard task of facing the
"traditional" Taiwanese adversary and, supposedly,
coping with US battle groups. In fact, it appears
that Beijing discarded the possibility of
deploying a limited number of aircraft carriers
(which would appear excessive in relation to other
regional navies) since they would have little hope
of prevailing in an engagement with US naval
forces. This explains why China's aircraft carrier
planning and construction is slowing in pace.
Indeed, Beijing now prefers a well-stocked fleet
of diesel submarines and nuclear powered
submarines to have the difficult role of exerting
some deterrence against American ships in case of
a crisis.
Following this path, China will
rise to a respectable level of underwater power,
partially repeating the Soviet strategy during the
Cold War. However, unlike the past Soviet
submarine fleet (essentially dedicated to
attacking NATO forces and protecting bastions full
of SSBNs), Chinese submarine forces seem to be
assigned the role of supporting surface forces -
in their attempts to control sea lines of
communication, with the additional mission of
trying to exert some form of counter-power against
US forces.
In this context, moreover, the
Taiwan issue requires careful examination. In
fact, the expansion and improvement of the Chinese
submarine fleet, especially in diesel submarine
numbers, can give Beijing an additional card to
play against Taipei under the form of a submarine
blockade. Such a blockade is potentially very hard
to neutralize and cope with, even for Taiwan's
respectable anti-submarine warfare forces; this
strategy can exert stronger pressure than
diplomatic threats, but is not comparable to a
real attempt at invasion, hazardous and hard to
carry out - and also fraught with unforeseeable
political and military consequences.
Conclusion The Chinese fleet's
evolution in the coming years suggests that PLAN
will be essentially concerned with protecting sea
trade with the aim of assuring an uninterrupted
flow of energy resources to satisfy the needs most
dependent on overseas resources and safeguarding
sea lines of communication. The enlargement and
modernization of the Chinese fleet will inevitably
alarm surrounding countries and other regional
powers (such as India and Australia) and will
oblige other states to renew their surface and
submarine forces. However, it appears unlikely
that PLAN can, or will, become a force with global
projection (notably far behind the US Navy's
capabilities, or those of the Soviet Navy during
the 1980s) in the next decade.
The chief
missions that PLAN will be called on to perform
are eminently regional, such as power projection
to support claims to areas of dubious sovereignty,
but with rich subsoil resources (such as the
Spratley Islands), to achieve the same operative
capability as the more powerful Asian fleets, and
ability to engage such a demanding adversary as
the Taiwanese fleet (able to perform at high
levels due to continuous acquisition of American
equipment). In relation to US Navy battle groups,
PLAN can, at most, aim for the possibility of
exerting some form of deterrence (especially
through the use of submarine forces), thus
refuting all those who, since the beginning of the
21st century, have imagined American and Chinese
battle groups confronting one another to decide
which state will rule over the Pacific Ocean.
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