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Taiwan independence forces
rejoice
By Laurence Eyton
TAIPEI - The passage by the National
People's Congress of an Anti-Secession Law
authorizing China to use "non-peaceful" means to
prevent Taiwan from establishing de jure
independence from the "motherland" has generated
outrage in Taiwan itself and international
concern. But one group has benefited immensely:
the Taiwan independence movement.
That
this is exactly the reverse of what China intended
is a measure both of how badly thought out China's
action has been and how little it understands
Taiwan.
In Taiwan itself, while the
general public reaction to the law is one of
almost universal outrage, committed supporters of
Taiwanese independence, while fulminating on cue
for the TV cameras, are privately gleeful.
The story of the origin and development of
the law has been frequently told in recent weeks
but each telling seems to miss at least one of the
essential details about Taiwan on which, like
submerged rocks, Beijing has come to grief.
Initially the law was conceived as a
response to Taiwan's Referendum Law, passed in
December 2003. The Referendum Law in turn was the
result of a campaign played with great deftness
and skill by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian,
who drummed up public opinion in support of the
law, and then used the overwhelming public support
to force the opposition parties that controlled
the legislature to pass the law, despite their
decade-long aversion to do anything of the sort.
The opposition had always claimed,
especially when it was in government, that a law
laying down procedures for people to carry out
their constitutional right of referendum might
lead to a referendum on Taiwanese independence -
with potentially disastrous consequences if China
saw this as a casus belli.
If this
argument ever had popular support, by early 2003
it was threadbare. Of far greater public concern
was that the opposition parties had been seen to
be enjoying unprecedented levels of dalliance with
authorities in Beijing and, since they were widely
expected to win the presidential election in March
2004, there was consternation that they might be
engineering a deal with China involving the
sacrifice of Taiwan's de facto independence in
return for installation as the permanent
government of a unified Taiwan province.
Such fears perhaps deliberately
exaggerated what the opposition was capable of
doing and willing to undertake. But they were
deftly used by Chen and his Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) to pressure the opposition into
passing the Referendum Law, if only to show in the
run-up to the election that they were not in
China's pocket.
The law as passed actually
ruled out questions on independence or unification
as being something on which a referendum might be
called. The DPP slammed the opposition for passing
what it called a "bird cage" Referendum Law but,
nevertheless, nobody could be in any doubt that,
once the law was passed, no
unification/independence matter could be decided
without a vote - even if the law had to be amended
to do this.
China radically misinterpreted
the law - though it was not the only one to do so.
In Taiwan, the Referendum Law was plainly aimed at
preventing any reunification deal that lacked a
referendum's democratic imprimatur; the intention
was specifically to prevent the opposition
"selling out" Taiwan should it regain power. China
- and others - mistakenly thought, however, that
the Referendum Law was to be used to try to
further Taiwan independence. Partly this was a
result of misinformation that Beijing was getting
from its friends in Taiwan's opposition parties,
and partly it was the result of Chen and the DPP
making promises - as part of their
presidential-campaign rhetoric - that they in fact
had no chance of keeping. Even if Chen won
re-election (which he in fact did), there was no
chance that the DPP and its allies would win
enough seats in the legislature - a super-majority
of 75% - to initiate the bold changes that Chen
talked of and China feared. And these changes
themselves stopped way short of independence,
though they did chip away at those symbols that
identified Taiwan with China - especially the
constitution, implemented by Chiang Kai-shek in
China in 1947 - much to Beijing's ire.
But
the plain truth, obvious to anybody resident in
Taiwan, and yet obscure and elusive to others, is
that Chen would never call a referendum on
independence, not because of China's threats or
the United States' constraints, but simply because
it would never pass. While fewer than one in 10
Taiwanese wants reunification in the foreseeable
future, prudent thinking among the Taiwanese means
hardline pro-independence support rarely reaches
20% in polls.
Against this background,
Chinese fears of "secession" and US fears of a
"declaration of independence" are tremendously
unrealistic and show an alarming ignorance both of
Taiwan's constitutional processes and public
opinion. A declaration of independence would
involve a constitutional amendment that would have
to be passed by 75% of the legislature and then be
ratified by a National Assembly convened for the
purpose. Given the almost 50:50 split in voting
preferences among Taiwanese, it is extremely
unlikely that the DPP and its allies would be able
to muster this kind of support in the near future.
Perhaps the only thing that could seriously alter
the issue would be the implosion of the
pro-unification opposition parties as a result of
Beijing's trying to force the unification issue -
the strange Newtonian mechanics of cross-strait
relations.
Anti-secession law benefits
Taiwan independence
In this light the whole
idea of the Anti-Secession Law looks unnecessary
and potentially counterproductive. After all,
Taiwanese do want to decide for themselves and
deeply resent Beijing's refusal to acknowledge
that they even have a say, let alone a choice.
What they need to be persuaded of is the benefits
of having a seat at the top table of the world's
economic powerhouse, rather than an economy tied
to a juggernaut the direction of which is utterly
beyond their control. Taiwanese might be
susceptible to a charm offensive, but they will
not be bullied.
The reason for and nature
of the Anti-Secession Law was fundamentally
misconceived from the start. Beijing was led into
this mess by paying more attention to rhetoric,
its self-serving friends among Taiwan's opposition
parties and its own fears, rather than a shrewd
practical assessment of the current situation and
its possibilities. The law was based on a deeply
inaccurate understanding of what the Chen
government could do and what the public would let
it do.
The law became all the more
unnecessary when, after serious miscalculations by
Chen in the run-up to legislative elections last
December 11, the DPP and its allies failed to
secure the majority of seats in the legislature
that had been widely expected, leaving the
ostensibly pro-unification Kuomintang (KMT) and
People First Party (PFP) in control, and severely
cramping Chen's ability to proceed with even
relatively innocuous moves - such as changing the
names of Taiwan's representative offices abroad,
which go by a variety of odd names and pseudonyms,
to include the word "Taiwan".
Then, in
late February, Chen actually reached a consensus
with PFP leader James Soong to try to cobble
together enough momentum in the legislature to get
important bills passed. The cost of this to Chen
was the repudiation of almost his entire
presidential-election platform - at least where it
involved Taiwanese "nation-building" and Chen's
name became anathema to the independence crowd -
an "apostate", one pro-independence newspaper
called him.
It is no exaggeration to say
that the fortunes of the independence lobby were,
in late February, at their lowest for more than
four years. That there is a new buoyancy in the
air is entirely due to China's insisting on
pushing through the Anti-Secession Law.
The immediate benefit in domestic politics
is that the opposition parties no longer have the
strength to hold up a massive arms-procurement
budget that has been the subject of bitter
controversy. In 2001 the US agreed to sell Taiwan
an arms package including anti-submarine aircraft,
Patriot missile batteries and eight diesel
submarines. The package is currently worth about
US$15 billion.
The pro-unification PFP and
KMT have opposed the weapons purchase, arguing
variously that the weapons are unnecessary, don't
work, are not what Taiwan really needs, or will
fuel a cross-strait arms race, and that the money
should be spent on social programs instead.
These arguments did not resonate with
voters and there was a widespread feeling that the
US was milking Taiwan for the benefit of the
defense-contractor friends of US President George
W Bush's administration.
When US officials
said the weapons purchase was a sign that the
Taiwanese were willing to take responsibility for
their own defense and failure to buy the weapons
would result in a lessening of US enthusiasm to
help Taiwan in a crisis, even some in the
pro-weapons, pro-independence lobby talked of
"gangster-like tactics" and "extortion". Meanwhile
Taiwan's dithering over the weapons purchase sent
Taipei-Washington relations into a tailspin -
somewhat unfairly, because the inability to get
the budget for the purchase passed by the
legislature was certainly not the fault of the
Chen administration.
In the wake of the
passage of the Anti-Secession Law and the
tremendous public anger this has generated in
Taiwan, it is hard to see how the opposition can
stall the weapons-procurement budget any longer.
It is not even clear, as massive street protests
against the Anti-Secession Law are planned for the
weekend of March 26, that it could stand in the
way of the passage of some kind of riposte to
China, such as an "anti-annexation law" proposed
by the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union
(TSU) or an "anti-invasion" law proposed by the
DPP.
The TSU and DPP motions are almost
pastiches of China's law, even utilizing its odd
vocabulary - including the memorable euphemism
"non-peaceful means" - but substituting key terms
such as "secession" and "independence" with words
like "aggression" and "unification".
Other
repercussions dear to the hearts of the
independence lobby include the scuppering of talks
about direct cross-strait air-cargo flights -
building on the architecture for cross-strait
links laid down for the ground-breaking Lunar New
Year direct charter fights for businessmen to
return to Taiwan. Independence supporters tend to
dislike the idea of direct links because they
dislike anything that is likely to tie Taiwan's
economy more closely to China's.
Shunting
Taiwan's special arms budget through the
legislature and stalling direct links could hardly
have been Beijing's intention. But there has also
been, from Beijing's point of view, a far graver
unintended consequence, namely the decision of the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, a
deputy-ministerial-level forum, on February 19, to
list the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic
objective" for both the US and Japan.
While Taiwan's mention in the report was
of "blink and you could miss it" briefness, it has
nevertheless been labeled by some analysts in
Taipei the most important diplomatic event for
Taiwan since the passage of the Taiwan Relations
Act by the US in 1978.
Others have also
pointed out that that the US appears to have
abandoned its long-touted policy of "strategic
ambiguity", while Japan's actually naming
strategic interests that conflict with China's is
seen as a remarkable departure from its
long-established norm.
Nobody in Taiwan
thinks the joint statement is a blank check for
Taiwan to pursue independence. But it is a very
pointed message to China about where the interests
of the regions' two most powerful players lie.
Some commentators in Taiwan were shocked
at the apparent betrayal of Taiwan's interests
shown in former US secretary of state Colin
Powell's televised remarks last November to the
effect that Taiwan did not enjoy legitimate
sovereignty. If the US wanted to remain a power in
East Asia, they argued, it had a clear strategic
interest in Taiwan's remaining out of the grasp of
the People's Republic of China and it was high
time that the US admitted this, instead of
currying favor with Beijing at Taiwan's expense.
That on the heels of Powell's comments
Beijing announced that it was pressing ahead with
the Anti-Secession Law lent weight to claims that
the US, in its efforts to deter Chen Shui-bian's
perceived independence drive, had been too
accommodating to China. As private contacts
between Beijing and Washington through December
and January failed to deter the Chinese side, the
February 19 statement was the sharp corrective.
But it involved a quietly stated commitment to the
security of the Taiwan Strait that was beyond
Taiwan's wildest dreams three months ago.
The Anti-Secession Law seems, therefore,
to have been dogged by the law of unintended
consequences. In Taiwan it has increased
pro-independence sentiment - polls after the
passage of the law this week showed a rise of 5
percentage points - and passage of the law gained
more supporters for Taiwan's arms budget;
internationally it has caused the US and Japan to
clarify their intentions regarding the Taiwan
Strait - which are not to China's advantage; while
the law itself is curiously empty, making no more
than the usual threats about what might provoke a
"non-peaceful" response that China has been
uttering for more than a decade. No wonder that,
behind their angry rhetoric, Taiwan's independence
supporters are smirking.
Laurence
Eyton is deputy editor-in-chief of the Taipei
Times. He has worked in Taiwan for 18 years.
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