SPEAKING FREELY Secession bill shows China's
wisdom By Zhiqun Zhu
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Though
the timing may be surprising to some, China's decision
to go ahead with the legislative procedure to enact an
anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan has been widely
anticipated in recent years, given that the Taiwanese
authorities have led the island further away from the
Chinese mainland politically and culturally.
Several considerations may be behind Beijing's
high-profile announcement of the proposed law, which
comes one week after Taiwan's legislative elections.
First, as President Hu Jintao gradually
consolidates his power, he and his team are testing new
territories in China's domestic and foreign affairs.
China's foreign policy is being transformed from passive
to active. This is demonstrated in China's recently
spotlighted activities in its relations with Japan, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, Latin America, and European Union countries.
Chinese scholars such as Zhang Nianchi, director
of the East Asia Institute in Shanghai, already proposed
enactment of a unification law back in 1999 after
Taiwan's then-president Lee Teng-hui departed from
Taipei's long-standing cross-strait policy and announced
his explosive "special state-to-state relationship"
theory to describe cross-strait relations (counter to
the one China policy).
But it was after the
complete power transition from former Chinese president
Jiang Zemin to President Hu Jintao in September that the
Chinese government started to seriously consider passing
a law to prevent Taiwan from slipping away without any
hindrance. The fourth generation of Chinese Communist
Party leadership has exhibited new thinking in both
domestic and foreign affairs. A new law attempting to
rein in Taiwan separatist tendencies, as well as
possible new policies toward Taiwan, are only natural if
the new Chinese leadership wants to achieve any
breakthrough in the cross-strait political stalemate.
Second, while officially China still adheres
to Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" policy,
Chinese leaders realize that the policy does not sell
well in Taiwan. Perhaps newly elected legislator Lee Au
is the only prominent Taiwan figure who embraces this
policy. If Taiwan eventually rejoins the Chinese
mainland, it will most likely take place under a
different scheme. Cross-strait relations have changed so
drastically since the late 1990s that if Deng Xiaoping,
who died in 1997, were still alive today, probably he
himself would propose some new plans in dealing with
Taiwan, given his record of pragmatism.
The
passage of a new law regulating relations between Taiwan
and China is indeed a testament to the flexibility of
current Chinese leaders to face reality and change a
failing policy.
Third, From Beijing's perspective, the
enactment of an anti-secession law is defensive
legislation in response to frequent provocations by
Taiwan's pro-independence leaders. That the new
legislation will be called an anti-secession law, not a
unification law, is significant. The title of the law
itself will defeat any accusations from Taiwan that this
law is destabilizing and challenging the status quo
across the Taiwan Strait.
This law is tailored
to counter the independence movement in Taiwan. Radical
pro-independence forces seemed to have reached a point
of no return in Taiwan. Frustrated, Beijing has
scratched its head for quite some time. In the end,
Beijing decided to pass an anti-secession law, not a
unification law, which might be considered as an attempt
to unilaterally change the status quo. Beijing wants to
send a strong message to pro-independence forces and put
oral warnings against independence into legally binding
words. At the same time, Beijing does not want to appear
to be aggressive or eager to retake Taiwan anytime soon.
The angry and seemingly indignant responses from
Taiwan's pro-independence parties and politicians have
been expected. But the relatively moderate reaction from
the Kuomintang and the People's First Part indicates
that Beijing's proposed new law is measured and
necessary.
Fourth, this law is also aimed at the United
States. Since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) by the US Congress in 1979, the United States has
routinely cited articles in the TRA in order to defend
its weapons sales to Taiwan. Few realize that the TRA is
a US domestic law; a domestic law does not and cannot
supercede international agreements the US has reached
with other governments.
Some argue that the
three joint communiques between the United States and
China are just policy statements by the two countries,
whereas the TRA is "the law of the land" in the US. But
can one country justify its objectionable foreign
policies with a domestic law to another party to the
joint agreement? Just imagine if every country were to
justify its policies based on its own laws while
disregarding international agreements, what kind of
world would we live in?
Obviously, China would
hope that the United States will not continue to use the
TRA to justify its weapons sales to Taiwan, especially
when these arms sales are often misunderstood by
pro-independence politicians in Taiwan as America's
endorsement of their irresponsible behavior. Realizing
America's long-term interest in China and Taiwan, China
does not challenge America's position in Asia through
passage of this law. What this anti-secession law is
against also is opposed by the United States. Since the
United States and China share a common interest in
maintaining stability and the status quo across the
Taiwan Strait, the anti-secession law should be
palatable and acceptable to Washington.
The law
will also confirm China's pledge to the international
community that it desires to maintain the status quo
across the Taiwan Strait.
Contrary to many
pundits who reason that China may feel relieved from
Taiwan's recent legislative elections since the
pro-independence camp suffered a major setback, China
has never relaxed its vigilance against Taiwan
independence. This can be sensed from the harsh rhetoric
by Chinese generals and Beijing's spokesperson for the
Taiwan Affairs Office after Taiwan's legislative
elections.
Apparently China is not in a hurry to
unify with Taiwan, and a forced unification by military
means does not serve anybody's interests. But while
Beijing is focusing on economic growth, Taipei wants to
take the opportunity to seek permanent separation, often
in the name of democracy. Beijing's restraint has often
been misconstrued as impotence and being a "paper
tiger".
However, passing an anti-secession law
is relatively easy for Beijing. What is difficult is
winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese public.
When China argues that this anti-secession law is a
defensive measure, the world waits to see whether and
how Beijing will launch any new charm offensives to lure
Taiwan back.
Zhiqun Zhu, PhD, is
assistant professor of international political economy
and diplomacy at the International College of the
University of Bridgeport, Connecticut. He has researched
and written extensively on US-China relations and
cross-strait conflicts.
(Copyright 2004
Zhiqun Zhu.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
