Submarines: Obsolete symbols of national
pride By Eric Koo Peng Kuan
SINGAPORE - The great naval theorists Alfred
Mahan and Julian Corbett stressed that a navy serves two
important functions for a state - to project naval power
overseas, and to protect maritime commercial interests.
And so medium- and great-power states maintain
formidable fleets comprised of aircraft carriers,
destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and, of course,
submarines.
The submarine - that vessel and its
crews romanticized in the films Run Silent, Run
Deep and Das Boot (The Boat) - faces the very
real danger, a technological depth-charge, of becoming
obsolete and totally redundant in modern navies.
Probably, it already is obsolete, more a relic of
national pride and prestige than an actually effective
weapon or weapons platform.
No matter - China,
Taiwan and other nations are still eagerly buying and
building submarines, electric, diesel and nuclear. These U-boats,
however, would be virtually useless in the narrow
and shallow Taiwan Strait, detected by ships and aircraft
with high-technology and then destroyed. And they
are virtually useless elsewhere, with scant exceptions.
Originally conceptualized as vessels designed to
travel underwater, submarines became the naval
equivalent of land-based special forces designed to raid
deep into the enemy's rear territory. Submarines employ
ambush tactics, hitting ships unaware by being out of
sight on the sea's surface, and utilizing the element of
surprise to the fullest in modern naval doctrine.
In World Wars I and II, first-generation
submarines employed simple torpedoes and large-caliber
anti-aircraft machine guns as their main weapons. During
the Cold War, submarines could also equipped with cruise
missiles or ballistic missiles that could be armed with
nuclear, chemical or biological warheads in order to
enhance their lethality. Submarines thus became mobile
launching pads for ballistic missiles at sea. However,
surface ships also have missile-launching capabilities,
and in fact, have proved to be much more militarily
effective and cheaper than submarines.
The
invention of radar, however, and subsequently satellite
surveillance technology from the United States, meant
that the advantages of being submerged were negated
totally. Surface ships are easily able to detect
submarines if they are equipped with such technology,
which is not excessively expensive and is
cost-effective.
The ability to travel underwater
thus becomes a naval liability, as nautical design meant
that submarines might not be heavily armed, nor as
heavy, as surface warships. With the invention of depth
charges, and then anti-submarine torpedoes, surface
warships have become more than a match for submarines
simply by having superior firepower, and the option of
calling in air support to bomb the menacing submarine.
Submarines are sometimes used in reconnaissance
roles of locating enemy ships, but aircraft and surface
ships are better and more effective choices. In the case
of the US Navy, with its satellite technology, US
submarines have become redundant and unnecessary for
this task.
Thus, the only combat role left to
the submarine is that of harassing defenseless civilian
ships and naval support vessels. However, international
maritime laws governing the conduct of naval warfare
prohibits hitting certain ships, such as hospital ships,
supply ships bearing humanitarian aid, as well as ships
from countries neutral in a conflict. The international
outrage and diplomatic repercussions of states violating
this rule far outweigh the strategic advantages of
attacking such surface ships.
So that leaves
submarines theoretically with only insignificant
targets, such as patrol boats and enemy submarines to
attack. They could, of course, try to attack major
combat vessels but as stated, advanced technology makes
submarines far from effective.
In truth, modern
maritime security problems lie in the threat posed by
non-state actors such as pirates and maritime
terrorists, not from other conventional state navies.
Early detection and pursuit capabilities are much more
important than stealth and firepower in maritime
patrolling work. In the case of the Malacca Strait,
which is jointly patrolled by navies from Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia, visible and above-board naval
activities and trust among the nations are the more
necessary to achieve naval objectives, deterring and
capturing pirates and maritime terrorists. In this
respect too, submarines are not useful; their underwater
operations become redundant to those of surface ships;
their presence in the jointly patrolled waters may
arouse the suspicion of other nations.
In
practice, submarines in a naval arsenal play more of a
deterrent role and are prestige symbols of national
pride, signaling that a state has reached a
sophisticated level of national wealth and military
technology. Submarines are like the luxury goods owned
by states, stylish but of little practical use. A case
in point is the arms race for submarines by Taiwan and
China. In a potential future conflict, the most likely
battleground would be the narrow Taiwan Strait. Yet,
with its shallow seabed, and with such close proximity
of coastal bases, aircraft and other surface vessels,
the Taiwan Strait is the last place a submarine should
be. Indeed, if hostilities break out, any submarine
found in the Taiwan Strait would quickly be reduced to
mincemeat by the the enemy's concentrated firepower.
The brutal and illegal practice of the German
Kriegsmarine submarines, which destroyed numerous
merchant ships during the two World Wars, has not been
forgotten and has served as a classic lesson of
effective submarine warfare to those rogue nations
undeterred by international opinion. However, more
heavily armed surface ships provide better protection
for unarmed ships by providing escort. But in practice,
the ratio of combat vessels to merchant or support
vessels is far smaller, making the policy of naval
escort not very feasible. Thus, submarines could help
offset this ratio, should a need for naval escort arise.
Other than as a deterrent and as an occasional
naval escort, it is hard to imagine what other use there
is for submarines in a world where conflicts are
increasingly becoming land-based and the security
landscape of nations is moving more towards
unconventional, low-intensity wars and terrorism. Like
cavalry or chariots, the submarine is fast joining the
ranks of obsolete weapons in the history of warfare.
Eric Koo Peng Kuan is a freelance
writer who holds a master's degree in strategic studies
from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies
(IDSS) in Singapore.
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