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Why China-North Korea ties are still
strong
By Jaewoo Choo
TAIPEI
- Whenever an international crisis involving North Korea
breaks out, the question arises: What is China going to
do? Answering that question is one of the most daunting
challenges to observers and analysts of Korean Peninsula
affairs as well as Chinese foreign affairs. Some are
willing to guess the answer, but no one can do so
confidently, because of the lack of transparency in
China's foreign-affairs decision-making process - not to
mention North Korea's.
Other than the diplomatic
rhetoric found in public statements, how the Chinese
leadership really perceives North Korean affairs, or
really views North Korea, is relatively unknown. This is
because what goes on in the internal circle of debate
among the Chinese leaders is kept behind walls higher
and longer than the Great Wall. So another question
naturally ensues: Can we utilize the way China practices
diplomacy in its relations with North Korea as a source
of analysis? If so, is it possible to trace any
practical evidence that would substantiate the Chinese
leadership's favorite claim of "lips-to-teeth" relations
when describing the bilateral relationship with North
Korea?
Many analyses and pundits have relied on
China's status as North Korea's sole ally to prove this
point. However, when there is a crisis, and when it
seems that China does not have the leverage to make
North Korea comply with the international community's
demands, doubt is cast on whether the bilateral
relationship is really as intimate as claimed by both
Beijing and Pyongyang. China's seemingly insufficient
ability to manipulate the Hermit Kingdom, despite its
status as Pyongyang's only friend on this planet,
provided a new orientation for interpreting the
bilateral relationship. Nonetheless, when Beijing
succeeded in persuading Pyongyang to show up at the
discussion table it set up in April and August this
year, there was a deep sigh of relief from many,
including the leaders of the surrounding nations of the
Korean Peninsula.
A set of questions still
remains, despite China's highly laudable diplomatic
endeavor. Is China a mere conduit for communication with
North Korea? How close a relationship does China really
have with its isolated neighbor? What stance does
Beijing have on the two Koreas? Is the equidistance
policy still at work or does it view the entire
peninsula as a single entity, for which it has a single
policy? Does China still regard itself as an ally to
North Korea at all? And how are we supposed to measure
these factors in realistic terms beyond mere theory?
We may be able to infer answers to these
questions on current affairs from the way the Sino-North
Korean relationship has worked previously in the world
of diplomacy. In other words, some long-forgotten, and
overlooked, factors should be retrieved to aid our
analysis.
Ideology still
matters
Sino-North Korean relations are still
between two socialist states, if not communist. We are
often misled by China's miraculous economic
achievements, and the degree of the reform it has
realized in its economic systems and institutions. It is
a misperception, however, to think of China as a
capitalist, or nearly capitalist, society. It in fact
remains one of the few communist states still in
existence. While its economic side has been liberated,
its politics have not. From this perspective, ideology
as a tool for political communication is still a
determinant in Chinese domestic politics and foreign
relations.
Indeed, Chinese leaders' perception
of the world has substantially changed since the
country's opening to the outside in 1978, a fact vividly
shown in their official diplomatic documents and
statements. The magnitude of this change has seemed to
allow them to free themselves from the ideological
shackles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in their conduct of
foreign policy. While they may be doing so with those
nations that are dominantly market-capitalist and
democratic in nature, however, Chinese leaders still
observe a great deal of their traditional communist way
of conducting diplomacy with their socialist
counterparts.
One peculiarity is that China
still attaches great importance to party-to-party
relations over relationships at the state level, a
hardly noticeable factor in its diplomatic conduct with
non-socialist states. The scope of these party-to-party
relations has undergone a serious revision in terms of
definition and concept, just like the change in the
leadership's perception and understanding of the world
and the international system. However, the nation's
domestic and foreign affairs are led and dictated by the
Communist Party.
Such diplomatic practice is
clearly transmitted in the titles of personnel. Such
titles appear differently in reports in different
languages, and according to the readers for which the
reports were produced or translated. For example, in the
Chinese and North Korean press coverage of the summit
between Kim Jong-il and Jiang Zemin, the two leaders
were identified as the general secretaries of their
respective Communist parties. In South Korea, however,
the papers would have dubbed Kim the chairman of the
central military committee, while in the West, the media
would have styled Jiang as the (then) president of
China.
The personal touch
Ideological
ties notwithstanding, it is crucial even among socialist
states to maintain their ties through periodic
consultation. High-level exchanges of visits by heads of
state serve the function of developing the relationship
between the respective states, and sometimes
fence-mending when policies differ sharply. In the case
of China and North Korea, a close relationship was
maintained by four decades of personal contact between
Kim Il-sung and the Chinese leaders.
After Kim
Jong-il came to power in Pyongyang, coupled with
generational changes in the Chinese leadership, ties
between the two countries seemed to go off track,
especially when Beijing formally recognized South Korea
in 1992. According to some studies, however, it did not
take long for Beijing to shore up its relations with
Pyongyang after it established ties with Seoul. As
evidence of this, Chinese premier Li Peng, in his report
Gongzuo baogao ("Work of Government") presented
at the second session of the Eighth National People's
Congress on Mach 10, 1994, declared that the
relationship between China and North Korea had been
completely restored. Furthermore, once the two nations
reassumed high-level exchanges beginning with an
official visit by Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the Standing
Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, to Beijing
in 1999, the Sino-North Korea bilateral relationship
began to achieve a balance against that of China and
South Korea.
A valued alliance
China
and North Korea remain official allies, bound by the
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
ratified in 1961. States join an alliance as a result of
perceived benefits being greater than the assumed costs.
Once states join an alliance, they will continue to have
to undergo an extensive bargaining process to maximize
shared interests and to cope with security challenges
posed by a common enemy.
It is in this respect
that it would be safe to assume that China will continue
to abide by its responsibilities and obligations as an
ally as stated in the treaty of 1961. One of these
obligations is economic support to North Korea.
According to Article 5 of the treaty, "The contracting
parties ... will continue to render each other every
possible economic and technical aid in the cause of
socialist construction of the two countries and will
continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural,
and scientific technical cooperation between the two
countries." In the statement, released at the conclusion
of Chinese parliamentary head Wu Bangguo's visit to
Pyongyang in October, it was again confirmed that such
cooperation would continue for the foreseeable future.
In short, it is safe to assume that, for now,
the Sino-North Korea alliance is still effective and
valid. Although there may have been a slight shift and
change in the Chinese position with regard to the issues
involving the North as well as the peninsula as a whole,
there is still plenty of evidence substantiating the
validity of their alliance relationship. This includes
mutual cooperation in safeguarding the peace in the
region as indicated in Article 1, mutual effort in
confronting security challenges (Article 2), and mutual
agreement on the way the Koreas should be unified
(Article 6).
Some may view the Sino-North Korean
alliance as developing in an asymmetrical way, with
costs on China's part far exceeding the possible gains
just to keep an effective alliance. Nonetheless, as long
as China believes it can achieve what it seeks from the
alliance, the alliance will remain in effect. This will
be so particularly if China continues to see as
attainable the foremost goal of its foreign policy, that
is, maintaining a stable and peaceful international
environment in its neighboring regions for its economic
development.
As long as there exist shared goals
and interests between China and North Korea, ideology
will remain the force binding the alliance. Some may
argue that ideology is a fading factor in Chinese
foreign policy, as shown in the recent calls by a couple
of Chinese scholars for the nullification of Article 2
of the Treaty of Friendship, which guarantees China's
automatic intervention at the breakout of a crisis on
the Korean Peninsula. That view is endorsed by other
Chinese experts as they characterize Sino-Korean ties as
in the process of transformation from party-to-party to
state-to-state relations. Nevertheless, the fact that
China practices its diplomacy with North Korea
differently than with other states is a clear testament
to the role of ideology and tradition as the former
places significant value on being an ally to the latter.
The alliance, therefore, will continue to exist, if it
is effective in maintaining the balance of power outside
of, and not the symmetry within, the alliance system.
Jaewoo Choo is assistant professor at
the School of International Relations and Area Studies,
Kyung Hee University, South Korea.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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