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Illusions and political spin in
Taipei
By David G Brown
(Used
by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
In
Washington, there is concern that mixed messages to
Taipei from within the Bush administration, Congress,
think-tanks and paid consultants may be creating
confusion about US policy toward Taiwan. A four-day
visit to Taipei in early December confirmed that US
policy is being seen through politically tinted lenses
and transmitted to the public by a bewildering array of
official spin-masters, party-affiliated papers, six
24-hour news channels and more than a dozen political
talk shows. While some seasoned analysts have an
accurate reading of US policy, the politically charged
presidential election campaign is occasioning some
serious illusions and misperceptions of US policy.
Despite frequent media attention to US
government statements concerning Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian's campaign moves, there is a widespread
impression, particularly among those sympathetic to
Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), that
US-Taiwan relations are as good as ever. Washington's
concerns about Chen's referendum and constitutional
initiatives, US-Taiwan differences over intellectual
property rights (IPR) and other trade issues,
frustrations over the pace of Taiwan's defense
procurements and Washington's concerns over Chen's
apparent disregard for US interests seem to get filtered
out to leave a rosy picture of the relationship. But
why?
One factor is a perceptual time lag. Old
impressions from 2001, the first year of the Bush
administration when US-Taiwan relations were better than
at any time since diplomatic ties were broken in 1978,
have not been updated to reflect current events.
President George W Bush's April 2001 statement that the
United States would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan
defend itself remains the dominant element. The US
Defense Department's (DOD) steadily growing support for
Taiwan's defense is good news that is easily remembered.
And, in this campaign season, it is natural that Chen is
emphasizing the positive as he did during his New York
transit when he repeatedly called the United States
Taiwan's best friend. Unfortunately, these elements are
not the whole picture and the public illusions are
neither accurate nor a sound basis upon which to sustain
the relationship.
What is more surprising and
dangerous is the view heard across the political
spectrum in Taipei that the Bush administration favors
Chen's re-election. Repeated official statements of US
neutrality in the election have not registered. One
might speculate that the United States actually favors
the Pan-Blue ticket led by Lien Chan because its
platform proposals for economic revitalization,
non-provocation of Beijing, restoration of cross-Strait
dialogue, and the facilitation of cross-Strait economic
ties are quite compatible with US policy. So why is the
opposite view prevalent?
The most important
explanation is the way Chen's New York transit was
portrayed in the Taiwanese media. The picture was that,
despite his recent statements about a new constitution
to make Taiwan a normal and complete country, Chen was
treated extremely well by the US government. Chen
himself repeatedly noted that the treatment he received
in New York was better than on his previous transits.
This was interpreted in Taipei as support for Chen and
his policies. The fact that the planned meeting of a
senior State Department official with Chen in New York
was dropped got lost in the positive media coverage.
Adding to this impression were press reports
that American Institute in Taiwan chairwoman Therese
Shaheen had told Chen in New York that Bush was his
"secret guardian angel". Not surprisingly, Chen repeated
this remark to the Taiwan media on his return trip to
Taipei. People in Taiwan understandably have difficulty
distinguishing between the free-speaking Shaheen's
private and officially authorized comments. The
international human-rights award that Chen received in
New York made him look like the pro-democracy candidate,
when in fact all candidates are vigorous proponents of
democracy in Taiwan.
Then there is the question
of how the recent string of increasingly explicit US
policy statements on Chen's referendum and
constitutional proposals have been heard in Taipei. The
hard-hitting statement that National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice made shortly after Chen's announcement
of his plans for a new constitution, including Rice's
call for Taipei to abide by a "one China" policy, has
all but been forgotten. When deputy assistant secretary
of state Randall Schriver gave a balanced restatement of
US policy, it was his message addressed to Beijing -
that the use of force is unacceptable - that got the
headlines in Taipei. Essential as that message was, his
message addressed to the Chen administration - that
Taipei should avoid provocative steps or moves to
unilaterally change the status quo - was buried down in
the text. Similarly, when State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher reiterated US policy concerns in very
explicit terms on December 2, his remarks were played
down by the Presidential Office spokesman as nothing
more than what one would expect the United States would
have to say on the eve of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's
visit to Washington. While it is hardly unusual for a
campaign organization to hear what it wants to hear and
to spin US statements to serve its interests, the result
is confusing and is misleading the Taiwan public about
US policy.
The public picture is further
confused by conspiratorial speculation about secret back
channel messages from "friends" in Washington who
reportedly advise discounting official policy
statements. The conspiratorial speculation is buttressed
by right-wing media attacks in Washington on officials
responsible for conveying Bush's policy. One theory,
said to be widespread among Legislative Yuan members, is
that the United States secretly supports Chen because he
is the candidate who can ensure Taiwan's continued
separation from China, which is believed to be the
hidden US agenda.
Washington is struggling to
address these misperceptions and to get through the twin
messages that Beijing must not use force and that the
Chen administration should avoid provocative steps that
would unilaterally change the cross-Strait status quo.
The recent exceptional series of explicit public
statements was supplemented by a detailed
not-for-attribution briefing given to Hong Kong's
Phoenix TV by a senior US National Security Council
(NSC) official. According to media reports, NSC Asia
director James Moriarty made a discreet visit to Taipei
on December 1 to meet with Chiou I-jen, the Presidential
Office secretary general and Chen's campaign chief, and
to deliver a private message from Bush.
Nevertheless, these misperceptions seem
deep-rooted, and the campaign will likely occasion
continuing self-serving political spin about US policy
that could affect the electoral outcome. More will need
to be done. True, on Tuesday Bush added his
unquestionably authoritative voice to cautions about any
unilateral steps to change the status quo, and he did so
in a way that should make it clear that Taipei does not
have a blank check that could drag the United States
into a conflict with China. However, official statements
will need to be backed up by actions, such as
adjustments in the pace and scope of US defense
cooperation that send a clear political message that
there will be costs to ignoring stated US policy. It is
particularly important that such actions not be so
subtle as to be invisible to the public because it is in
the public arena in Taiwan that the seriously misleading
perceptions of US policy exist.
David G
Brown is associate director of Asian studies and the
School of Advanced International Studies of Johns
Hopkins University. He can be reached at dgbrown@jhu.edu
. This article is used by permission
of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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