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China's self-defeating North Korea
gamble
By Marc Erikson
US
Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent Northeast Asia
trip (Japan, China, South Korea) probably was comforting
in some respects. No one openly contradicted him or
questioned his motives as has become commonplace with
"Old Europe" allies France and Germany. Japan even
promised support for a second United Nations resolution
on Iraq. Still, when it comes to the acute regional
problem of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic-missile
armaments, precious little was achieved. Like the United
States, the Northeast Asians want a peaceful solution,
but - much like North Korea - they want Washington to
find it and talk directly, bilaterally to Pyongyang. The
US sharply disagrees with such a bilateral approach and
sees the nuclear standoff as a multilateral issue.
It is, of course. Not only some 90,000 US
troops in South Korea and Japan, but also South Korea's
and Japan's major population centers are at risk from
North Korean missiles capable of delivering nuclear or
biological and chemical warheads. And while China does
not face a missile threat, any military conflict on the
Korean Peninsula or the collapse of the Pyongyang regime
would confront it with serious strategic-economic
consequences. Among regional powers only Russia, which
wants to play a role without any real means of doing so,
has nothing substantial to gain or lose.
So, how
will this play out? When the Europeans and the UN proved
incapable of dealing decisively with the mid-'90s ethnic
cleansing crisis in the Balkans, the US stepped in and -
with the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) - got it sorted. But Washington is
determined not to see a repeat of this bizarre scenario
in which regional powers abdicate the responsibility for
cleaning up their own neighborhood only to turn around
later to badmouth the United States for acting as global
sheriff. It wants South Korea, Japan and, in particular,
China to step up to the plate and go to bat rather than
being compelled to act alone and shoulder the blame
should something go wrong.
In this game, short
of outbreak of hot conflict, China stands to lose the
most if it fails to act. Powell has reported that
Beijing is undertaking quiet steps to get Pyongyang to
see the light. But to date there's little evidence of
that. Since Powell left Beijing, North Korea - to greet
new South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun - has
flight-tested a new type of cruise missile, not an old
China-model "Silkworm" as originally reported. It has
also started up the five-megawatt Yongbyong nuclear
reactor. "Typically at times of inaugural festivities,
most nations send flowers or bouquets or visiting
dignitaries. North Korea sent a short-range cruise
missile," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer quipped,
adding that the missile launch fitted a pattern in which
North Korea "engages in rather bizarre actions and then
expects the world to pay them or negotiate with them to
give them something in exchange for stopping what they
shouldn't have done in the first place ... North Korea
will not be rewarded for bad behavior, they should not
expect any types of financial inducements as a result of
their actions. This is a regional issue for the nations
in the region to deal with."
China prefers the
status quo - or rather status quo ante North Korea's
now-revealed new nuclear activities - to any other
outcome. It wants a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. It
also wants two separate Koreas, with the North at least
partially under its influence and a strategic card to
play. But if it doesn't act decisively to contain Kim
Jong-il's dangerous antics, it will find itself
confronted with a radically different situation.
Japan can only tolerate aggressive North Korean
behavior up to a point. That point would likely be
reached with another longer-range missile launch on the
model of the 1993 and 1998 Nodong and Taepodong tests.
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has already threatened
preemptive military action. And on February 16, Japan
and the US decided to start a series of joint missile
defense tests next year. Those tests, to be conducted
off Hawaii, will involve missile interception both from
the ground and Aegis-equipped destroyers (Japan now has
several of those). The tests will cost about 20 billion
yen (about US$170 million), 10 times the amount
Japan spent on theater missile defense (TMD) programs
this year. Development of a full-scale TMD system will
cost 1 trillion to 1.3 trillion yen, and those funds are
now being allocated. According to a defense official,
TMD "will pose no constitutional problem because the
experiments are designed to cope with situations in
which the possibility has greatly risen of missiles
hitting Japanese territories and waters, for which Japan
can exercise the right of self-defense".
China
to date has not publicly reacted to the announcement of
the joint US-Japan TMD exercises nor - to my knowledge -
has it complained about Japan's plans to develop its own
reconnaissance-satellite system. But that's just a
matter of time or timing. Any TMD system capable of
covering the Koreas from Japan is equally capable of
covering Taiwan - to China's certain chagrin. By not
acting on the North Korea threat now, China is inviting
a militarily more assertive and capable Japan neither it
nor the rest of Asia will be happy with.
China
must also be aware that by failing to rein in firmly,
while at the same time not helping to stabilize North
Korea, it might well be faced with a sudden catastrophic
collapse of Kim Jong-il's realm. You consider this
unlikely? Let me remind you of one of former German
chancellor Helmut Schmidt's more famous predictions.
Asked at an early October 1989 Hamburg forum when German
unification would occur, he said "some time between 2010
and 2020". The Berlin Wall, of course, came down three
weeks later. Under similar circumstances in Korea, China
would have to be prepared for a massive flood of
refugees and in the aftermath would have to endure other
unpalatable economic consequences. China last year
became the principal destination for South Korean
foreign direct investment. Overnight unification would
of necessity divert virtually all such investments to
North Korea and disrupt fast-growing trade flows.
When the International Atomic Energy Agency
board recently voted to submit North Korea's nuclear
violations to the UN Security Council, China - unlike
Russia - voted in favor. But since taking that step
toward multilateral action, China has backtracked and
wants the US take up the burden alone. This will not
happen. China is by far the largest food and energy
provider for North Korea. It has more clout (albeit
perhaps diminished) and influence with Kim Jong-il's
regime than anyone else. By its calculated reluctance to
act, it is inviting strategic consequences that put its
standing in Asia and the fragile Northeast Asian
security system at risk.
(©2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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