As the dust settles over the Fergana Valley, Russian foreign policy analysts in
Western Europe and the United States are wallowing in a state of bewilderment.
Despite then-acting President Roza Otunbayeva's call for Russian involvement
during the ethnic riots in southern Kyrgyzstan, Moscow rejected any plans to
deploy troops into the fray.
The Kremlin's reluctance to increase Russia's military presence in the former
Soviet republic has thus been interpreted by several analysts as a sign of
weakness. However, this rushed conclusion is based on flawed presumptions on
Russia that should have been retired long before the end of the Cold War.
The Russian Federation is more than capable of defending its interests in the
former Soviet space (or its "near abroad"), but it
will not act beyond what is absolutely necessary to preserve its dominance. It
is this strategic decision to lie quiet that many analysts have confused with
frailty.
Even the Economist of London on June 24 declared that Russia's "neo-imperial
ambitions" had succumbed to the "rock of reality", and that the largest country
in the world (by area) was an "empty empire". The Economist's position reflects
two questionable premises that many analysts have taken for granted about
Russian foreign policy: first, that Russia actively seeks an imperial dominion
over the former Soviet space withstanding its real interests; and second, that
Russia extends its political influence solely through military coercion.
When Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev was ousted from power on April 15,
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko questioned the raison d'etre of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if it were unable to prevent
"anti-constitutional coup d'etats" in member states. (The members are Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.)
This criticism was undoubtedly directed at the Russian Federation which, as a
key member of the CSTO, maintains a military presence at Kant air base not far
from the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek.
However, it seems as though Lukashenko has forgotten the original purpose of
the CSTO. The Tashkent Treaty that led to the foundation of the CSTO in October
2002 never obligated the signatory states to become involved in the internal
affairs of other member states. In of itself, the CSTO simply ensures
non-aggression among participating states through the prevention of aggressive
military alliances outside the treaty.
Nonetheless, the opinion of Minsk captured the preconceptions of many analysts
who expected Russia to act paternalistically during the ethnic riots in the
Fergana Valley.
However, the non-intervention of the Russian Federation in the months-long
political and ethnic crisis in Kyrgyzstan is an indicator that the Kremlin does
not see the CSTO or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a vehicle
for re-dominating the region. (The CIS is a regional organization whose
participating countries are former Soviet Republics, formed during the breakup
of the Soviet Union. Its current members are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Ukraine.)
During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) the Boris Yeltsin administration
experienced the heavy cost of intervention in an ethnically-charged domestic
conflict and only managed to cease the violence when former foreign minister
Yevgeny Primakov met with his Iranian counterpart to establish what eventually
became the "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord
in Tajikistan".
For the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, there were no suitable countries to fill the role
of Russia's partner; the United States was unwilling to divest from Afghanistan
and China was equally unwilling to engage anything beyond its western province
of Xinjiang.
Furthermore, recognizing Uzbekistan's discomfort over a Russian proposal to
establish a CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force base in southern Kyrgyzstan
last year, Russia is unlikely to spend political capital to serve the interests
of a state that has been unreliable with its promises, especially regarding the
American air base in Manas.
What may seem puzzling to outside observers is why President Dmitry Medvedev
(or rather Prime Minister Vladimir Putin) did not utilize Russian assistance as
a bargaining chip to ensure the eviction of the American air force from the
Manas base. It was definitely an option when the ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan
were at their peak.
While some interpret the extension of the American lease of the Manas Transit
Center (air base) as a decisive failure on the part of the Kremlin,
re-monopolizing its military presence in Central Asia may not have been a
crucial priority for the Russian Federation.
The continuation of operations in Afghanistan is in some part dependent on
Manas as it remains one of the most crucial entry points for coalition troops
going to Afghanistan. Considering the cordial relationship between the Taliban
and Chechen separatists (along with other radical militant groups in the
Caucasus), Russia still has much to gain from the continued American military
presence in Afghanistan.
Russia also has additional reasons why it is not too concerned about its
political influence in the Central Asian republics. Russia's geographic
position makes it a vital transit territory for republics that are dependent on
the export of natural resources. While exercising monopsony in some Central
Asian natural gas and oil markets, Russia is also the dominant provider of
electricity and remains the most crucial financier for hydroelectricity
development in the region.
Recognizing Kyrgyzstan's heavy dependence on hydroelectricity and Russian
investment, Bakiyev attempted to attract investment from other countries.
However, despite inroads by energy hungry China, Russian electricity companies
like Transneft will undoubtedly play a major role in the economy of Kyrgyzstan
for years to come. [1]
Otunbayeva's new government, regardless of its intentions, will find itself
heavily dependent on the export of hydroelectricity to Russia and thus having
to work with Moscow extensively to secure economic stability in the aftermath
of the civil disorder. Russia is well entrenched as the dominant regional
power, whether or not it chooses to maintain a military presence in Kyrgyzstan
or to help Bishkek re-establish domestic order. It does not need to act like an
imperial power to retain that privileged position in the region.
This is certainly not to suggest that Russia does not retain a notable military
force. Despite the annually diminishing number of healthy conscripts in the
army, the Russian armed forces still maintain their edge on the frontiers of
missile technology.
Particularly worrying to the American navy is the "Sizzler" variant of the Klub
missile (3M-54E). In March this year the Pentagon officially admitted to having
no adequate defense plan against this new Russian anti-ship and anti-submarine
missile, admittedly a difficult feat against a weapon that can curve around
islands and accelerate from the speed of sound to three times that speed while
fragmenting into several deadly projectiles. Dan McNamara, a program manager
for the US Navy, estimated that the US may produce something capable of
countering the "Sizzler" only by 2014.
Other worries for the American fleet include high-speed "cavitating" torpedoes
that travel two to three times faster than regular torpedoes, which makes them
difficult to detect. The most widely distributed "cavitating" torpedo is the
Shkval type produced by the Russian navy.
This challenge to the US's supremacy of the seas holds serious ramifications.
What happened to the South Korean frigate Cheonan, allegedly sunk in
March by North Korea, is an example of how modern warships are still extremely
vulnerable to torpedo attacks. In times of rapid arms development, the Russian
Federation has gained significant political leverage by being capable of
supplying and transforming disgruntled technology-poor nations into sizeable
naval powers.
Furthermore, having successfully flown its first prototype fifth-generation jet
fighter, the Sukhoi T-50, in January this year, the Russian air force, in
conjunction with the Indian military, may soon be producing warplanes that
rival the F-22 Raptor. The Russian military maintains an incredible array of
firepower that makes it an indispensable political and military player in every
region along its vast borders.
Accepting the premise that Russia is an imperial power whose only foreign
policy tool is its military would naturally result in the notion that Russia
must have become significantly weak not to have taken advantage of Kyrgyzstan's
plight.
However, to get a more accurate sense of Russia's position, one must shed these
preconceptions in the face of Russia's neo-realist approach to Central Asia and
its diverse socio-economic means of securing its interests abroad. Russia is a
realist world power administered by rational foreign policy makers in the
Kremlin; this is a basic "rock of reality".
Note
1. Sabonis-Helf, Theresa, Power and Influence: Russian Energy Behavior in
Central Asia Competition and Change Volume 11, Number 2 (June 2007):
199-219,
Yong Kwon is a Washington-based analyst of international affairs.
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